THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

No. 1 OCTOBER 1961 NEW SERIES VOL. V

THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE

THE FORTY-FOURTH Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, from 25-29 July, 1961. This annual gathering for the advancement of liberal religious thought, for study and social fellowship, has survived the vicissitudes of two world wars and the gloomy forebodings of those who have been saying for the past thirty years that its day was done.

The Conference this year was fortunate in its congenial and comfortable location in St. Hilda's College, and the pleasure of those attending was due in no small measure to the admirable arrangements made by the domestic secretary of the Conference (Lady Kathleen Oldfield) and her assistants. There was a good attendance of resident members, supplemented on this occasion by an unusually large number of visitors attracted by the calibre of the paper readers and by a general interest in the subjects and aims of the Conference itself.

At the opening session a tribute was paid to the late Dr. H. D. A. Major, the founder and spiritual father of the Modern Churchmen's Conference. He it was who convened the first Conference at Ripon in 1914 and organised thirty-one conferences before his retirement in 1948.

The Bishop of Birmingham, the President of the Modern Churchmen's Union, welcomed the conference members and spoke of the new heart and vitality that was evident in the Union. Our Conference theme 'Christ and Human Need' was chosen (at our President's suggestion) to explore the pastoral concern of the Church for human need in all its aspects. The following papers were read, all of which are published in this Conference number:

The Christian View of Human Nature: The Rev. Norman Pittenger, S.T.D., Professor of Christian Apologetics, General Theological Seminary, New York.

The Meaning of Social Health: L. J. Barnes, Esq., M.A., Head of Department of Social and Administrative Studies, Oxford.

Moral and Religious Values in Education: J. T. Christie, Esq., M.A., Principal of Jesus College, Oxford.

Man in an Industrial Society: The Rev. Canon R. S. O. Stevens, Vicar of St. Paul's, Birmingham, and Rural Dean of Birmingham City. Bishop of Birmingham's Industrial Chaplain, and Director of Bishop's Industrial Mission.

Liturgy and Community: The Very Rev. F. W. Dillistone, D.D., Dean of Liverpool.

Psychological Research into the Origins of the Conscience: Michael Argyle, Esq., M.A., Lecturer in Social Psychology in the University of Oxford.

Christianity and Sexual Ethics: The Rev. D. Sherwin Bailey, Ph.D., Rector of Lyndon, Rutland.

The Resources of Christ in the Healing of Mental Pain: Dr. Frank Lake, M.B., D.P.M., Psychiatric Consultant, Nottingham. Lecturer in Clinical Theology.

Personal History and Christian Preaching: The Rev. A. O. Dyson, B.A., Assistant Curate of Putney.

Truth and Christianity: The Rev. E. F. Carpenter, Ph.D., Canon of Westminster.

Wide ranging and varied as the subjects were, it was only possible in a single conference to touch upon a few aspects of human need and the Christian response to that need. The new sciences of psychology, psychiatry, and sociology are opening up new fields of human knowledge which the Christian Church and the Christian Minister must take account of in the 'cure of souls'. We must be ready in these fields 'to sit down before facts as a little child' and to follow the argument where it leads as open-mindedly and as courageously as our forebears did in the fields of historical and biblical studies.

In a valuable article, *The Relevance of Liberal Christianity*, in the *Hibbert Journal* for July 1961 Dr. T. A. Roberts writes:

> 'Hitherto there has been precious little evidence of an awareness that the next great battle which the Church has to face will not be on the old battlefields of science versus religion, or philosophy versus theology —theologians like generals dearly love to prepare for the next war on the pattern of the last—but on the entirely new field of Sociology. If the struggle is to be at all even, the Church will need men of the intellectual calibre of the nineteenth-century Liberals, men daring and courageous enough to accept new knowledge from any quarter, and capable of rethinking the Christian message in the light of this new knowledge.'

The Conference papers and the discussions which followed them indicate our awareness of this struggle and our readiness to engage in it. New knowledge must be welcomed from every quarter and not least from the fields of the social sciences. A Christian apologetic for today must take them into account. But 'man shall not live by bread alone' and the in-

tellectual task of the older generation of liberals in emancipating men's minds from biblical and scientific obscurantism is a continuing task. Part of human need is a need to understand. In our technological age many dismiss Christianity because they simply do not believe it to be true. Herein lies the coherence of such apparently unconnected subjects as 'The Meaning of Social Health' and 'Truth and Christianity' in a Conference on 'Christ and Human Need'. The pastoral concern of the Church embraces body, mind and spirit. Although it is true that

> 'New occasions teach new duties: Time makes ancient good uncouth
> They must upward still, and onward, who would keep abreast of Truth',

yet the ground won in the past must be secured while new advances are made.

THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

By the Revd. W. Norman Pittenger, S.T.D.
Professor of Christian Apologetics at the General Theological Seminary in New York City.

I am greatly honoured by the invitation to give the opening paper at this conference of the Modern Churchmen's Union, the first conference which I have been able to attend since the nineteen-thirties. The last paper which I presented at a Modern Churchmen's conference was in 1936, when with my friends the late Revd. J. R. C. Webb and Dr. Douglas Richardson, I participated in a discussion of the significance of Jesus for the present age. Today I shall speak, as I have been asked, on the Christian view of human nature, in the hope that what I say may provide the setting for the other papers which we shall hear at this year's conference.

Some time in the late twenties or early thirties, I was at a Student Christian Movement meeting at Swanwick, at which Dr. Georges Florowsky, the Russian theologian, was a principal speaker. I have always remembered one remark of Dr. Florowsky: 'You can best understand what a religion thinks about God and everything else, if you first discover what that religion has to say about man'. In this respect, then, our topic is of crucial importance, for (if Dr. Florowsky was right, as I believe he was) the Christian interpretation of human nature will open up to us, as we proceed, the way in which Christian faith sees the nature of God, the purpose of creation, the meaning of revelation, and the consummation or fulfilment of the divine intention. 'What is man?' is a question which sooner or later turns us away from the specificity of the phrasing to the widest possible affirmations about ultimate reality and the significance of derived or creaturely reality.

In our contemporary world there are many definitions of man. He is an economic animal; he is a social being; he is sexual; he is the religious creature; he is even, as I think St. Thomas Aquinas remarks somewhere, the animal who laughs. Most of the popular ways of describing man are true so far as they go, or at least they contain important elements of truth; but it seems to me that most of them are very partial, very limited. It is certainly true, for example, that man is the victim of whatever economic laws, say of supply-and-demand, there may be; it is also true that man is in many respects an animal who seeks for and requires animal fulfilment. On the other hand, man is able to 'deal firmly', as a friend of mine once put it, with some so-called 'economic laws'; and he is to greater or less degree a rather peculiar animal in that he is possessed of rationality. So it goes . . . and my suggestion here is simply that we recognise the truth in much of what is said about man in the light of the various sciences and systems of our day, but that we refuse

to confine him to the proposed definitions. Above all, for us who are concerned with matters of faith and of religion, it is important to avoid one of the most dangerous partial definitions: that man is a 'spiritual being.' He *is* that, but he is much else; and I suspect that one of the reasons for at least some contemporary revolt against religion is that too often the clergy, and religiously minded laity, have talked of humankind in altogether too 'spiritual' a way, forgetting so much else that is in fact true of every man who has ever lived.

What, then, does the Christian say about human nature?

I should like to set this down under several headings and then speak briefly about each of them. Here are the headings: 1. Man is a dependent being; in Christian language, 'it is God that hath made us, and not we ourselves.' 2. Man is an unfulfilled being; in Christian language, 'God has made us for himself.' 3. Man is a social being; in Christian language, 'we are members one of another', naturally as men as well as spiritually in Christ. 4. Man is neither soul or mind alone, nor body alone, but is an organism of body-soul or mind-body; in Christian language, he is made 'of the dust of the earth' and into that dust has been breathed the life which comes from the Spirit of God. 5. Man is a sexual being, in a sense far deeper than is true of other creatures; in Christian language, 'male and female created he them.' 6. Man, as we know him, is in defection from his deepest intentionality and unable of himself to achieve his proper fulfilment; in Christian language, 'he is a sinner.' 7. Man can be restored to himself, re-integrated or made whole, and thus fulfilled; in Christian language, he may be enabled 'both to perceive and know what things he ought to do, and also may have grace and power faithfully to fulfil the same.' 8. Finally, man is not totally fulfilled or completely explained in the terms of this present world, but has before him further possibilities of development and growth; in Christian language, after this life he may have 'the fruition of thy glorious Godhead.'

Something like this, I believe, sums up the Christian view of human nature. But it requires one further affirmation, which I shall not discuss in this paper because to do so would lengthen it beyond your endurance: man also possesses some measure of genuine freedom with its corollary of some measure of genuine moral responsibility. Man is, one might say, 'creaturely freedom'; without that, apart from that, disregarding that, nothing else of importance can be said about man, by Christians or anybody else; and it is a merit of modern existentialists, including non-theists like Heidegger and Sartre, that they understand and insist on this truth about human nature.

So we now turn to the first of our affirmations. Man is a dependent being; he does not explain himself, he did not bring himself into existence, he cannot keep himself in existence, he requires that which is not

himself in order to be himself. He is not *in*dependent. It is most unfortunate that a great many people who would accept this fact in a general way are unable to accept it in its specifically Christian phrasing because it is still associated in their minds with the literal acceptance of the story of man's creation as told in Genesis. One of our important duties, as I think, is to be much clearer, and much louder, in our insistence that the Genesis story is of the nature of myth and that no theological conclusions are to drawn from it which presuppose its historical factuality. The Christian assertion is that man depends, not only on a presumed 'First Cause', but also always and everywhere upon the sustaining power of the creative ground of being. Further, that man is constantly dependent upon more proximate realities—family, friends, food, shelter and the like, history, the accumulated wisdom of the race, nature and its products, the whole created order in so far as it impinges upon him. All these are, so to say, surrogates for his ultimate dependence, which is upon the Ultimate, upon Reality itself which is the final dependability, the 'enduring strength of all creation', the final determiner of destiny cosmic and human. To pretend that he is independent, self-explanatory, able of himself to be himself, is both vain and stupid. It is the root of man's trouble in the world; in the traditional language of moral theology, it is the pride (*superbia*) which is the aboriginal sin of man. Baron von Hügel, great lay-leader of the Roman modernists even though later he became in many Roman eyes the protagonist of modern orthodoxy, spoke often of 'a humble sense of creatureliness.' He was right; this awareness of our created dependence is for the Christian the motif which qualifies all his thinking and doing.

But it is time to go on to the second affirmation. Man is an unfulfilled being. He has been described as an 'unfulfilled capacity'. He is made with and for a purpose. The Christian would say that man is made in 'the image of God'; and that the deep intentionality in his making is for him to find his fulfilment by finding fellowship with God. *Tu fecisti nos ad te, domine, et inquietum cor nostrum adhuc requiescat in te.* I have quoted St. Augustine's words in their Latin original because I wish to correct the usual mistranslation of them which makes Augustine say that man is made 'for God'. Surely what he meant was that man is made 'towards God', the force of the Latin *ad* being movement to an end indicated by the noun which follows the preposition. So we can say that man in his creaturely existence is made to push on towards the fulfilment of his capacity; because he is dependent finally upon God he is made to drive towards that relationship with God, in communion and fellowship, which alone will bring to flower the potentialities which are given him in his creation. For the Christian, then, true fulfilment is to be found in God alone, although once again other realities may serve as surrogates for that end. As *surrogates*, as *agents* and as *means*; it is when they are

set up as ends in themselves, as substitutes for God, that they become demonic in their effect and distort the life of the one who rests in them. Any good reality, less than God, can well serve as a means towards him; it is, alas, equally true that any such reality, in place of God, can pervert human life and bring it to tragic loss. Even religion can do this; and in the course of Christian history there have been instances enough to make us very wary of the modern heresy which would substitute religion for God.

St. Augustine spoke of the human heart as *inquietum*, disquieted, until it finds its true rest in God. *Inquietum* is, I think, a very good word. It expresses, in Latin, what is true in the claim of modern existentialists that 'anxiety', *angst,* is part of the very existence of man in his alienation from the truth of his being. Why is this? I take it to be explained by man's being made to move towards fulfilment and to find his purpose in that movement, and yet being unable in and of himself to reach that fulfilment. Unless man moves towards fulfilment, he is less than man; he is but a sophisticated simian. Unless his movement is ultimately towards God, his restlessness reflects his serious, sometimes his terrifying, falling-short of that for which he exists. *Ersatz* fulfilments are dust and ashes. Francis Thompson's 'Hound of Heaven' is often dismissed nowadays as flamboyant and exotic, but there have been few more eloquent expressions of the truth that 'naught satisfieth' man that does not lead him to fulfilment in God. But once again we need to be careful lest we appear to insist that such fulfilment necessarily involves the acceptance of conventional patterns of theology. One does not need to call the Reality which thus fulfils human life by the name 'God', although this is the hallowed word for that Reality. An authentic Christianity will welcome God's *incognitos*, wherever they may be, whatever they may be; it will only claim that whatever thus tends to real fulfilment, integrating a man through some mastering concern which takes possession of him, is the work of him whom we call God, a place and point where God's action is known and something of his nature becomes transparent to us.

I wish to link these first two points with the Christian conviction that man is 'made in the image of God'. That phrase means more than mere reflection, as in a mirror; it means the active and energizing capacity given to man, as a creature, to live with integrity as the 'created second' of the God who made him. It is the heart of our Christian faith that our Lord Jesus Christ is the 'Express Image' of God; in him manhood is truly fulfilled; he is God's 'idea' of man; he is the manifestation in concrete human life of God's intention in creating man 'towards himself'; he is 'what God is up to' in respect to manhood. He is this because in him there is made actual, real, vivid and clear, what is potential although unrealized or barely realized in the rest of us. He is the Truth about man, placarded on the pages of history. In his being this Truth about man, he

is also the Truth about God, *vis-à-vis* man. For in him, as in all true fulfilment, it is not of and by man alone that the deed is accomplished. God is first; he is *always* first. Thus Christian faith dares to say that here is not only a human deed; here too, and here first, is God's deed humanly speaking. God so energized in this life which he himself had purposed and intended, that those upon whom it made and makes its impact have been obliged to say that here in this humanity God lived and wrought in man, as man, and for man, as nowhere else and as never before. This, I take it, is what the 'divinity of Christ' really means; and this is what, when taken in combination with recognition of the genuinely human conditions in and under which God thus acted, is what the doctrine of the Incarnation means. God's focal presence and action in the Man Christ Jesus is no mere rescue expedition of sinful man from his appalling situation; it is primarily, I am convinced, the coronation of God's continuing and consistent activity to bring about the fulfilment in man of that intention with which he created and creates him.

In the third place, man is a social being, living in deepest commonalty with his human brethren. I trust that I shall be pardoned if I do not dwell on this truth, so apparent to us nowadays. We are all 'bound together in a bundle of life'; no 'man lives unto himself', and more and more we understand how, as Mr. Auden has told us, this means that 'We must love one another or die'. This Christian recognition of man's social nature, which is the natural reason for the existence of church as well as state, has very close relationship to the fourth assertion: man is an organic unity, body-soul or mind-body. Here the most recent developments in medical science, for example, are constantly offering confirmatory evidence of the biblical and Christian understanding of man. We are not animals only, although we have animality in us; we are not angels, either, although we can think, aspire, value, love, worship. Gabriel Marcel has protested against the saying 'I have a body' and has insisted that in a very profound sense it is more true to say 'I am a body' . . . although that is not all I am.

In its teaching concerning 'the resurrection of the body' the Church has been saying something like this, especially as it concerns life beyond physical death; but once again we must be on our guard lest this be understood to mean what our beloved Dr. Major once described as 'a resurrection of relics'. The truth here is simply that man is not sheer soul, but embodied spirit and inspirited body; what he is and does in that bodily existence determines what he is, to a very large degree, and implies that some appropriate 'embodiment', not of flesh and blood but 'as it pleaseth God', is given man for whatever existence is his beyond this world of time and space. We must recognise and value our materiality, even while we reject materialism, just as we must recognise and value our spirituality, even while we reject spiritualism (and I am not here referring

to the cult called by that name, but to excessive and improper emphasis on man's non-material existence). Here once again is a task for Christian preachers and teachers and thinkers, both in what they have to say about men generally and in what they have to say about our Lord particularly. And here, too, in this Christian understanding of man's organic psycho-physical being is a natural reason for the use of sacramental means of worship and Christian nurture, and the vindication of our traditional emphasis on the Holy Communion as central to our relationship, as psycho-physical beings, with the divine Reality in whom alone we can find fulfilment of our creaturely potentiality.

Our fifth point is that man is a sexual being. I remember that on one occasion, when I said just this at a conference of university undergraduates, someone retorted, 'So are apples'. Of course they are; but man is sexual in a different sense from an apple—and from an ape, too. Because man is all that we have been saying, he is different from apples and apes; so is his sexuality. Human sexuality is much more than a biological drive for the propagation of the species, accompanied by such pleasant feeling-tones as shall make it very attractive. The truth is, I believe, that human sexuality is intimately related to the self-fulfilment about which I have spoken. Man's biological instinct is taken up into his yearning for that fulfilment and thus given a new significance and even a new direction. Furthermore, man's sexuality is linked with his being a psycho-somatic being, a being who in his movement towards fulfilment must employ his body as well as his mind. So we can say that man is so made that his chemistry, biology, and psychology are all part of him, as well as his spirituality. As a biological animal he moves towards fulfilment; so also in his psychological and spiritual life. And these are all one. Now if man is *for* fulfilment in God, he is also a creature who seeks fulfilment in community with his fellows, for he is a social being as well. The whole of man's embodiedness is included in his urge to fulfil himself in God, through various surrogates and means; and this suggests that his human sexuality is a means for deepening his relationships with others through the other to whom in faith he gives himself, to the end that in this sharing of life which we call love he may also find fulfilment in that Supreme Other we call God. Human sexuality is part of the double-truth about man: he is embodiedness and he is social; he is also made for a relationship with God which will complete his life.

This, I believe, is the insight (perhaps unconscious) which is behind the common Christian understanding of marriage as sacramental in some real sense. It is not only sacramental in that physical means are employed for spiritual purposes; it is also sacramental in that the *whole* relationship of marriage is deeply symbolic of God, a representation and an effectual sign of the love which is God-given and *is* God. Thus we can see why the Christian, with such an exalted view of the basic significance

of human sexuality, recoils from its abuse or misuse. Here is not only distortion of personal relationships; here, much more seriously, is blasphemous substitution of lust, or animality, for the love which is from God and which is God. Human sexuality is a *good* thing; its vulgarisation is a horrible thing, for in that way the fullness of personal relationship, as a means of mutual help towards fulfilment in God, is denied or lost.

And this leads us straight into the sixth Christian affirmation: that man is in defection from his true self, that he is a sinner. Despite the popular misunderstanding, in North America at least, which thinks that the Church identifies 'sex' with 'sin', the Christian view of human nature, whilst recognizing that sin or defection is much wider in range and scope, has also seen that there is no one area in which man's prideful assertion of self against creaturely dependence on God can more terribly manifest itself than in sexual relationships. St. Augustine exaggerated incredibly, but what he exaggerated remains true: misuse or abuse of sexuality can be taken as a ready symbol of man's sinfulness. What St. Augustine saw, and exaggerated, Freud has also seen, and exaggerated. We can learn from both of them, even when we carefully correct their exaggerations.

But, as I have said, sin means much more than this. I shall not here discuss the theological nuances, save to say that in my judgement the whole position needs re-thinking, especially in the way in which 'inherited sinfulness' is understood. If we use the 'Fall story' at all, it must be as a story told about each one of us, not as an historical account of how sin came into the world. But what is true of each one of us is that there is a defection from the excellence which is the divine intention for us, that we are caught in this together with our fellows, and that we need help. We are 'twisted in upon ourselves', in Luther's phrase (*incurvatus in se*); we deprive ourselves of the good which in principle is ours; we lack power to strive towards it and we have enfeebled eyes hardly able even to see where and what it is. This does not mean that man is a *massa perditionis*, totally corrupt. It does mean that he is in defection all along the line. We need not accept the ultra-Augustinianism of some contemporary theologians to see the truth in that statement. Indeed we can do, nowadays, with a healthy dose of Pelagianism as a corrective to excessive theological gloom. But we must recognize the situation for what it is, especially in these days when non-Christians like Arthur Koestler in England or Lionel Trilling in the United States are insistent to the facts.

Sin, I should suggest, is whatever prevents man's movement towards true fulfilment in God; it is ultimately a religious concept, because ultimately it has to do with God and his will for man, which is precisely this fulfilment. But the sins—in the plural—which we commit are

usually not 'religious sins' at all; and our best way to bring their sinfulness home to men is to point them to the places where they do in fact sin: in home, school, business, relationships with others. And yet, with the most realistic acceptance of the truth about us and about our situation, we dare not forget that we are *still* God's children, *still* grounded in him, *still* made in his image (however we have damaged it), *still* possessed of an unfulfilled capacity for him.

It is in this context that I approach the seventh Christian assertion: that man can be restored, that (in Christian language) he can be given the capacity to 'perceive and know what things he ought to do', and can be given also 'grace and power faithfully to fulfil the same'. This Christian assertion is based on that which has been 'determined, dared, and done' (in Christopher Smart's fine words) in Jesus Christ our Lord. In his life, which was a truly human life, where God's Self-Expression or Word or *Logos* for men is focal and decisive, something has been accomplished. What Professor Tillich has called 'the new being in Christ' has been realized in actual and concrete fact in this human world of ours. Now it is for us to enter into, appropriate, accept, and realize, that which has been done. I have protested against the view which would regard the Incarnation as essentially a 'rescue-expedition'; but that Jesus Christ does 'rescue' us is the plain testimony of two thousand years of Christian life. There *is* atonement; and it is found in our being brought into at-one-ment, to use the not too happy jargon of the day before yesterday, with God in Christ. Of course most of the atonement theologies, as they stand, are incredible and sometimes horribly sub-Christian in their conception of God. But the experienced reality to which they testify—that through Jesus Christ men have found deliverance from whatever they believed, in their own time, to be their worst defect, and however they may have phrased the way in which this deliverance was accomplished—is unquestionably a fact. My own theory of the atonement would be a combination of Abelard's (and Hasting Rashdall's) so-called 'exemplarism', which is a poor name for so great a view, and the ontological grounding in the very structure of reality of what was done in Christ; but my theory is so far undeveloped and would not interest you. What matters is that through union with our Lord in faith, by prayer and communion, by seeking to follow 'the blessed steps of his most holy life', by acquaintance with him in the Scriptures, we may indeed grow in grace towards true fulfilment, more and more coming to see the will God has for us, more and more finding ourselves enabled to do that will, more and more becoming 'en-Christed' men.

But not completely in this present life; which is the eighth and last point. For God has indeed 'set eternity in our hearts'; there is more for man than this world can provide, a richer fulfilment than time and

space can offer. Hence there is a sense in which Christianity's view of human nature must always include a note of 'otherworldliness'—*not* 'next-worldliness', mind you, for that would imply what Professor Bethune-Baker once rightly denounced: the putting off to another and succeeding world of our imagination of that which we ought to be doing in this present world where we now are. For the Christian, I believe, this present existence, in which man may move towards fulfilment in God, is shot through with 'bright beams of everlastingness'—better, of 'eternity'. Even now he lives, in part, in heavenly places. Even now he shares, in part, the vision of God. Even now, although partially, the Kingdom of God is among us. I said 'partially', but I should have used the Pauline word *arrabon*, as an 'earnest'. Here already we have a foretaste of that fulfilment of human nature, both personally and socially, of which St. Augustine spoke in the lovely words that come at the end of *The City of God*: 'There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise. This is what shall be in the end without end. For what other end do we propose to ourselves than to attain to the Kingdom of God of which there is no end?'

May I apologize for the informality, as well as for the over-simplicity, of this outline of the Christian view of human nature? I am able, I assure you, to speak and write in the theological jargon which so often obscures the truth of Christian thought; my students in New York, as well as those who have read some of my books, can testify to this horrible thing. But I have thought that at this conference you would prefer simplicity and informality, at least at the opening session. In any event, the Christian view of human nature can be quite plainly stated, and in one sentence: Man needs Christ, and in Christ we have been given, through no merit of our own, that which man needs.

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL HEALTH

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Section 1

In talking about social health, I want to discuss how mental health, conceived as a functional condition of individuals, is related to a particular quality of the social order within which individuals live their lives. To this quality I attach the provisional label social health, and this paper tries to describe what is meant by the term.

Mental health, as a personal quality, is a term in common currency and probably has no paradoxical ring to it. The same cannot be said of social health. If one is to speak of health as a quality or condition of society, you will quite rightly ask to what sort of society the attribution can be made. In the last resort I suppose the only answer is that one refers to the world order as a whole. Certainly one can judge, for purposes of rather loose comparison, that one country, or one cultural group, or even one civilization exhibits more of social health than another. One can judge also that some social customs or cultural traditions are more conductive to social health than others. But this is hardly more than saying that the incidence of specific social disorders varies in different parts of the world and at different periods of history. Moreover, in a world where global interdependence has developed to the point it has in ours, political boundaries and lines of cultural cleavage can no longer be used as frontiers at which the spread or the contraction of social health can be controlled. On these grounds I am inclined to urge that the matrix within which social health subsists can be no less than the world population, all partakers in the comity and antipathy of nations, all citizen-colleagues in the service of world order. This implies, in turn, that the concept of social health must in principle take into account all subgroups of which the world population is composed.

Our problem, therefore, is a comprehensive one. My approach to it is twofold. First, as one interested in sociological studies, I shall take a look at some of the work now being done on the borderline between sociology and psychiatry. Second, I shall try to present some sociological attitudes and insights in a way that may be helpful to people who are actively concerned in the pastoral work of the church.

Section 2

Current notions of mental health seem to be derived from a more basic notion of normality, and can be understood only by analysing what we mean by normal. I suggest that in this context the definition of

normal is purely statistical. We imagine, as it were, a symmetrical humpback curve, on which we each have an allotted place. All those who are bunched together within some stated distance from the mean occupy the zone of normality; those who fall outside the stated limits towards either the top or the bottom of the range are abnormal. For example, if in response to changing traffic lights you halt on the red and advance on the green, you are normal; if you creep forward on the amber and are three parts of the way across by the time the green appears, or contrariwise if you fail to move on the green until blasted on by the indignant hoots of those behind you, then you are abnormal. Or, again, in regard to bedmaking, if you turn the mattress and change the sheets once a week, you may possibly be regarded as normal; if you turn the mattress every day and change the sheets twice a week your are abnormal; if your practice is to set fire to the bedding as a whole, again you are abnormal (and psychopathic into the bargain).

Trivial instances like these will illustrate our subconscious tendency to locate people and types of behaviour on an imaginary curve of normal distribution. But we have to look elsewhere for working criteria of mental health, or (to express the same thought more simply and more precisely) for symptoms of mental illness. We turn to regions of behaviour marked on our maps as crime, prostitution, vandalism, family breakdown, neurotic incapacity or violence, the disorders of psychosis, and so on. And at this stage we note that all these indicators or varieties of mental illness have two things in common; they are thought of as qualities of the social functioning of persons, and they are deemed to be socially unacceptable.

Who speaks for 'society', and by what right, in declaring where the limits of the acceptable fall is a difficult and fascinating question, but one outside the scope of this paper. Immediately in point is to observe that the normal and the socially acceptable are very close, if not identical, in meaning, to re-affirm that both are statistical concepts having reference only to the specific society under discussion, and to emphasize that the normal becomes normative when it is identified with the socially acceptable. We are thus led to the notion of *adjustment* which, together with that of *normality*, is required for understanding what mental health means. We can now say that to be mentally healthy is to be in adjustment with current norms of socially acceptable behaviour as they apply in a number of key-areas of social functioning. To be mentally ill is to be out of adjustment with these norms, so that one's behaviour in any of the key-areas becomes socially unacceptable. Therapy consists in making this unacceptable put on acceptability; in other words in inducing such change in the abnormal as will warrant promotion to the zone of normality. The therapeutic processes are the means by which adjustment to the normal is secured.

Section 3

What I have been saying gives, I believe, a fair account of the meaning our contemporaries intend when they speak of mental health. We should probably all agree that in this form the notion is inadequate and unsatisfactory. I therefore go on to suggest that if the notion of mental health is to be useful and valid it needs re-interpreting in the light of a correlative notion of social health.

The term mental health, used in the sense explained, is unsatisfactory because it includes two very dubious assumptions; one, that mental disorders are traits or qualities of persons, the other that a person who is in adjustment with current norms of social functioning is healthier than a person who is not.

It is second nature in all of us who have been brought up in the culture of the West to make our diagnoses and appreciations in terms of the individual. This habit is very deeply imbedded in our oldest and most respected professional traditions—those of church, law and medicine—and hence in our language structure itself. It has fallen largely to sociologists to point out how naïve this procedure is, and their much-criticised jargon is an attempt to free the common diction from crippling semantic limitations.

In considering crime and criminals, for example, it is often more effective and more just to cast one's thinking into non-personal sociological concepts such as status and rôle than into the customary personalised concepts of thief, sex-maniac, and so on. What we really do when we characterise a man as a thief is to take certain items which we observe as consistent and persistent in his behaviour, abstract them from his total behaviour, label them, and ascribe them to him as personal attributes, as though they were independent of the interactive social situations which call them forth. In short we ignore the crucial fact that the person and the events observed as well as the observer himself are all interacting participants in a particular social field.

In suggesting that mental disorders are generally better regarded and treated as social situations than as personal traits, I am not of course claiming that genetic or constitutional factors peculiar to the individual never enter in. On the contrary, there is a good deal of evidence that in the psychoses at any rate, we are dealing with conditions which are more dependent on heredity or on physiological malfunctioning than on environmental circumstances.[1] At the same time, some American studies indicate that the incidence of various kinds of mental disorders correlates clearly with social variables such as social class, occupation, area of residence, marital status and so on; for instance, neurosis has been found

[1]See H. Goldhamer and A. Marshall: *Psychosis and Civilisation*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.

to be concentrated at the higher levels of social class, psychosis at the lower.[2] The point I am making is that, subject to certain reservations, if one looks at the whole range of socially disorganised acts, one finds that they are commonly without organic cause, and are properly considered as learned responses. They emerge, that is to say, as functional systems whose origins are to be sought not in the depths of the mind, but in the forms of a person's childhood relationships with the adult world. The same is true, of course, of socially well-organized acts, acts which *are* socially approved. On this view, mental health and mental disease are both lessons taught by experience, and the provider of the experience, the real teacher, is the social order in which the individual life is lived.

Section 4

I turn now to the second questionable assumption embedded in our ideas of mental health, the assumption that to be well-adjusted to current norms of social functioning is healthier than to be ill-adjusted to them. It cannot be denied, I think, that in our ordinary usage the term maladjustment connotes mental disorder. Such usage may have its conveniences, but it is not really defensible, because it implies in turn that current norms are themselves both healthy and not discrepant with one another. It often also carries the further implication (an even more illogical one) that standards of behaviour which happen to have become normal in the statistical sense have thereby made good a claim to be normative in the sense of entitled to call for compliance from recalcitrant individuals.

Clearly, before normative status can be conferred on any statistical norm, we must have some way of assessing the value of the normal behaviour in itself, quite independently of its normality. Here the notion of social health comes in as a necessary complement to the notion of mental health. In the abstract, we might, I suppose, all agree that where a social order is itself healthy, there its norms will be healthy also. But societies are just as liable to disease as persons. In one sense, perhaps they are more so, since it might be argued that when social disorder and individual disorder are viewed together within a single span of perception, the second appears as manifest consequence or function of the first. Particularly in an era of endemic war, revolution and hideous insecurity such as our own, all streams of cultural tradition exhibit neurotic tendencies. Ruth Benedict,[3] as far back as the thirties, was

[2]See A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich: *Social Stratification and Psychiatric Disorders, in Mental Health and Mental Disorder* (Ed. A. M. Rose) pp. 123 ff. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956.

[3]See *Patterns of Culture,* New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

pointing out that western culture 'with its overgrown fear of deviation from its own fortuitous standards conforms to all the usual definitions of the psychopathic,'—a judgement which the experience of McCarthyism has only made more plausible.

It seems therefore that we have to distinguish two kinds of mental health and two kinds of mental disorder. Mental health may consist either in adjustment to a good norm or in maladjustment to a bad norm; mental disorder either in adjustment to a bad norm or in maladjustment to a good norm.

In a fully healthy social order mental health and social conformity might well coincide. The extreme of freedom might well meet the extreme of necessity. The free act would be that which our spirit performs because it can no other, the act which comes as complete and precise solution of a precise problem, the act which wins unmixed approval from the agent's whole and undivided self, the act to which it would therefore be irrational to prefer any possible alternative. Indeed, as we shall see, a healthy society might be defined as one where behaviour is free because it proceeds from spontaneous necessity, and where what man does tallies with what he means to do.

But mental health can never be found in conformity to norms which, however strongly supported by public consensus, are unwholesome or unworthy or even unexamined. This view has been cardinal in the moral tradition, and intermittent in the political tradition, of European civilization, ever since the sophists and tragedians of ancient Greece first framed the doubt 'What if the multitude is bent on evil or is blind? There are many men who are evil but seem righteous; what if the man who is righteous seems to be evil?' Plato, who had watched the trial and execution of Socrates, warns us against the messiah-lynching drives of orthodoxy, saying that the righteous shall be scourged, tortured, bound, and at last impaled or crucified. That health is restored to sick societies by groups who generate heroic resistance to unwholesome norms is an idea that attains its culminating point in Christianity. The righteous man, in this meaning of the term, is one who shows awareness of some reality deeper and truer than conventional desire, of some loyalty higher than the claims of friends or country, of some factor that supersedes as both false and inadequate current moral codes and current theologies. The social tragedy is that he is delinquent by society's standards and that society is delinquent by his. In the tension between the two rests the promise of human progress towards social health. But society's compulsive ambition to crucify those who would raise the moral level of its norms is a symptom of mental disorder, whereas the critical impulse towards improvement of the norms is evidence of mental health.

Section 5

It is twenty-five years since Lawrence K. Frank published an article in the American Journal of Sociology (42. 1936. pp. 335 f.) which he called *Society as the Patient.* In the interval his leading ideas have been developed and given greater precision, both by himself and other writers; but the basic thesis remains, as Frank first expressed it, that 'the concept of a sick society in need of treatment has many advantages for diagnosis of our individual and social difficulties and for constructive therapy'. He points out that the whole world order is being blindly pulled down and haphazardly remade by technology. At the same time, institutional life fails to keep in step with technical change by making corresponding innovations in our culture and our values. In such conditions individual behaviour, bereft of sure direction or sanctions or guiding conceptions, inevitably becomes torn by conflict, confused, neurotic and anti-social. We classify such behaviour under various headings, such as crime, mental illness, family breakdown, prostitution and sex offences, gastric ulcer, cancer, psychosomatic disorders of many kinds. But we are to view these calamities less as proofs of individual wickedness, incompetence, perversity, or pathology than as frantic trial-and-error reactions to living in inescapable conditions of cultural collapse. Much mental conflict and disease in the individual would disappear or be greatly reduced if we could bring about certain long-overdue changes in our culture. The therapeutic problem, Frank urges, is therefore primarily one of institutional reorganization, of political and economic planning.

The rapid, accelerating and unending processes of cultural change set in train by technological invention cannot be stopped or reversed. But they can be steered. The contention of Frank and his school is that we ought to be steering them but are not doing so. The knowledge of how to steer them is at least in part at our disposal, but we do not harness and apply it. If we did set about applying it, we could use for the solution of our social problems the very ideas and methods of technology which have created them. We could develop a technology of social change to bring order out of the chaos induced by the unregulated technology of industrial production. For the present failure of society as a whole to readjust to its own potentialities of progress the Americans have thought up a special piece of descriptive jargon. They call it cultural lag. The leeway implied by the term can only be made good, so the suggestion runs, by applying the findings of science to the production of human happiness as and when scientists make them available.

When a social system is well organised, it provides through its institutions and groups the roles which are needed to utilise the energies

and realise the purposes of its members. By moulding our motives and assigning rewards to this kind of behaviour and punishments to that, it composes a harmony of co-operative wills. But if a system is incapable of devising and maintaining a hierarchy of roles and relationships that the citizens acknowledge as expressive, fruitful, dignified, and therefore satisfying, it cannot escape responsibility for the misfits, the unadjusted and maladjusted persons who become criminals or lunatics or both. Such misfits are rightly in rebellion against a system that makes them what they are, even if their rebel aims are wrongheaded.

Not, of course, that it can be the job of social organization to empty out all frustrations from the citizen's life. No system could ever offer to put all possible beliefs and desires on equal footing, for this would be the end of organization of any kind, sheer indeterminacy. Since any actual social system must be determinate in one way or another, the openings and barriers to individual and group enterprise that constitute its particular mode of organization must disfavour some beliefs and desires and accord preference to others. The sole question is which shall be waved on by society's green light, which held up by its red, and whether a reasonable balance of restraint and opportunity is struck in the end.

In this context sociologists have given attention to the open-class structure of western society.[4] The view, put in very oversimplified terms, seems to be that that structure makes envy and spite a settled feature in the personality make-up of many people, and that much mental illness is rooted in these emotions. The social role of an individual is not simply a matter of occupation, employment, service, or activity as such. It involves status also, and status is conferred by the communicated esteem or disesteem of others. This in turn entails continuous comparison of one's own placing on the approval-scale with that of neighbours, rivals, colleagues. Many of our motives and attitudes thus become suffused with an invidious, emulative component, sometimes called 'vertical' in the jargon, because it is concerned with the vertical dimension in society and the value-judgments that we build into it. Guilt feelings, inferiority complexes, anxiety states often reflect the power of such compulsive and invidious comparison.

This situation well exemplifies the practical difference between the concepts of mental health and social health. In terms of the former, therapy would aim at transforming anxious and guilt-filled individuals into a blend of good conformist and successful competitor. In terms of social health, a direct move would be made against the market-mind itself, against our structural habits which regard the practice of buying cheap and selling dear as both inevitable and right, against the ethics

[4]See e.g. Kingsley Davis: *Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure,* in *Mental Health and Mental Disorder,* Ed. Arnold M. Rose, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956.

of aggressive individualism that attaches the highest importance to social inequality and dominance, especially as measured by private wealth and the power such wealth confers. The scheme of social rewards and punishments would be modified so as to hamper the motives of competition and give scope and prestige to those of co-operation.

Section 6

I have been stressing the importance of group factors in mental health and the extent to which individual behaviour is socially determined. From time to time we all need these correctives to the fallacy of the self-substantial individual, and I hope you will not have thought them out of place here today. But I entirely agree that one must always come back to the individual sooner or later, if only because group influences cannot operate except by way of communication between persons. It is, of course, equally true, and we ought not to forget this, that any interpersonal network of communication forms at the same time part of a larger group network and cultural network.

It is significant that some sociologists as well as some psychiatrists are now seeking to draw from the concept of communication a theoretical frame within which individual and society can be comprehended as aspects or dimensions of a single whole. I offer here a very summary account of one recent attempt of the kind.[5]

The concept of communication includes all processes by which people influence one another. It is built on the assumption that all actions and events have communicative aspects as soon as they are perceived by a human being; in other words, perceiving any action or event alters the information which the perceiver possesses and thereby influences him. We communicate successfully when we mutually verify the meaning of each other's messages, and mutually influence each other's behaviour to each other's satisfaction. In so far as we achieve this truth-telling and co-operative relationship, we enjoy mental health.

We are biologically committed to the attempt to communicate, and we can never abstain from it. Our sense organs are constantly on the alert and are registering the signals received, and in as much as our effector organs are never at rest, we are at the same time continuously transmitting signals to the outside world. Communication links object to person, and person to person, thus forming a social matrix within which all human activities are embedded. Our life and our sanity are alike directly dependent on our ability to communicate successfully with other human beings.

On this view social health is measured by the extent to which the given mode of social organization facilitates successful communication. It follows that mental disease is defined in terms of disturbances or

[5] J. Ruesch and G. Bateson: *Communication*. New York. Norton. 1951.

distortions of communication. Therapy can only occur through the development of more adequate and freer-running systems of communication, which will permit the patient to affect his surroundings in ways that lead to lasting satisfaction of some kind. Every improvement in communication implies that the patient's messages are influencing the behaviour of other people in ways the patient desires. Exerting such influence will benefit the patient, and if the patient is benefitted, so also will others be with whom he is in contact. Thus each piecemeal advance in mental health, by confirming and raising the measure of social health that makes it possible, opens the way to more advances.

Following up his identification of mental disturbance with disturbance of communication, Ruesch suggests (op. cit. pp. 88-9) that the term psychotic denotes someone whose communicative processes are disrupted primarily in the sphere of reception, the term neurotic someone in trouble in the sphere of transmission.

The psychotic assigns a role to himself, forgetting that roles are in fact determined by a reciprocal relationship with other people. This makes him unperceptive of his impact upon others, while he exaggerates the coercive aspects of the messages that others transmit to him. So he fails either to receive messages correctly or to use them for checking information he already has. Building up a distorted model of himself and his world in this way, he progressively isolates himself from everyday reality.

The neurotic, on the other hand, tends to flood other people with messages in the effort to make them accept roles they do not want. Instead of progressively modifying his rejected messages until they begin to evoke something of the hoped-for response, he goes on repeating the originals over and over again, in blind belief that eventually his mere insistence will get them understood and answered as he wishes.

Only the mentally healthy are aware of the reciprocal effects of communicative processes, and of the wholesome results of co-operative interaction.

Section 7

These, then, are some of the ideas which, it seemed to me, a student of sociology might modestly offer to an audience of churchmen as relevant to their concerns, deserving of their attention, and perhaps even affording clues worth following further. They are, as I am sure you would expect, expressed in terms of scientific humanism, and, for that and other reasons, do not claim to be anything more than highly provisional. The fact that they have come to light in a non-theological world of discourse need not mean that they are without significance for theologians. In my opinion, they comprise some distinctive insights

which may lead to a fuller understanding of the nature and possibilities of human association. They are to be regarded, I suggest, as hypotheses, supported by a good deal of evidence, but destined to be superseded to a greater or lesser extent in the light of evidence not yet gathered in. Our successors will use them as observation-posts and vantage points from which to attain a larger and clearer view than is open to us in our day.

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS VALUES IN EDUCATION

By J. T. Christie, Esq., Principal of Jesus College, Oxford.

I began writing the paper which I am to read to you this morning well aware that my own experience of moral and religious education, though long in years, especially if I count my days as a schoolboy as well as a teacher, was limited in outlook; and as I wrote, I felt the limitation more acutely until I read a recent article in the Press, which has induced me to change my opening paragraphs. The writer deals with Religious Knowledge in a Secondary Modern School:

> 'When I was a boy at elementary school, nearly forty years ago, we had Scripture every morning. I left for a grammar school at twelve, and by then I had read most of the Old Testament, knew the Gospels pretty thoroughly, and had a nodding aquaintance with a little of St. Paul's voluminous correspondence. I do not know whether or not my teachers were practising or believing Christians, but they taught us conscientiously and well. Religion had at least the same standing as Arithmetic and Geography. . . . Today many teachers are neither believers nor willing to pretend to be, but Religious Knowledge still has its place in all State school timetables. . . . Religion has become a specialist subject. . . . The lack of specialists leads to religion becoming the Cinderella of the curriculum. The necessary periods are farmed out round the staff and anybody may find Religious Knowledge on his timetable once or twice a week. Of course he could refuse to take it . . . but . . . he doesn't usually do so. No, he grumbles bitterly in the privacy of the staff-room, and takes the lessons half or totally unprepared and without any conviction, much less enthusiasm. I know some—a Communist colleague comes to mind—who frankly use the lesson to teach their own secular subject. They get away with this because many head masters are no more convinced of the need and value of Religious Knowledge than are

their staffs, and turn a blind eye to the whole business. . . . Religious Knowledge isn't examinable either, and a blank on the terminal report deepens the impression that it is of no importance. So, I'm afraid, does the statutory morning assembly. This 'act of worship' occurs every day, and a deplorable travesty of worship it often is. A Christian head master has an uphill task with an indifferent staff and generally hostile upper school: a non-Christian going through the motions does a great deal of harm. I have been on a staff where only three out of twenty were present, and conversation drowned the prayers. On a typical Secondary Modern staff there may be one or two convinced Christians, but this is by no means probable. . . . The rest of the staff simply have little or no interest in religion and do not wish to practise or teach it. . . . The older men, whether believers or not, generally maintain an uncomfortable silence; but the young men—and some of them may soon be head masters themselves—have, generally speaking, no religious background, and are scathing in their denunciations of the Churches, the clergy and the absurdities of dogma.'

I dare say this is not the whole truth and we may hear another side to the question in later issues of the paper, but I feel sure that from other evidence there is much to justify the picture. My only claim to speak to you is as one who has taught Religious Knowledge at Public Schools. Against the background of that article, how comfortable, how respectable, how easy it all appears to have been! I have something to say, of a pedestrian nature, about the traditional methods of teaching morals and religion, but I am not forgetting that I who speak and you who are listening represent a small minority in the educational world. The background given in the newspaper article—this absence of faith and indifference to Christian standards, must be a challenge to us whose lot has fallen more happily. If we believe in what we teach, it is more important now than ever to share our conviction with the rising generation, so that some of them may go out into these barren lands where religion is almost a dead letter, and declare their own faith. After all, there ought to be nothing in the present situation that should surprise us or shock us unduly. Genuine Christians have always been a minority. In those halcyon Victorian days, when churches were full and Sunday Schools flourishing, remember what Kingsley and Maurice had to say about the sin and ignorance of the starving masses, or the barbarism that John Wesley found as he rode about England a hundred years earlier; or go back to the vaunted Middle Ages and recall what Piers Plowman thinks of the wickedness and hypocrisy of Christian England. The background has always been dark, right back to St. John when he exclaimed, 'The whole world lies in the shadow of the Evil one'.

The theme I have been given is Moral and Religious Values in Education. Morals and religion are not the same, and religion must in some sense come first. For the ordinary Englishman, especially at school, 'Conduct is three fourths of life', as Matthew Arnold used to say, and religion came in as a sanction for good behaviour. Not so many years ago the nurse would say to a child, 'If you go on being naughty, God won't love you and you will go to Hell'. I verily believe that in every child there is a primitive kind of conscience and the shadowy beginnings of an idea of God that develop as the child grows. Our job as teachers is not to implant these values but to train them, and if we invoke too often the guilty conscience and the sanction of religion, irrespective of the child's age and capacity, we shall, as it were, weaken the springs, and the children will grow up hardened against moral appeal, and inoculated against religion.

The old-fashioned home, the home of our grandfathers, with its clear strict unquestioned standards, produced strong characters, but often it tried too hard to mould the young personality; by too frequent appeals to a sense of guilt, it led either to timidity and indecision when the child grew up (as happened to some of Dr. Arnold's pupils) or it led to flat rebellion. Similarly by too rigorous a training in religious observance, it led, more perhaps with boys than with girls, to apathy and at length to a cold dislike of the whole business. In the home surely it is not precept, but the unconscious tone and spirit of the household that has life-long influence.

School, at any rate in this generation, is more appropriately the place of precept and formal instruction. Among the conscious and deliberate methods of training morality and religion we may reckon the *esprit de corps* of school and house, the teaching of Scripture, school worship and preparation for Confirmation. I will try to say something about these various activities, but fundamentally, as in a home, the unconscious spirit of the place and the unconscious personality of the trainer is the strongest of them all.

The community spirit of a school or house is proverbially strong among our countrymen, especially in the old established boarding-schools. The young creature on the threshold of puberty is psychologically arriving at the pack-stage; he gangs up easily, he admire his leaders; as a member of his group he may be ready for stratagems and subterfuges which he would shrink from as an individual. All this can be turned to good account: it can be the begetter of the right loyalty, self-abnegation and readiness to shoulder responsibility provided it is not fostered too deliberately or too early. The educator, in planning the stages of the training in morality and religion, must not lose sight of the natural 'wild' stage in the growing child. I was brought up to this tradition of *esprit de corps* from the tender age of eight, when there is as yet no

natural foundation for it, and the sentiment may become artificial and priggish. Even at the appropriate age, it can make for blind conformity and loud-mouthed support for the majority, which is not a sign of courage but of fear. It is, after all, only a civilized form of the same pack-enthusiasm which produces the street gang and the teddy-boys on the corner. Even at its best it does not harmonise easily with the Christian ideal. Those who like to lift the roof off with 'Onward Christian Soldiers' are happiest in a pack; as individuals their creed is often more Stoic than Christian. Fortunately there lies beneath this tough collective loyalty a shy, home-loving, imaginative individual. I have come to think of a typical English boy as Thomas Clump: Clump is the hearty, cheerful member of the community, ready to give a hand, ready to call the non-conformer 'perfectly mad' and to persecute the rebel; but there is also Thomas, by no means sure of himself, full of unconfessed day-dreams and ambitions. The moral and religious teacher must not exploit Thomas, but he must never forget him, even when as a teacher he is confronted by Clump in his most aggressive aspect. When Clump gets up to mischief, he can usually be dealt with on the Clump level: the appeal to loyalty, the fair-minded application of rules or penalties. But there are times when an appeal must be made to Thomas and it is the whole art of moral education to distinguish between the time for an appeal to the one and an appeal to the other.

On the specifically religious side, the Scripture lesson is generally speaking a Clump occasion, but this does not mean that it will not ultimately be an inspiration to Thomas. Erasmus, I think it was, described the teacher's task as consisting of three stages: *placet* he pleases or interests, *docet* he teaches or instructs, *movet* he moves or inspires. The definition applies well to religious teaching. *Placet*: the curse of many old-fashioned Scripture lessons in my own memory was that in the name of reverence they were so dull. The same form-master who delighted us with Horace or English History, when he taught us St. Paul or St. John became 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of reverence. Things have much improved since then. We have visual aids, we have attractive text-books with pictures, and not always bound in funereal black. It is possible for the boy to ask pert questions, and the master to make an occasional joke. (William Temple used to say that the more spiritual a religion was, the more secular it could afford to be.) All this stimulates interest, but being interested is by no means the same as being educated. We must have *docet*; clear firm instruction. Interest is an indispensable preliminary—the feeling that religion is a living, relevant subject. But that is not enough; Christianity more than most religions is historical. In the heart of our Liturgy there stands the name of one actual average Roman procurator, nailing our creed to the floor of history. To belittle the importance of Jesus of Nazareth not only falsifies religion, it falsifies

history for believer and unbeliever alike. Religion is more than moral uplift: a shocking truism in an audience like this but a much needed conviction for the young both at home and at school (perhaps anyone who knows many homes, as parsons and schoolmasters do, will agree with me). Instruction, *docet,* implies an honest search for the truth as much in the Scripture lesson as in the History lesson, and to recognize this is good morality as well as good religion. It may, it should, lead to awkward and disturbing questions. An old colleague of mine, hearing from a boy something that I had said, or was reported to have said in the Scripture lesson, remarked with a twinkle, 'You'll have the pious mammas after you, head master, you will indeed'. If so, all the better, provided that the teacher can face and explore any number of difficulties and inconsistencies with the certainty that they can never outweigh the force of his own central conviction.

Placet and *docet* are both the outcome of conscious effort in the teacher. *Movet* is the most important and most lasting of the three, and it is mostly unconscious. It is useless for anyone to say to a class, or I imagine to a congregation, 'Today I intend to inspire you'—with English boys and girls at any rate. *Movet* comes from inward conviction; it cannot be counterfeited and, happily, it cannot be disguised, but it cannot be deliberately worked for. Moreover, a teacher's Christian personality will appear not only in the Scripture lesson but ultimately in all his teaching and all his responsibilities.

Very early in Christian thought, Christian educators were faced with the question, 'If the Christian faith is the one thing of supreme importance in man's life, why teach anything else?'. One party in the Church came to regard any other branch of knowledge as irrelevant or sinful and dedicated themselves in monastery or desert to prayer and mortification, leaving the rest of the world to reach Heaven, if possible, through the prayers of the faithful remnant. But the other tradition, typified I suppose by Origen, thought that all knowledge can be Christianized if it is approached in the true spirit—this is the tradition which we as Christian educators have inherited: that a liberal education can also be a Christian education. Any teacher whether at school or at home (and after all, parents are still the earliest teachers) can, indeed must, declare for or against the Christian ideal by his life, though they may never give Christian instruction or even utter a consciously Christian precept. They can all have the hidden permanent influence which Erasmus calls *movet*. Most of all, of course, in their attitude to religious observance and Christian worship.

As far as Christian instruction goes, the break between school and home is a sharp one. Most modern boys or girls depend mainly on school for systematic Christian teaching. In worship there is, or ought to be, a link, a continuum between the two. But the link between school

chapel and parish church has become increasingly weaker within my own experience as a schoolmaster. Parents, long aware of this disjunction and their own responsibility for it, have defended themselves at different times for different reasons. In the 1920's they would say to me, 'These wretched boys are driven to compulsory chapel every day of term and at least twice on Sundays. How can you expect them to come willingly to church in the holidays?'. But thirty years later they were saying, 'We love your school services—so alive and so heartfelt: in comparison with this, how can you expect a boy to come willingly to a dull Sunday service in a church three quarters empty?'. It is hard for schools to profit from both these criticisms.

Meantime the organizers of school worship can only go ahead and make the most of their opportunities; and these are great. Worship can be the very heart of religion for the young. It appeals to Thomas as well as to Clump; the sermon can set the Sixth Form thinking and arguing, though above the heads of the Lower Fourth; but the service as a whole can give to younger children a peace which they need for a strenuous school routine, and start them dreaming. No harm in that, for have we not been told on good authority that much prayer is 'directed dreaming'? Above all, worship can introduce them, Sixth Form and Fourth Form alike, to beauty: the beauty of words and of music, and the beauty of orderliness.

That School Services or School Prayers frequently fail to induce these feelings is only too true, and at best the effect is cumulative. What matters ultimately is the spirit in which they are conducted. If the head master or chaplain bustles through them as a piece of routine or as a preliminary to School Notices, nothing will save them, not even the most topical and up-to-date petitions culled from books of School Prayers. But if the man responsible obviously feels that this is the right way for young and imperfect Christians to begin the day—that we are prone to err, that our spirits need help, that we are grateful for our own blessings and concerned for those who have none of them—then this will, as the boys say, 'get across' even though the vehicle be a familiar Collect or the Prayer of St. Chrysostom.

Preparation for Confirmation, whether given by the school or the parish priest, provides a contact of great potential value. It differs from the others by being individual, or at any rate intimate, and it includes both the religious and the moral. Strife has long raged about the appropriate age of Confirmation, and I will not renew it here: six, thirteen, or seventeen, on the threshold of leaving school—each age has its advocates. I must have seen many hundreds of boys individually on such occasions and I am very conscious how little such interviews seem to achieve, but I can never believe that they are purely waste of time. Once again, what does one want to achieve? Is it *placet*—to get

their sympathy and interest? Is it *docet,* to give them straight teaching about the Faith, the Church, and their duty to both? Is it *movet*? This no-one can tell, neither teacher nor taught; only a life will reveal it. To stir the moral conscience is not difficult. A boy or girl is quickly alarmed by talk of besetting sins and self-examination. But such an approach is moral rather than religious, and negative rather than positive. Communicating a faith is a longer and more mysterious business than working on an adolescent conscience, expounding the Catechism or setting out the rules of Church Membership.

I have spent this much time in a bare recital of the various accepted ways of training the young in religion and morality because I felt the temptation of talking at large about moral and religious values while ignoring the everyday means at our disposal, their possibilities and their limits. But I turn now to the more general question of our conference as seen by one who has spent most of his working life with the young. Moral and religious values are not the same. The Englishman of past generations, including my own, took for granted a moral standard. Well aware that he did not always live up to it, he yet believed in the supremacy of conduct. A century ago he felt as deeply about the importance of Belief, but within my own life-time his sense of religion—the significance of faith and prayer and regular worship—has become dim; it came to be regarded as a particular way of being good, an extra for those who like that kind of thing. Today, a real religious conviction is rare among young and old alike, and far fewer people go to Church. For a time a moral standard was accepted apart from any religious sanction. Today moral standards have dropped as never before. It is not so much that men fail to live up to them; they openly doubt whether they exist. It is just a chance that the decline of religion has been steadily followed by the decline of morality in this country? And yet we must not, as was said earlier, begin with morality and introduce religion primarily as an aid to living the good life. That is not St. Paul's order. For him the theology comes first—God's will for the world, the Chosen Race, and ultimately the revelation in Christ for all mankind. Only when this has been marked, learned and inwardly digested come the exhortations to steadfastness, purity or love: 'Therefore, my beloved brethren . . . '. Is it possible to apply this order of instruction to our training of the young? To them, morality with its rules and taboos and conventions is more apparent and more urgent. But morality taken by itself is not enough to commend the Christian ethic. I remember a clever sixth-form boy saying to me in a Scripture lesson: 'What is there in the New Testament about conduct—such things as kindness to the poor and weak, bodily self-control, contempt or wordly wealth, fortitude under suffering—that you cannot find equally recommended by Plato and Epictetus, or even by Horace and Seneca?'. It was a boy's question

and may not cut very deep, but it was worth asking, and it reminded me that as far as moral ideals go there was on the surface not so much to choose between Pagan and Christian. No doubt the Pagan preacher did not live up to his precepts, but neither does the Christian. No doubt the Christian is asked for a more complete surrender, and the Pagans can show us no line of saints, though they have no Torquemadas to show us either. The fundamental difference is religious not moral.

This is where the Bible, Old Testament as well as New, is relevant, especially for the Sixth Form. The basis of education on the Arts Side for the able boy or girl is still the humanism of the Renaissance: the achievements of Man, the clear rational outlines of classical literature and classical art. All this makes its own appeal and rightly to the growing mind, but it represents a very different world from that assumed by Christianity. 'The Crucifixion is the central event of world history.' We have all heard that from the pulpit. Can anyone remember hearing it in the History lesson? Again, how crude seem the Old Testament stories when we set them against the beautiful sophisticated myths in the ancient poets! But all the same, there is a place for the Hebraic element as well as for the Hellenic, and Christians certainly must not ignore it. I came lately upon some words of the American critic Edmund Wilson, which are relevant here.

> These strokes of human feeling, of insight, are so trenchant and so authentic, and they so surely awake a response in all kinds and conditions of people, that there are moments when the gods and the heroes of the so much more expertly handled, the so much more sophisticated Homeric poems seem less real than the nomads of Genesis when the finger of the unknown scribe, tracing the ancient story, flashes across the page the verses that make them alive.

Jacob at Bethel, and at Penuel; the Burning Bush; the Call of Isaiah—there we have the majesty and mystery of God and the humbleness of man presented in a way that the humanist never wholly attains. Even the commerce of gods and men the humanist expresses with such skill and beauty that we admire him in the act of expression; there is nothing of the brief stumbling inadequate response of man which we can find in the Old Testament. Even in ethics the Old Testament has its own light to throw along the path of the growing child. Many healthy boys are by nature at the Old Testament stage of religion. He can relish a God 'That maketh my hands to war and my fingers to fight'. At his hero-worshipping stage he has more sympathy with the courage, the impulsiveness and the penitence of David than with the meekness and humility of the Gospel; and at the pack-stage he may feel that tribal sin and tribal retribution appeal to him more than the personal scheme of salvation (as he sees it) in the New Testament. It is surely a mistake

to omit the Old Testament altogether from religious teaching, as I have heard recommended recently at a conference. But the strength of the boy's sympathy for such things is the measure of our difficulty as teachers in recommending the Christian ideal. Admittedly the Nineteenth Century and Victorian stained-glass windows have much to answer for in overstressing what one may call the 'gentle Jesus meek and mild' ideal. Certainly, my brothers and I fifty years ago thought of the Gospel story as more suited to one's mother than to one's father. But perhaps I am attributing to the 'teenager' of today feelings only appropriate to those who were brought up as we were in a church-going household, with a parson or two in the family tree. That was a precious heritage in its way, but it had its dangers. It became too much a matter of routine, it was socially respectable, it was the thing to do. Then it needed courage not to go to Church; now it needs courage to go; and that is good. Nowadays the great majority of the young grow up and come to school with no such background. If they are to catch religion at all, they catch it as something new; on some of them, realizing for the first time that they have a religious instinct, the experience makes a sharp impression. 'The greatest story in the world' is all the greater because it is unfamiliar. The danger for the boy with the old-fashioned training was that he became either bored with religion, or something of a Pharisee, exclusive and self-righteous. The danger for a boy who comes to it fresh is that it may not last; it has no depth of earth. The situation is like that which St. Paul experienced with his Jewish and his Gentile converts respectively. The former needed to learn tolerance and readiness for a new outlook, and to unlearn exclusiveness. The latter needed to beware of the impact of sudden new forms of faith; 'What sophistry has bewitched you, O you foolish Galations?'. Such disciples are not unknown at Oxford today. They are not ballasted with an old tradition, whether Anglican or Free Church: they are 'Hot for certainties in this our life' and they join the ranks of the Fundamentalists or the cut-and-dried Ritualists or maybe Moral Re-armament and thus they too are infected with a kind of Pharisaism, a knowledge of God that does not expand, an 'I'm all right Jack' kind of religion. It is fair to add that their membership of such groups does notably provide them with a moral standard, but they are not always attractive advertisements for Christianity to the great unthinking, uncaring majority.

The unthinking, uncaring majority: the herd that has little interest in religion and an increasing doubt of the distinction between right and wrong, (as a youth put it in a recent film, 'Well, a thief steals, an informer squeals and a killer kills; and that's all there is to it'). But Christians will never find themselves in a majority. Genuine Christians, as I have said, have always been a small group, a leaven. The Christian

educator must do his best to recommend Christianity to all for whom he is responsible, secure in the confidence that in some of them the God-sown seeds of religion are destined to ripen if the teacher can till the soil and clear the weeds. The history of Christendom abounds in records of the influence wielded, consciously and unconsciously, by individual teachers. In some it will be by the witness of a life (I remember an old man who deplored the dead, dull religious teaching of his youth, but added that his whole life had been redirected by the unconscious demeanour of a master who happened to kneel next to him for one year in the school chapel). Sometimes the master will be conscious of his aim and the child too young to understand it, and the influence will work on the principle which is sound religion and sound education, 'What I do thou knowest not now but thou shalt know hereafter'. Different disciples will start, as it were, at different points on the circumference of the religious circle, according to their temperaments. For some it may be the Church, for others personal holiness, for others a desire to spread the Gospel or to help the destitute. Whatever the starting point, the centre is the person of Jesus of Nazareth and his revelation of the nature and the love of God. The nearer we approach to that centre, the more we speak with one voice—Catholic and Wesleyan, Eastern and Western, literate and illiterate. And it is to this centre that the teacher turns his own eyes, from his own particular point on the circle. If he is a good teacher, he will never say 'Look at me', but 'Look the way I am looking'.

MAN IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

By Canon R. S. O. Stevens, M.A.,
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The title of this paper, 'Man in an Industrial Society' is in some sense misleading, in so far as it implies that there is another sort of society. In fact we have to recognise that the modern world is industrial society. Whether they will or whether they will not, men are in an industrial society. All over the world there are people whose communities are to a greater or lesser degree industrialised and it is probably true to say that there is no quiet obscure corner of the world to which none of the echoes of industrialisation have yet penetrated. Where you find a community living in an undeveloped state, there you nevertheless have the determination to follow the example of the West—where power lies!—and to pursue as fast as is possible, perhaps much faster than is possible, the process of industrialisation with which we in the West have lived so long. To under-developed countries, industrialisation spells hope, spells freedom, freedom from famine, freedom from epidemic disease, freedom from abject poverty, freedom from exploitation. It spells power. And it is probably true that one of the strongest motivations in the determination to become free from that which is called imperialist domination or colonialism is the belief that once 'free', the process of industrialisation will be able to leap forward in an uninhibited and impetuous way.

It doesn't do for us to say that this is not really what Industrialisation is. It may well be that we ourselves are bound to be affected by some of the negative aspects of our society, with which, of course, we have lived so long, and which we have been able to study as it unfolded itself and evolved at a much slower tempo than that which it takes up in the newer developments all over the world. We are aware of some of the problems which arise for men living in this kind of society, and it is inevitable that we should devote a great deal of thought and concern to those problems. It is, however, quite useless for us to be directing the attention of enthusiastic newcomers into the field of industrialisation to those problems, in the hope that they will slow down and avoid them, any more than it is really possible for us to influence the development of adolescents by warnings of disaster ahead, as they move forward into their adult world. In fact, to most people the growth and development of industry is seen as a positive thing to be welcomed and encouraged on the grounds that the gains outweigh the losses. In any case the most anxiously pessimistic of us has finally to admit that there is no going back. We cannot stop the trend towards universal industrialisation, and a moment's thought will convince us that we should not want to try. The process is a necessary one in our world.

You can't have it both ways! You can't have medical science and encourage it to make people live longer and dies less often, as it were; you can't extend the length of life and reduce infant mortality, you can't eliminate epidemic diseases and not have the population increase. If the population increases, you have got to have the means for producing the minimum which that population needs in order to live at all. If you are going to produce an ordered society, you must go on producing goods and services to enable the vastly increased numbers in the world to live in decency and in an ordered way. We are often nostalgic about the simple days of the past, 'the good old days'. In point of fact they were 'good old days' for a very small percentage of people, a very highly privileged small percentage. Our western world has demonstrated that certain features of modern life are necessary for the living of civilised life as we have come to understand it, by raising the standard of living universally. You have got to have the services, even apart from those things which one might consider to be materialistic luxuries—the individual's possession of his car or his television or his refrigerator. You still have to have, in the modern world, in order to feed, clothe, house and maintain in health this vastly increased population an enormously complex system of public services—schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, medical services, water supplies, power supplies, postal services, communication and transport. You just cannot maintain the vast population of today at a standard of living necessary for the maintenance of health and of freedom without these things, and these things presuppose and demand the whole great productive machinery which we call modern industry.

This argument would imply that the development we have described is, in the first place necessary, and in the second place essentially good. One would say, speaking in theological and Christian terms, that it is within the Providence of God, as part of the purpose of God for man being worked out in his world. I believe that it is essential that we should begin to think in these terms, and I would suggest that, in general, the Church has been extremely reluctant to accept the facts of the modern situation either as inevitable or as good. There has been continually a looking back over the shoulder to earlier forms of society, in which, let us confess, the place of the Church was more easily recognised and understood. I believe that if we are really to understand the situation of man in the modern world, and the place which the contemporary Church, the rôle which the Church has to take up, we must wholeheartedly accept the basic principle that scientific and technological, mass-production society is inevitable and essentially good.

This is not to deny, and indeed it would be quite foolish to deny, that the increased population of the world, the development of urban society as the basic pattern for human living, the break-up of primal

family groups which is inherent in and necessary for the development of urban society do not bring great human problems with them, some of them, apparently, almost insoluble. It is not to deny that there are, perhaps because, one would suggest, of the nature of man himself, great difficulties in the adjustment to a new society, that there are in the process of that adjustment, casualties, people who become victims of neurosis, or who become delinquent. The rate of change in industrial society, always rapid by comparison with the evolution of earlier societies, is increasing in such a way that people find it extremely difficult to live secure and balanced lives, without the fixed regulating points which they had come to regard as permanent when seen against the slower moving changes of earlier times.

But if we have accepted the point which I have made, then it becomes incumbent upon us to take seriously science, technology and industry, and the condition of man in a situation controlled by science, technology and industry. We have to accept the position of a man in a situation where his loyalties are divided between the place where he lives and the place where he works. The loyalties in either of those two places are far more complex than they were in earlier days, when he lived and worked in the same place, where he owed a simple loyalty to his superiors in the hierarchy, and to the code of behaviour of his day (which was in fact the accumulating conventions of social conduct gradually crystallising into the Common Law). In the new situation he finds himself so required to be responsible, to be free, and to act responsibly within the limits of his freedom, that he is faced with a tremendous moral burden. This—to recognize and understand the condition of man in society—is a first prerequisite for discovering what it is that the Christian faith has to say to such a man.

Let us now look a little more closely at the characteristics of modern society, dominated as we have seen it to be by science, by technology, by the institutions of industry itself. In the first place we have to reemphasise that the basic pattern of human living is urban. The great city instead of being as formerly an isolated phenomenon, a capital city, a centre of national life, is now the norm. This has inevitably involved the removal of masses of population from direct close contact with the world of nature and agriculture. Secondly, the organization of life in the urban world separates residence from place of work. It is true that there is a suggestion in the development in this country of the new towns, satellite towns, of an attempt to reduce the distance which a man has to go from his home to his job. It seems, however, likely that in order to produce a balanced community, new towns will have to have a diversity of industry and that this diversity will itself demand a continued separation between home and work. There is, in my experience, no more alarming social phenomenon than a one-industry town such

as the Volkswagen city of Wolfsburg in Western Germany, where everybody, unless he happens to be a dustman or a shopkeeper or a doctor, works in the one factory. This is in some respects good. It has its positive aspects, but the insecurity involved in living and working in a place which is completely dependent on the continued level of prosperity of a particular industry, and of a particular firm within that industry must be very alarming indeed.

So man is separated—living in one place and working in another. Because industry demands the mobility of labour, the primal family group of the sociologist has had to disintegrate, and the family group now is something quite different from the family of earlier times. Then the whole kinship group lived close together. Now, we say that the family likes to keep itself to itself, to be a unit, but by a unit we mean father and mother and one or two or two point four children. This means, amongst other things, that a boy growing up tends to be, in his earliest years, under the direct supervision mainly of women, whereas in the family group in the village there were grandfathers, there were uncles, there were men about the place, and in any case father at his work was sufficiently near at hand to be at any rate always remembered. The small family of our cities forces the boy out to associate with his peers of the same age to form the peer group, the gang, in which the leader or exemplar is thrown up by the group itself. This has, of course, enormous consequences when it comes to the consideration of educational method, the dealing with the misfits, the awkward types, who are not prepared to accept the norms of society but form their own norms within the group. Its consequences are seen, too, in the contemporary importance of the small group and of the leader within the group. The absence of a group of elders means that there are greater difficulties in the handing on of traditional wisdom.

The next characteristic which it seems to me we must note about man in society today is the dominance in his thinking of science. I don't wish to emphasize or to say too much about the so-called materialism of scientific thinking, because this is not really significant or vital. The fact is that to most men science is seen to work. It has produced the good things in life. It has produced health. It has produced the modern techniques of manufacture. It has produced the good and useful things which we all enjoy and wish to share in. Science works. It produces the sputniks and the rockets, but—it works, and to all our youngsters is a source of tremendous fascination and excitement and hope. It supplies the element of wonder, even if sometimes we think our youngsters are so blasé that for them no new development is surprising or calculated to inspire wonder.

Fourthly, within the industrial situation itself men are exposed to new pressures which their forefathers did not know. I have already

spoken of the tension between work and home. At work a man is required to be ready to make decisions in a situation within which there are no signposts and no guiding principles. Ethically, he is faced with the choice between two greys rather than the clear distinction between black and white. His life has become relative. There are no absolutes. It is a question of saying 'What ought I to do, here and now, exposed to these pressures and these pulls?' Men are continually in a 'crucial' situation. For most people crisis has become chronic and normal. In a sense it is true to say, with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, that we have come into the age of the maturity of mankind, where men are required for the first time in history to be adult, to bear the responsibility, and where submission to authority is not possible any more.

A brief digression will perhaps illustrate the problem which this poses in the field of industry itself. There are, it seems, only two ways of making industry work efficiently. One is, in fact, by totalitarian control. The industry of Hitler, the industry of Stalin were, one supposes, efficient. They were made efficient by depriving men of responsibility and freedom. The responsibility to do as you are told is the negation of responsibility. The only other way of making industry work efficiently is the way which, broadly speaking, has been chosen by the West, certainly chosen by this country. It is to assert that men must be required to act responsibly, and to make western industry work in the western way demands, in the last resort, adult, mature, responsible human beings. In saying this one realizes that the idea of such an industrial world is somewhat utopian. It may perhaps be true, as I believe it is, that we approach it more nearly in this country than in the other great industrial countries. In fact, I personally would go so far as to suggest that there is very little to choose between American industry, German industry and Russian industry. I would say this on the grounds that each of these three types of industry have come to rely increasingly on a docile labour force, a submissive labour force. The Americans produce theirs by modern management methods, which are, in fact, techniques for the conditioning and processing of men to fit them more efficiently into their particular situation. The Germans produce their because this is the way Germans have learnt to behave anyway, the Russians because this is the heritage of Stalin, and because Russian governments have decided this is the way industry must be made to work. We here in this country can see prehaps more clearly than others what is really desirable because we have developed our industry slowly and over a long period, on a basis of a strong, self-assured, self-confident trade-union movement. This must be remembered whatever our feelings about the present difficulties through which the trade-union movement is passing. Our industrial development in the last hundred years has been based upon the tension between two virtually

equal and opposite forces, and out of this tension maintained in equilibrium have come new developments. Modern British industry has been the product of this dialectic, and it is in the interests of both management and the trade-unions that this kind of balance or conflict should be maintained and fostered and nursed and kept healthy. It has been our belief that in the long run the only effective industrial development is that which is based upon free, responsible, mature human beings.

This digression serves to emphasise the difficulty the modern man finds himself in in the middle of all these forces which are at work upon him, continually pushing him this way and that way, leaving him often with a feeling of powerlessness and isolation, a feeling of uncertainty when it comes to a question of what kind of decisions he should make, what kind of basic purpose underlies his life and his activity, what is, in fact, his personal destiny within this kind of situation.

We must now turn to ask ourselves what is the rôle of the Church and the nature of its ministry within the kind of world we have been so far considering. And here, I think, we must be aware of the radical change in the generally held conception of the function of the Church in society in modern times as compared with that which was held in pre-Reformation days. The Reformation was itself in some respects the product of a changing social environment—the break-up of feudal society. In pre-Reformation days, the Church was very heavily involved within the structures of feudal society itself. It is clear that it recognized an obligation within that society, that it saw itself as concerned with the well-being of society as such, as much as with the individual person and his salvation. It recognized the power of social institutions over men. It recognized the ordinary activities of men in society as being themselves under the judgement of God. It saw society itself as a field for the activities of the Spirit of God. The break-up of feudalism brought about by the pressure of developing mercantilism, was an expression of the need for a new individualism. Mercantilism needed individual initiative and adventure. This was closely associated with the new individualism which sprang up within the theological understanding of the Church. The Reformation pointed to the individual and his responsibility and his personal relationship to God. This process of the 'individualisation' of religion has gone along side-by-side with an increased specialisation within society, resulting, in more recent times from the growth and development of the kind of society we have been discussing. Increasingly modern industrial society demands specialization. Increasingly society has become fragmented by the specialization of the rôles of individuals within it, and their tendency to live within the confines of their own specialities. I think it is probably true that the Church itself has tended to become more ingrowing as a result of this

tendency. The ministers of the Church are inclined in conformity with other professionals to see themselves as specialists because everyone else is a specialist. If you ask yourself as a minister of the Church 'What am I a specialist in?', the answer comes—inevitably—'I am a specialist in the spiritual' (whatever that may be!). This is of course in sharp contrast with the understanding which the Church had of itself in the earlier days of its history. I think we can say without exaggeration or perversion of the truth that the function of the parish priest within the village society in pre-Reformation days, and to a gradually diminishing extent since the Reformation was to be a minister of wholeness, whose task it was to foster and ensure so far as he was able the wholeness of the individual man within himself, and the wholeness of society. He was an integrating factor, a catalyst of unity within society and within the life of the individual person. Now if this is true, then it is clear that with the development of the new concept of the Church as concerned with the speciality of the spiritual, with 'religion' as a special province within human life, then there is a sense in which the last three or four hundred years have been reactionary and retrograde, a falling away from the true understanding of the rôle of the Church in society.

The analysis we have had already of the modern industrial world surely points us to the belief that when one considers the rôle of the Church, it is primarily to be seen in terms of the Church as a minister of wholeness, an agent of unity, within the fragmented society of today.

To spend one's life, as I do, working in what we have come to call the frontier situations of the Church's life—in my case in relation to industry, and within the structures of industry itself—is to be continually faced with the alarming consequences of the Church's withdrawal into itself. This withdrawal expresses itself in a preoccupation with the 'religious' as a separate category of human life, with its fostering and nursing of the false dualism between the sacred and the secular; in an over-concern with the activities which go on in churches, and with the pattern of institutional life. One is continually challenged to re-assess the nature of the Church and its mission, and the ways in which that mission must be carried out in the contemporary situation. I have mentioned the separation between the sacred and the secular. To think theologically, what is it that our Christian faith asserts? It asserts in the doctrine of the Incarnation, that God and his world are made one. It asserts in the doctrine of the Ascension, the unity between God and man. It asserts God's forgiveness of man as an achieved fact, i.e. the forgiven-ness of man, that the gulf which man feels to exist between himself and God, between the world and God, in reality no longer exists. What the Christian faith is proclaiming is that God has accepted man, God has accepted the world, that it is his world, the field of his activity, in which he has involved himself, in which he is at work.

This is fundamental and inescapable, and there would seem to be only two contemporary theologians who have truly faced its implications. On the one hand Dietrich Bonhoeffer, on the other hand Paul Tillich, and from my experience as one engaged in what we call frontier work, these and only these two thinkers of our time have contributed towards a new and creative understanding of the relevance and significance of the Christian religion in relation to our society. It is interesting to notice that Bonhoeffer has said that so far as he was concerned the implication of his thinking was that in the last resort it secularized everything, and that he saw the writings and thought of Paul Tillich as the obverse of his own thinking in that Tillich found it necessary, so to say, to 'religionise' everything. In both cases their thinking demands, and the situation on which their thinking was based demands, a doing away with the distinction between the sacred and the secular, the separation of the divine and the human, and the full and complete recognition that the world is God's world, and that he has identified himself with it and is active within it.

If we accept this as a basis for our action, then we discover that the Christian understanding of the atonement becomes alive and relevant and significant in the world in which we have to work. St. Mark says that Jesus 'steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem'. Jerusalem was what we can reasonably describe as the political 'hot spot' of the world in which Jesus lived. 'Steadfastly to set his face to go to Jerusalem' meant in fact to involve himself in the social and political stresses and strains and tensions of his time. When we speak of the Cross, the Jesus on the cross who says, 'Father, forgive them for they know not what they do' is the Jesus who accepts responsibility for the evil in the situation which brought him onto the cross. When we speak of the Church as the Body of Christ, it means the body of those who continue in the world the work of Christ—a work of healing and reconciliation, a work of redemption, a ministry of wholeness.

And so, I believe that within the situation we have described, the rôle of the Church is what the rôle of the Church should always have been, too minister oneness and wholeness. That ministry, in so far as it has to be described in terms of the activity of Christian believers, is an involvement in and commitment to the world as it is, the identification with the cares and anxieties, the hopes and fears and joys of the men and women in the world. It involves the bearing of the responsibility, the being at the 'crucial' situation, at the middle of it all.

The Church does not perform its ministry by standing outside, or by standing at the door and calling to people to come in out of the situation. It only performs its ministry by being within the developing structures, at the centre of the stresses and the strains of the human situation, demonstrating by its attitudes and by its actions the truth of the Chris-

tian proclamation that God has accepted and forgiven men in their situation as they are.

How in fact and in practice this can be worked out is, one has to say, a matter of responsiveness to the actual, living, concrete human situation, and where that situation is concerned, we are called not to be creators or manipulators, but responders. It is no use formulating plans, objectives, goals. The only goal which the Christian minister, clerical or lay, can set himself is the goal of being as responsive as possible to the demands which God in the situation makes upon him.

LITURGY AND COMMUNITY

By the Very Rev. F. W. Dillistone, D.D., Dean of Liverpool

Just over 25 years ago Father Gabriel Hebert wrote a book which he called *Liturgy and Society*. It quickly established itself as an unusually important and suggestive piece of work. It has often been reprinted since then and was recently issued in a paper-back edition. Through it Anglicans became aware of the Liturgical Movement in the Roman Church and began to see the possibilities of something similar within their own Communion. Unfortunately the war prevented the Church from following Father Hebert's lead as vigorously as might have been desired. Instead changes which might have been worked out with some degree of leisure were suddenly forced upon us by the quite revolutionary social upheavals of the post-war years.

In the preface to his book Father Hebert describes his major concern in this way:

> 'I began to plan a book' he writes, 'that would show how Christian dogma finds its typical expression in worship, and how Christian religion is not merely a way of piety for the individual soul, but is in the first place a participation in a common life. But the subject would not allow itself to be limited to a purely religious and ecclesiastical treatment. If Christianity is a redemption of all life, the things done and said in Church must have a direct relation to the things done and said everywhere else; the sacraments and the liturgy exist in order to give to human life its true direction in relation to God, and to bind men in fellowship with one another. Therefore it became necessary to envisage the conditions of modern Europe, which, having lost the common faith by which it once lived, is seeing its social life lose its cohesion and threaten to disintegrate altogether. One must ask whether the Church does not show the way, the only way, to the recovery of a common faith and a true social life.'

In ways which the author could not possibly have forseen not only Europe but other continents also have lost the cohesion of their social life and in many cases communities have disintegrated altogether. The sheer destructiveness of war, the rapid advance in the speed of transportation and communication which war stimulated, the mobility of peoples which the strategy of war entailed—all these were disruptive of community life. But the coming of uneasy peace has not contributed greatly to the restoration of stable patterns of society. Facilities for cheap and rapid travel have multiplied greatly. Specialisation of labour and the spread of mass culture has each in its own way undermined the cohesion of the small-scale community. Increasing mechanisation has corroded the delicate personal ties which formerly held society together.

Thus the situation is far more serious than it was in 1936 when Hebert's book was first published. So far as can be seen the Church has only to a very limited degree succeeded in fulfilling his hope that it would show the way to the recovery of a true social life in the world. The time is ripe for a re-assessment of the whole situation in order both to understand the world's need and to estimate what the Church can do to show a way of recovery.

I

I propose to make only a few brief observations on the world's need. I shall do this by referring to certain concrete examples that have come to my notice quite recently. Here first of all is a vivid description of the breakdown in China. In his brilliant book *Communism and the Theologians* Charles West tells of an experience in that country in 1950 when the revolution was gathering momentum.

His work was with students, many of whom were perplexed about their responsibility in the new situation. He recalls how when they were assembled together one afternoon he noticed one girl of outstanding qualities looking at the classical paintings on the wall of the courtyard.

> 'I learned to paint like that as a child' she said. 'Every stroke is a symbol and has its place in the structure of the whole. Each style has its history and expresses the culture and tradition of our land.' Then she turned 'But all that has no power to help us now. It has no meaning any more. It's all dead'.

But the abandonment of old symbolic patterns within society does not mean that liturgy in the widest sense is no longer needed. *The Times* of 15 June, 1961, had a fascinating commentary on the efforts of the Communist regime to provide ceremonial forms in order to strengthen community life. It first described an incident reported in a Soviet newspaper revealing the compelling attraction even to young people of the

little church with its frescoes and ikons and incense. It continued with a summary of an article in *Kommunist*, the journal of the Central Committee of the Party, which deplored the survival of traditional religious ceremonies but advocated in no uncertain terms the creation of new forms which would provide for the modern community the indispensable cohesion so effectively mediated by the old. Ceremonial is needed, it declared, to celebrate birth, enrolment in the Young Communist League, matriculation, graduation, wedding, qualification for pension and funeral. Only thus could individual emotional needs be satisfied and corporate structural patterns supplied.

Similar examples could be given from the rapidly changing scene in Africa. Contact with the West may shatter social habits and customs but before long there may be an almost fanatical search for new shrines, new forms of witchcraft, new religious ceremonies in order that the breach may be repaired and a strong sense of social togetherness may be re-created. In other words, men are realising in a dumb, instinctive way what the social anthropolgists have learned through long and patient investigation: that society, anywhere and everywhere, needs to be held together by the veneration of common symbolic objects, by the observance of common symbolic times and seasons, by the participation in common symbolic patterns of behaviour. It may be right, it may even be inevitable that political and economic changes should lead to the abandonment of certain time-honoured forms and ceremonies. It is entirely wishful thinking to imagine that any society can hold together without symbolic objects and ceremonial dynamisms of some kind.

II

If this is true then the obvious and most urgent question arises: can Christianity supply the symbolic forms which men and women need today as they seek to re-create community in a still rapidly changing world? In attempting to answer this question I shall first glance back at the past and then try to make some constructive suggestions about the present.

First it can be claimed that for the period stretching roughly from the second to the sixteenth centuries A.D. the Christian Church did provide a remarkably cohesive symbolic structure for the peoples both of Western and Eastern Christendom. The liturgies which gradually assumed a settled form covered all major critical events of communal life—the coming of a child, the entrance into maturity, marriage, healing from sickness, death. Still more they provided a form for the regular renewal of life, individual and social, in the Eucharist. So long as the dominantly feudal system, closely related to land-tenure and to a regular time-structure persisted, these liturgies, largely unchanged and unchanging, sufficed to stabilize the life of the community.

But vast changes were taking place in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries particularly through the emergence of a new sense of nationhood. What forces economic, political, and cultural brought about this national self-consciousness it is not necessary to determine. What is important is that nothing mattered more for a nation or state struggling towards independence than that it should have its own appropriate forms and ceremonies to reinforce the distinctiveness of its communal existence. So the new nations of the Reformation, each in its own way, established both a confession of common faith and a structure of symbolic forms to celebrate this corporate unity. Perhaps the most notable example of any is the Book of Common Prayer which gave to the English people in their own language both a distinctive liturgy and a particular confession. It would be hard to over-estimate the significance of the Book of Common Prayer as the cement of the social life of England over the past four centuries, especially when it is remembered that its services have been read in parish churches each related to a particular land-area and to a time-span which in many cases embraces centuries.

At the same time it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the concept of a reformed national church was not the only new and creative pattern to emerge from the Reformation. There was also the concept of an elect gathered community, less dependent on settled location or on continuity in time, knit together by God's covenant to which the members of the community pledged their entire obedience. Such a covenant needed to be renewed by a periodic meeting together of its members and on these occasions some kind of a liturgy had to be re-enacted. But it was a liturgy related to the essential character of the society: its dominant features had to be freedom from the oppression of earthly tyrants, alertness to new contingencies, renewed submission to the requirements of God's covenanted Word. The Reformed Churches which established themselves in Switzerland, Holland, Scotland, fleetingly in Puritan England and above all in the New England Colonies were but little dependent upon continuing sacramentalisms of place and time. They were deeply dependent upon an intimate fellowship with one another, upon a shared responsibility, upon a common allegiance to God's Covenant. They had no abiding city; they were pilgrims in time: they were rarely exempt from the threat of hostility from the world by which they were surrounded.

Two patterns have thus come to us from the Reformation. On one side a relatively settled, strongly traditional, dominantly organic society with its corresponding liturgy to sanctify the created order and the regular cycle of organic life. On the other side a relatively flexible, strongly circumstantial, dominantly contractual society with its corresponding liturgy to encourage loyalty and confidence and hope, whatever might threaten from the world outside. These patterns are still important

in the political and economic as well as the ecclesiastical life of the peoples of the West. But they are not the only patterns and I must briefly draw attention to other developments.

Whereas through the upheavals of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries nations and states and parties came into being, each with its own social ideals and liturgical forms, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the emergence of a new individualism which was but little interested in given political structures or in long established liturgies. It focussed attention first upon the individual—his needs, his potentialities, his responsibilities—and only secondarily upon the free association into which he might be incorporated. And this association was less concerned with life in the world and in the midst of the world's culture than with life in the new society where each could help his neighbour in the aspiration towards other-worldly perfection. The liturgy reflected and reinforced the conception of an *other-worldly* society whose members would be devoted to the service of God and withdrawn from all worldly cares and preoccupations. Through the liturgy truly religious feelings would be awakened and deepened and those participating in it would be encouraged to pursue the path of perfection by loving others as themselves. Such a liturgy was normally characterised by its intensity and often provided an appropriate setting for self discovery. At the same time it was severely restricted in its outreach and could easily promote self-centredness and self-complacency.

A different emphasis was provided by certain new movements in the nineteenth century but the appeal to the individual and his emotions still remained central. Whereas in the eighteenth century this appeal had been made almost exclusively through words and music, in the nineteenth a wider range of media came to be employed. Colour, light, dramatic movement, architectural forms, different types of music all began to be re-introduced into the liturgy. The individual who had been thrown into a situation of isolation and insecurity by the new urbanization and general social instability of his day turned for assurance not so much to the Divine Word mediated through oratory and musical forms but to the Divine Society made visible through the beauties of form and movement. This had found outward expression in certain notable periods of Christian history and could surely be rediscovered and re-enacted amidst all the changes of the nineteenth century. Though the renewal of liturgical interest appeared at first sight to be a movement with wide social implications, in point of fact it too was quite restricted in its range of vision and easily promoted either a religious aestheticism or an ecclesiastical conservatism. The discovery of the individual, his importance and his responsibility, which the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made possible, was certainly one of the most significant events in world-history. But it was by no means a final and all-embracing event.

The great task of the twentieth century has been to preserve the individual, his status and his function, in the midst of the growth of the mammoth societies which are now the order of the day.

III

In a strange way the two major social patterns of the Reformation to which I have already called attention have survived through all the vicissitudes of the past four centuries and still constitute the major alternatives of our own time. On the one side there is the nation-state, firmly rooted in the soil of a particular area, deeply conscious of an age-long tradition to which it belongs. It is an organic structure and its members are at best urged to develop their own individualities while putting their gifts at the service of the wider whole. Its liturgy sanctifies places, seasons, the regular occasions of individual and social life, the continuities of a long developing history. On the other side there is the covenant-union, intimately related to common interests and concerns, ever responsive to the demands of the changing present. It is a contractual structure in which each is expected to render a particular service, to each is promised a particular reward. Its liturgy exists to renew and re-affirm the basis of the union, to express confidence and faith in face of all threats from outside and to receive symbolic offerings from all to be used in the service of community ideals.

But whereas these two social alternatives in the sixteenth century were undergirded by and indeed surrounded by religious sanctions, today this is far less the case. Nation-states often seek to maintain the stability and continuity of the community by encouraging the retention of certain religious customs and ceremonies but in actual fact these cover only a tiny segment of the total social complex. Then so far as the great contractual unions are concerned, although the pattern of their structure was devised from a religious source, such connections are no longer apparent. Ritual forms are indeed employed whenever a great assembly of a union takes place but it would be an exceedingly rare phenomenom to find them in any way consciously related to transcendent values.

The fact is that the inescapable environment within which both types of community are compelled to exist is today technological rather than religious. The advances of science have been such that all social life seems now to be governed by the presence or absence of skills, resources, materials of a technological kind. A nation may have a land which it loves and a history of which it is proud but if it lacks all raw materials and is backward in technical education it has little chance of survival as an independent unit. An order, banded together to pursue common ideals or to promote common interests may be excellent in its aims and intentions but if it has no financial backing and is concerned with the production

of goods for which there is no longer any urgent demand then it too can hardly expect to escape extinction.

Thus the urgent matter in our own contemporary society is the creation or renewal of symbolic forms which have a clear reference to the realities of the current economic and social situation. How can organic structures be related to a technical society? How can personal commitment still find a place in a dominantly mass organization?

Two principles seem to me basic. In the first place liturgy must, if it is to be the sanctification of an industrial that is to say *work*-society, be itself primarily regarded as an act of common work. As is well-known the very term liturgy is derived from the two words *laos* and *ergon* and denotes a public work, a community action needing to be performed for the preservation of the health of the people. Unhappily the Reformers reacted so violently against the whole conception of liturgy as a good work that it has been very difficult to establish it in a non-Roman context. Yet if once the idea of work is separated from the idea of merit, if once the conception of the total community engaging in the work of offering thanksgiving and intercession to God comes to be accepted, then there is no serious divorce between the pattern of the work-community in action during the week and that of the work-community in action on the day of sanctification.

I need not give detailed examples of the way this is put into practice in for example the Church of Saint Severin in Paris or in Clare College, Cambridge. The altogether important components in this new expression of the *opus Dei* are the central action of the offering (to which many and varied actions lead up) and the true corporateness of that which is done. The raw materials of our common life—the bread, the wine, the money, the record of the sufferings and anxieties and sickness—in other words the alms and oblations and prayers are all to be brought as imaginatively and as comprehensively as possible in order that they may be offered up into the redeeming and transforming activity of God Himself. And the action is to be as imaginatively corporate as it can possibly be. Our churches by and large are desperately unsuited for such corporate action. Cluttered up with pews in every available part of the nave, choked with stalls in the choir, they leave little or no room for movement and action and vital involvement. There is a place in the service of the Church, it is true, for sitting and kneeling. A far greater place needs to be given today to moving and standing and acting jointly in some form of symbolic offering if we are to sanctify a pattern of daily life which involves constant activity in the form of taking raw materials and transmuting them into desired artefacts.

Within the general realm of sacred action in a technological context the actual building of churches occupies a most important place. I could speak at length of what seems to me to be the most serious lost opportun-

ity in relating the life of the Church to the new technological society which has been incurred over the past 15 years. But it is of little use to cry over spilt milk. Happily there are signs that this side of symbolic activity is at last being taken seriously. I doubt if anything is more important for the re-establishment of the Church in the technological society than that its own outward and visible sign of communal activity, namely the building itself, should become a constituent part of that organic architecture which is being freely spoken of as the chief aim of responsible builders today. If liturgical activity could become the life-principle of a new organic emphasis within technology it could do more than anything else to save us from that arid and mechanical functionalism which has been so marked a characteristic of post-war planning.

IV

Let me finally turn to the other main principle which must, it seems to me, inspire liturgical development today. It is, as I have earlier suggested, the personalization of media of interchange which so easily become mere instruments of a mass organization. Society today is governed not only by the technological structures which belong to a particular industrial enterprise but also by the media of communication which link together the wider company of those who share common interests and purposes and enjoyments. With the rapid acceleration of mechanical means of diffusion, information, both verbal and visual, can be transmitted widely without any marked need for personal involvement or personal inter-relationship. This means that all social life is now encompassed by an environment of 'noise', verbal and visual, rather than by the silence—which might indeed be a vacuous silence—of earlier generations.

The danger of course is that the patterns of society will be governed consciously and often unconsciously by the pressures of the surrounding 'noise'. The chief way in which this can be prevented is through vigorous retention of person-with-person encounters, person-with-person co-operation, person-with-person communion, person-with-person enjoyment within the framework of the Liturgy. As Father Hebert pointed out in *Liturgy and Society*, the rediscovery of the idea of *communion* was perhaps the most notable and constructive of all the changes which came to pass at the time of the Reformation. Unfortunately it tended to be forgotten or at least overlooked during the period of excessive individualism which the nineteenth century produced when it was assumed that purely arbitrary and *ad hoc* associations could hold society together. If that was ever the case it is certainly so no longer. Either society will be integrated through strong inter-personal ties related to the social and economic realities of the age or it will be

moulded by the less directly personal images which the mass media diffuse.

What are the simple facts of the present situation? The mass media perform two basic functions with extraordinary success: they inform: they entertain. Vast numbers of people hear easily, see easily, either through live words and images broadcast or by means of static words and images disseminated through print. Hearing and seeing without effort they receive impressions and information in a fairly continuous stream. This is a great fact of our time which cannot be evaded or resisted. The altogether important question for the Church is how can these media be *supplemented*. For although they are so wide in their outreach and influence it is a very open question how far these mass media penetrate in *depth*. And because there is little depth there is little strength of community ties. The mass media do not create real community by themselves. They can hardly do more than establish some of the preliminary conditions towards that end.

Where then do they fail? They fail in being unable to take personal conversation and discussion and dialectic beyond the three or four who are involved in a programme in a very limited period. If the give-and-take of the exchange of words and images is to create real community it must stretch out beyond just the three or four, and must continue over a very considerable period of time. It must operate within a tradition and a stable context. In other words it is only really possible within a community of the general size of a school or college or church or chapel or club or union or friendly society. Within such a context (and if it becomes too big the whole purpose is defeated) the constant personal interchange of information and interpretation can take place and as a result of such interchange the bonds of community become stronger and stronger.

This however is not the only defect of the mass media. They cannot promote common eating and drinking nor can they bring about the actual contact of bodies such as is experienced in the kiss, the embrace, the handshake or the dance. These forms have always been of immense importance in the strengthening of society and their disappearance will inevitably mean that the family, now usually severely restricted in size, will remain the only close-knit community in existence.

All this is of great importance for the symbolic life of the Church. The significance of the common breakfast or the church supper has been realized afresh by a kind of blind instinct but it could be demonstrated by an appeal to basic sociological principles. The sharing in the common loaf, the sharing in a certain commonalty of possessions, the kiss of peace as re-discovered in the liturgy of South India—all are of more than ordinary significance for the fostering of a deep community spirit. These symbols of sharing are being promoted in the

secular world. It will be tragic if the Church proves to be less imaginative, less outgoing, less flexible, less true to its own most precious traditions in providing the essential supplement to all mass-community forming media by means of its own symbolic structures.

To sum up. We are living in a technological civilization served by mass-media of communication. It is easy for the Church to panic and to strive frantically to emulate the world, first by organizing itself into a vast technocracy and secondly by pouring its energy of communication into and through whatever mass-media are available. But these are not ways to the establishment of true community. Rather let the Church devote its energies on the one side to the promoting of organic communities integrated by common offering and common prayer, on the other side to communication by means of person-with-person participation in the deepest symbolic experiences of life. As Amos Wilder has pointed out society lives by its symbols and images: its life becomes stagnant and moribund where the living images fail. A living liturgy, inspired by organic and inter-personal energies, can be the greatest factor in promoting true community in the world today.

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH INTO THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSCIENCE

By Michael Argyle, Lecturer in Social Psychology in the University of Oxford

Introduction

Some people have a strong conscience, others have none. Some people feel guilty if they don't wash their hands and change their clothes many times a day. Some people feel that it is all right to eat their parents, but wrong to eat in public with a woman other than their wife. Clearly there are wide variations in the extent to which different individuals have a conscience at all, and even wider variations in the conduct which may be proscribed or prescribed. There are numerous psychological theories as to the origins of the conscience, but they all have one thing in common: they all assume that the conscience develops in a regular predictable manner, and that it is a product either of innate, constitutional aspects of the personality, or more commonly of certain experiences in childhood. In this paper I shall begin by describing some of my investigations into this question, together with the theories which I was trying to test: this will serve as an example of empirical research in this area. Then I shall summarize the principal results of other investigations in this field. I shall then go on to discuss some rather more general implications of this kind of research, implications for moral responsibility, for the practice of praise and blame, for the pastoral interpretation of guilt feelings and for the treatment of criminals.

The studies to be discussed here are concerned with a particular aspect of the conscience, what Freud called the super-ego, and my remarks throughout will be limited to this. I shall say nothing about the ego-ideal, sympathy or ego-control, all of which may also be regarded as parts of the conscience. Let me explain what is covered by the super-ego by reference to an early experiment by Mackinnon (1938) at Harvard. A hundred students did a test, one at a time, in which it was very easy to cheat; however, the experimenter observed them through a one-way window and found out which students did and did not cheat. The non-cheaters when interviewed were found to experience more guilt feelings in everyday life than the cheaters—though they presumably had less to feel guilty about. When confronted by an insoluble and frustrating task the non-cheaters blamed themselves for their failure—while the cheaters blamed the experimenter; the non-cheaters scratched and picked at themselves in this situation, while the cheaters were observed to kick the furniture and damage the apparatus. I shall say that a person has a strong super-ego when he has high standards of conduct, is able to resist temptation, experiences guilt feelings when he falls short of these standards, and tends to direct aggression towards himself. Notice that we are not par-

ticularly concerned with the content of the super-ego, since this may vary in different cultural and historical settings.

So much for what is meant by the super-ego. The existence and usefulness of such a psychological concept may be defended by reference to studies such as Mackinnon's which show that the various elements are correlated, i.e. occur together in the same people, and by the studies to be presented which provide consistent evidence for the childhood origins of this aspect of personality.

A variety of methods has been used to assess the strength of the super-ago by different investigators. These include ratings by parents of children, observation of cheating, etc., in test situations, and story-completion. In the study to be reported here a questionnaire was constructed.

Before describing this study, I should give an account of some of the alternative theories which have been put forward by different psychologists, and which are still upheld by different groups of people.

(*a*) Perhaps the simplest to describe is the theory that the conscience is learnt as a result of punishment: the child who is always punished for cheating learns to anticipate the punishment when tempted to cheat, the anticipated punishment is experienced as anxiety or guilt, and he is able to avoid the temptation. This is a type of learning known to psychologists as 'avoidance conditioning'. The most direct test of this theory is provided by evidence on the effects of punishment on conscience-formation. Sears and others (1957) interviewed the mothers of 379 5-year-old children, and found a negative relation between use of physical punishment and guilt feelings, i.e. the more the punishment the less the guilt, which is the opposite of what the theory predicts.

(*b*) The classical Freudian theory of the super-ego is rather obscure. Briefly, when the 5-6-year-old child is forced to abandon the opposite-sexed parent as a love object at the end of the Oedipal period, it 'introjects' that parent. However, as Freud recognized, and has been later confirmed, the super-ego seems to be based more on the moral exhortations of the same-sexed parent. If we strip off these Oedipal trimmings, the Freudian theory still contains the germ of a very important hypothesis. When there is an intense and dependent relation between two people, such as parent and child, and when the parent is continually making demands for certain behaviour on the part of the child, the child will take over the demanding activity of the parent, and make the demands of himself. This is what is meant by 'introjection'. Some support for the theory lies in the fact that the conscience is commonly experienced as a separate part of the personality, in conflict with the self.

(*c*) Another theory is due to Anna Freud (1946), and is primarily concerned with the self-aggression which frequently accompanies the action of the conscience. It is postulated that when a child is confronted by a punitive and frightening parent, the child may make use of a de-

fence mechanism whereby it imitates the parent: this is known as 'identification with the aggressor'. It was observed by Bettelheim (1943) that some concentration camp prisoners imitated the guards, slavishly copying their treatment of other prisoners. On the other hand, much research on child-rearing shows that children are more likely to imitate parents when there is a warm relationship with them. A recent study by Bronson (1959) found that when there was a stressful relationship between father and son, some of the boys rejected their fathers as models, while others displayed an exaggerated masculinity and seemed to caricature their fathers. It seems as if identification with the aggressor can occur with *some* people under the conditions prescribed.

An Investigation of the Super-ego

I shall now describe briefly a series of investigations which we have been carrying out with the aim of testing these theories. The general method was to administer tests of strength of guilt feelings, and other personality traits, to see how far these correlated with reported childhood experience, in groups of 12-15-year-old children 60-100 in size. Thus, for example, if it is the case that physical punishment is a cause of guilt feelings, the children with the strongest guilt should report more physical punishment. Such statistical relationships were studied by working out the *correlations* between pairs of variables, and this gives a measure of the strength of such relationships.

The test of super-ego strength used was a guilt scale: this consists of a series of items arranged so that the subject indicates how guilty he would feel about engaging in the activity in question. The scale was purified by a statistical technique known as factor analysis, so that all the items in the scale correlate together. A similar scale was used to measure aggression against the self.

The type of discipline used was found by asking questions of the children themselves. This is one of the most difficult variables to measure satisfactorily—the children in this case may have forgotten, and their parents might not be candid. However, studies in which parents or children have been asked seem to produce very similar results. Another measuring instrument used was the so-called 'Semantic Differential' devised by Osgood and others (1957). Subjects indicate on a number of seven-point scales how they would describe THE KIND OF PERSON I WOULD MOST LIKE TO BE, THE SORT OF PERSON MY FATHER WOULD LIKE ME TO BE, and so on. From this various secondary indices can be built up, including the amount of conflict between self and super-ego. We defined identification with, for example, father, as the extent to which father and ideal self were described in similar terms on the Semantic Differential.

From each of the three theories described earlier, a number of definite empirical predictions follow, which were tested in these investigations.

For the low guilt subjects there was a high correlation between guilt and psychological discipline, i.e. the extent to which parents were hurt, shocked and withdrew affection when the child was naughty, as opposed to making use of physical punishment. Sears *et al.* (1957) found a correlation between psychological discipline and conscience formation, when there was a warm relation with parents, for their 5-year-old children. As we have formulated the introjection hypothesis it would be expected that withdrawal of love discipline would produce guilt feelings, since guilt corresponds to withdrawal of love and approval from oneself, which is the introjected result of this kind of parental treatment. On this theory the parental demands should continue as a separate section of the personality, and guilt feelings should be a function of the conflict between these demands and actual behaviour. We find that guilt is related to conflict in spheres of behaviour concerned with morality or achievement. Finally we find that the content of the super-ego's demands, as these are experienced, are most similar to the reported demands of the same-sexed parent. There is thus a certain amount of support for the introjection hypothesis, particularly for the low guilt subjects.

There is also support for the operation of an identification with the aggressor mechanism under certain conditions. High punishment *for aggression* results in either high or low guilt. It produces high guilt when there is also psychological discipline and identification with the father. For these subjects there is also the expected relationship between guilt, self-aggression and father-identification.

Although we did find that guilt correlated with extraversion—as predicted by the learning theory—this theory is quite unable to account for the complex pattern of relationship found, and must be abandoned.

The conclusions of our researches are that while the mechanism of introjection, as postulated, is primarily responsible for super-ego formation, the identification with the aggressor mechanism also functions under certain conditions.

Review of other findings concerning the origin of the conscience

A large number of studies have been concerned with the effects of different relations with the parents, and some of the results have been mentioned already. It is fairly clear that a warm, affectionate relationship during the years 3 to 10 is important. It has often been stressed by psychoanalysts that the earliest years are important, but there is no evidence that early variations in parental behaviour affect the super-ego, though it is probably necessary that the parents should be physically present.

The need for firm discipline and guidance is often the object of letters to the papers, and its importance is confirmed by research. However, when discipline is too strict it leads to submissive, overinhibited behaviour

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on the part of the child; when punishment is too severe it leads to aggressive delinquency.

There is considerable evidence that girls have stronger super-egos than boys. The reason for this is probably that the same-sexed parent is most influential, and that the mother is a more potent source since she was the origin of early nurturance. It is familiar that delinquency in boys is about eight times as common as delinquency in girls—though there are other contributory reasons for this. The greater suicide rate for males might be thought to be indicative of a stronger super-ego, but is probably to be explained in terms of the greater economic and other responsibility of the male in our society.

Similar considerations apply to variations with social class. All manifestations of super-ego strength show that middle class people have stronger consciences on average than working class people. This is simply the result of rather different methods of socialization in different classes.

Super-ego strength is regularly associated with certain other aspects of personality. For example it is found to be stronger in people of thin and bony physique, known as 'ectomorphs'. Another physiological finding is that the operation of leucotomy very much weakens the super-ego—which is of course very necessary for some mental patients. This suggests that the super-ego is intimately connected with the frontal lobes.

Some wider implications of this research

To begin with, I should like to make some remarks about the predictability of behaviour. Psychologists assume that human behaviour is lawful and predictable, so that in theory one should be able to say in advance how a person is going to behave in a given situation—provided that one knows the relevant psychological laws and has the necessary information about the person. These predictions can be made more efficiently in some situations than others. One of the better instances is in the prediction of delinquency. In one of the tables constructed by the Gluecks (1950), of boys with a certain combination of family characteristics, 98.1% will be delinquent. The predictability of behaviour is not incompatible with regarding behaviour as free. Behaviour is experienced as freely chosen when outside pressures are small. The fact that an observer might be able to predict which choice will be made shows that behaviour which is free to the agent may be predictable to the observer.

One reaction to such considerations has been to agree that the motivations and temptations are psychologically determined, but to suppose that some people are able to mobilise greater will power and, as a manifestation of free-will, overcome the temptation. What I think is wrong about this analysis is to suppose that there is anything particularly free or

voluntary about the mobilisation of resistance to temptation. As I have tried to show at some length, there are indeed individual differences in the strength of people's consciences, but this also is a wholly lawful and predictable matter. A person is acting just as freely, and also just as predictably, when he gives way to temptation as when he resists it.

To illustrate this point further, I would like to say a little about the dynamics of the conflict between the forces of conscience and the forces of temptation. In the first place the stronger the temptation and the weaker the super-ego and other restraints, the more likely a person is to give way. Thus cheating in school children is more likely to take place if the test is difficult and the results important (maximising the motivation), and if there is no surveillance and if the super-ego is weak (minimising the restraints). The super-ego can also be temporarily weakened by drink —it has been defined as that part of the personality which is soluble in alcohol. When the super-ego is sufficiently strong to more or less prevent the behaviour in question occurring, it is likely that the individual will be left in a state of undischarged drive arousal, for example of sexuality or aggression. This may seek expression in various indirect ways, and this is the whole area, which was first opened up by the psychoanalysts, of displacement and symbolic behaviour.

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Let us now consider the implications for the practice of moral praise and blame. On the traditional view that one could summon up will-power to resist temptation it followed that those who did so should be praised while those who did not might be blamed. If, as I have argued, the strength of the restraining forces is wholly predictable from antecedent events in childhood, it follows that it is no more appropriate to blame a person for having a weak conscience than it is to blame him for having a low intelligence or being too small. Neither is it appropriate to praise him if his conscience happens to be well developed. In fact the whole practice of praise and blame as commonly indulged in is mistaken.

There may however be some point in praising or blaming as a means of influencing future behaviour. If we hold that certain kinds of behaviour are undesirable, we may want to take steps to discourage them, and this may include telling people how wrong their behaviour is.

From the point of view of the agent the conscience acts as an indicator of whether he has done right or wrong: when he has done wrong he feels guilty. However the demands of the super-ego often include some rather out-of-date and arbitrary prohibitions, and may fail to include more important aspects of misbehaviour. From what has gone before it is clear that the amount of guilt experienced is no guide whatsoever to the amount of wrongdoing. The subjects who cheated in Mackinnon's

experiment felt less guilty in everyday life than the non-cheaters, yet the cheaters had more to feel guilty about. People with a thin and bony physique have stronger guilt feelings than others, yet their behaviour tends to be *more* restrained, not less. We should come to regard guilt feelings as part of the personality to be lived with, and to disregard those guilt feelings which we know to be caused by trivial acts of no moral significance. We should also beware of behaviour which we know to have evil consequences for others, but which does not happen to cause us any guilt. A possible example of the latter is drunken motoring, which, although illegal and extremely anti-social, appears to cause no guilt feelings whatever, presumably because it was not a misdemeanour which could occur in childhood and incur parental wrath.

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I turn now to implications for the treatment of criminals. The predictability of crime appears to be only half-accepted and understood by magistrates and judges. If a boy is found to come from a broken home and a delinquency area, sympathy is extended to him and he is treated leniently. If, on the other hand, the causes of his crime are more obscure, either to criminologists or to the judge, then it is taken to be his fault and he is treated more severely. In other words, one metaphysical model is used in the first case, and a different one in the second.

This leads us to the thorny question of legal responsibility. In this country, children under the age of 8, mental defectives, and certain ill-defined groups of mental patients are regarded as not legally responsible. Lady Wootton (1959) argued that since it is so difficult to draw the line between those criminals who are and those who are not insane in the relevant respects, it would be wiser to abandon this distinction and treat them all as patients. This is what is actually done in Luxemburg, and in fact it would not make much difference in this country as far as many classes of criminal are concerned. Lady Wootton's conclusion is of course entirely in line with our own argument, though for different reasons. A man commits a crime as a result of various empirical causes, and there is no point in trying to distinguish between those who are responsible and those who are not.

How would this point of view affect our treatment of criminals in practice? In the first place we should be less inclined to make use of punitive methods: if a person is not to be blamed then some of the grounds for punishing him are removed. However, punishment might be supported on the grounds of its reformatory or deterrent effect. If it was shown that punitive measures had such effects it would have to be considered how far they were justifiable in the light of the predictability of delinquent behaviour. So far there is no evidence that punitive meas-

ures such as corporal punishment, in any setting, have either reformatory or deterrent effects, so the question does not arise.

It is necessary to discover the methods of treating delinquents which are most successful in reforming them and in deterring others. The need for reform in penal practice is shown by the fact that although the majority of first offenders do not go to prison a second time, those for whom the treatment is unsuccessful may become repeated offenders, and go to prison 30 or more times. *They* have not learnt by experience, but neither have the authorities. One discovery in this area which may have rather awkward repercussions is that all delinquents are not best reformed by the same treatment—some need quite different handling from others. There is a danger that the use of this principle will clash with that of fairness. For instance, it seems likely that the typical gang member, whose personality is sound but who for various reasons has joined the wrong group, will not benefit at all from institutional treatment—this will merely strengthen his hostility to people in authority and strengthen his identification with other delinquents. There is some evidence that transferral to non-delinquent areas and organizations is the best approach for this type, but this might not be regarded as fair by those selected for institutional treatment. Furthermore, there is danger that the deterrent effect might be lost.

Other problems are created by the psychopath—the person with no conscience and no feeling for other people. The problem is that as yet no efficient means of reforming these people has been found, though many improve with time and are much improved by the age of 30. What is needed is more research into the classification of these people—for example into those who are primarily deficient in conscience, those who are affectionless, those who are impulsive. Secondly, more experimentation is needed with different methods of treatment for these various types to find the specific medicine for each. Here our researches into the origins of the conscience may bear fruit: perhaps the best way of creating a conscience where this is needed is by establishing a rather intense and dependent relationship with an older person, and for that person to make firm and clear demands for behaviour and to withdraw approval when these standards are not adhered to. Soon we should arrive at the point whereby psychopaths and other types of delinquent can be given treatment which will have a predictably efficient influence in strengthening their inner controlling mechanisms, which will enable them to resist anti-social temptations better in the future.

In conclusion it may be said that the investigations of the conscience which have been carried out so far show us the main empirical sources, although there is still some doubt over which theoretical model is most applicable. The findings are also sufficient to lead to the kind of implications which have been mentioned. There is, however, need for further

research to solve the practical problem of how to give a conscience to those who have failed to acquire one.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SEXUAL ETHICS

By the Rev. D. Sherwin Bailey, Ph.D., Rector of Lyndon, Rutland

'Sexual ethics' is an ambiguous term. Strictly speaking, it refers to the moral principles which should govern the mutual relations of men and women. But in the common usage of today it would generally be given a broader sense, to include also the moral principles applicable to every topic coming within the wide and somewhat imprecisely delimited field of what is now called sexology—artificial insemination, sterilization, abortion, homosexuality, sexual deviations, and the rest. In the brief time before us, it is obvious that we cannot range at large over so vast an area, and I propose therefore to keep strictly to the subject before us, and to deal only with the ethical aspects of the personal relation between man and woman—that is, with sexual ethics in its strict and (in my submission) proper meaning.

I realize that this immediately begs the question, What is 'sex'?—and here our discussion may well begin. 'Sex' denotes 'either of the two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male and female respectively' —but this is not what it means in popular journalism and literature, and in the colloquial speech of every day. There, its primary, neutral significance has been overlaid and distorted by a disproportionate stress upon the reproductive, and in particular the venereal, aspects of human sexuality, imparting to the word new overtones and emotional content, and a hint, either crude or subtle, of salacity and sensuality. Its decline from vulgarization into virtual nonsense is well illustrated by the reported comment of the editor of *Izvestia* when visiting the offices of the *Daily Mail*: 'Before the Revolution we, too, had sex; but not now'!

But sex in Man cannot be explained merely in terms of reproduction, or of coition and venereal pleasure, nor is it an irresistible power by which men and women are caught and enslaved. Originally, sex was simply a reproductive device one stage more advanced than binary fission, but it made possible the evolution of ever higher, more varied, and more complex forms of life in which the distinction between male and female grew progressively more elaborate. With the advent of Man a new factor, personality, emerged to sharpen and deepen this distinction, and in the end to invest human sex with a metaphysical significance which transcends, but does not supersede or diminish, its biological importance. It is here, in sex as a personal quality rather than a biological property or function, that we must seek the basis of sexual ethics.

To ask, What is human sex? is to ask, in effect, What is Man?—for the two questions are interdependent. If I begin my search for an answer in the Creation myths in the book of Genesis, it is simply because I find in them some very pregnant hints about the nature of Man which, when

followed up, throw a great deal of light upon the meaning of sex. Principally there is the declaration that God created *'adham* (Man—the human kind) in his own 'image', male and female together. We do not know with any certainty what the writer meant by this, but clearly it implies that in some significant way the 'adam' reflected the divine nature. Earlier attempts to define the 'image of God' sought it chiefly in Man's possession of spirit, freedom, reason, moral sense, and so forth; but recently attention has been directed also to its relational implications. Christianity conceives God as a coinherence of three co-equal, co-eternal divine Entities or 'Persons' in the unity of one Godhead; and on the finite plane Man, the image of God, is found also to be essentially a 'being-in-relation'—just as true human existence is essentially 'existence-in-community'.

Here is the clue to the meaning of human sexuality. Man is not sexually differentiated simply for the purpose of reproduction; he was created as a 'dual being' comprising two separate, distinct personal components (man and woman)—each as an individual completely and independently human, yet both naturally orientated towards one another and existing in a state of mutual belongingness which they are continually impelled to express in manifold kinds of relation. In Man, of course, sex retains its reproductive function, but this is now only one element in a factor of great complexity which divides the human race into two radically different yet complementary parts, and permeates our being to its roots, conditioning every facet of our individual life and personality. Human sex is, in fact, nothing less than the personalization of an ontological distinction in Man—a distinction which is bound up with the very nature and structure of humanity. As the myth says, Man was created male and female in the image of God; and this means, among other things, that from the moment of Man's emergence out of the pre-human condition, he was fundamentally this new and unique thing—a 'twofold being': a sexual duality of which man and woman are the individual and personal relational poles.

Sexual ethics must take account of the sexual structure of Man, and of the consequent relational obligations which devolve upon man and woman. Among these obligations, two are primary: to preserve sexual integrity, and to accept the duty of sexual partnership. The first means acceptance of one's sex in a positive spirit as something 'given' by God, and therefore not to be repudiated or deprecated. We are not concerned here with sex-denial as a psychological phenomenon, but rather with a social factor—sex-denial as the expression of a personal or cultural attitude deriving from misconception or perversion of the meaning of sex.

Every society evolves and continually modifies its ideas of what is 'manly' and 'womanly'. It defines the personal qualities and attributes expected of man and woman; the relative status of each sex; the func-

tions, rights, duties, and privileges accorded to men and women; and the approved patterns of sexual, and even venereal behaviour. These stereotypes are often arbitrary, they are never universal or unvarying, and they are not, of course, by any means all bad; but they both reveal and form the sexual ideas of society, and sometimes cause false conceptions of sex and sexual relation. It will be obvious that this standardization of sexual rôles and characteristics has ethical implications. There is a tendency, for instance, to approve what conforms to custom and to disapprove what contravenes it—and this is nowhere stronger than in sexual matters; but convention may not necessarily be a sound guide as to what is right and wrong. There is also the risk that false ideas or standards may come to be accepted as normal or desirable. The fact that a particular sexual rôle or concept is established in a culture does not make it morally or socially good; and in this connection it is specially important to watch the influence of mass communication upon the development of our own sexual stereotypes.

How, then, can false conceptions of what is manly and womanly be detected? By what criteria should the sexual ideas and values of a society be tested? Here I return to the Creation myths. The earlier, Yahwistic myth represents the creation of sex as something profoundly mysterious: the original human entity, or 'adam' was cast into a deep sleep, and was then resolved into its component sexual elements, which were given concrete personal existence as man and woman—for that is what the incident of the rib means. What God did in that period of the deep sleep remains his secret; Man, we may say, is aware of the fact of sex, but not of the inner significance of the fact. Awareness of being man or woman does not, of itself, convey any metaphysical understanding of sex; we have no intuitive comprehension of the meaning of manhood or womanhood but, as the myth suggests, we learn through relation—God brought the man and the woman together.

Sexual relation, whether generally in society or specifically in courtship, engagement, and marriage, means moving into a new dimension of human experience in which, through encounter with another who is human in a way radically different from oneself, sex becomes meaningful as a personal quality. True manliness and womanliness are not attained by striving to conform to stereotypes; that is essentially self-regarding and sterile. Just as I am most human when I forget myself and cease to be self-centred and self-sufficient, so I am most manly when I lose all false or artificial sex-consciousness in relationships of sincerity and integrity with the complementary half of humanity. Then I discern that manhood is more than maleness—which is simply impersonal sex. The significance of manhood consists, not in what I am for myself, but in what I am for another—this particular woman, whom I encounter in this particular relational context; and the same is equally true of womanhood.

Sexual relation, therefore, is a continual adventure in understanding, and in the pursuit of sexual integrity. When sexual attitudes and stereotypes are found to be incompatible with the knowledge mediated by sincere and responsible relation, there is good reason to doubt their validity. This obligation to seek and preserve sexual integrity is thus one of the foundations of an ethical view of sex.

We have already moved to the second obligation—acceptance of the duty of sexual partnership. By a fundamental law of their nature, the two sexes are orientated towards one another; being complementary and mutually dependent, they need each other for every kind of human activity, and not merely for procreation and the purposes of domestic life. Sexual partnership means nothing less than the free and equal association of man and woman in all the manifold interests and enterprises of social, political, and ecclesiastical life, thus liberating the creative dynamic of sex for the furtherance of the common good and the enrichment and elevation of human life as a whole.

Unfortunately there are obstacles in the way of partnership. First, there is our cultural obsession with the venereal element in sex, which creates a barrier between man and woman, and gives an unwholesome twist to what should be a natural and normal feature of human life, Then there is the persistence among us, often in subtle forms, of male-centred theories of sexual status and function, inhibiting creative co-operation between the sexes and buttressing false stereotypes of the social rôles and status of man and woman. The latter raises a very important ethical question—that of sexual order. There are no evolutionary, scientific, or empirical grounds for maintaining any longer an opinion that is in no way integral to the Christian religion—namely, that woman is in some sense subordinate to man. But it is difficult to speak of sexual order more positively for, like sex itself, it is something essentially mysterious —something of which we have no intuition or objective knowledge. As with manhood and womanhood, the meaning of sexual order can only be discovered in and through responsible relation—the experience of man and woman as they live and work together in partnership. It cannot be defined precisely, if only because it is as infinitely variable as sexual relation itself; but this at least can be affirmed—that sexual order is always basically one of complementation. Headship and subordination are really irrelevant issues; what really matters is that each sex should complement the other by playing the rôle appropriate to it in whatever relation the two are involved.

In deploring what I called our cultural obsession with the venereal element in sex, it is important at the same time to be realistic. We live in an environment which subjects our venereal impulses to continual stimulation, and often implies that their satisfaction is one of the most important things in life. We must neither treat these impulses as negligible,

nor overestimate the difficulty of controlling them. This brings us to one of the most important considerations in the field of sexual ethics. Right sexual relation, of whatever kind, depends upon obedience to the divine law pertaining to sex—an obedience which involves acceptance of the discipline of fidelity by the married and the single alike. Both must be faithful to the ordinance by which coition has been annexed to the common life of marriage in such a way that to detach it is to deprive it of its essential meaning. Both must also maintain the integrity of marriage—husband and wife, by an unqualified and unwavering mutual fidelity; the single, by studiously avoiding any course of action or personal entanglement which might endanger a marriage. Observance of this twofold discipline is essential to right sexual relation—but it is equally necessary to do everything possible to get rid of the idea that man and woman have basically but one common interest—in each other's bodies.

In spite of all that has been written about it, there is still no little confusion about the nature of coition, and it is not difficult to understand why this particular act should be so much a matter for ethical concern, when we consider its personal and social consequences. While the sexual tradition of the Christian West has chiefly stressed the generative aspect of coition, it is significant that the few biblical references to it have relational implication. Special interest attaches to I Cor. vi. 12-20, where St. Paul argues that 'prostitution' (which in this context seems to mean ritual coition) makes a man and woman 'one body'—that is, one-flesh. From this, the Church has always deduced that the one-flesh union is established by coition. No doubt the term 'one-flesh' originally signified in Hebrew usage little more than an identity of the individual with the group, and this sense may well underlie St. Paul's use of it—he who has recourse to a temple *hierodoulos* identifies himself with the idolatrous cult itself in an act of apostasy from Christ. But the idea of identification may properly be extended further.

Coition is an act, not simply of the genital organs, but of the whole 'body'—the whole person. It is never the act of an individual, for it always implicates another in such a way that the participants can never again be as they were before coming together. Once done, it can never be undone; its effect, though perhaps imperceptible, is indelible—and repetition only serves to deepen the impression made upon the personality for good or ill. That, too, is why coition makes man and woman one-flesh—deeply and inextricably involved in a relation which expresses the essence of their attitude to other persons. This alone is a weighty argument against casual or promiscuous coition; what may be regarded by a couple as nothing more than a passing indulgence can have unpredictable consequences; neither knows what reactions it may set up, what desires it may arouse, what needs it may reveal.

But what of coition that is not casual? Many today would hold that when a man and woman are in love, and perhaps engaged, the situation is changed—and this takes us to the heart of the problem of chastity. Though coition should always be an expression of love, it does not follow that love must always be expressed in coition. Coition, by its very nature, is the symbol of a particular relationship, founded indeed upon love, but consisting essentially in a common life 'at bed and board' —which means marriage. If a man and woman are not actually living together in the fullest sense, their coition occurs out of its proper context, and inevitably loses something of its meaning and value. Since engagement lacks the absolute finality of marriage, it cannot suitably be signified by an act so irrevocable in its personal consequences as coition. The significance of consummation in the formation of marriage comes partly from the fact that at last the relationship of the couple has entered a new and final phase. Coition should be the act of persons whose relation is such as to demand this form of physical expression; who are able and resolved to live out together the full implications of what they do, and to accept all that their mutual involvement means, both for themselves and for the community. In other words, it belongs essentially to the common life of marriage.

Thus the morally good act of coition must be in every respect free and responsible; it must also adequately fulfil the purposes which it was ordained to serve. Here it is better to avoid the somewhat barren arguments as to whether or not generation is primary. Coition has a double purpose; potentially it is a generative act, but being also a personal act, it has always a relational significance as well. There is no time now, however, to embark upon a discussion of the morality of recourse to artificial means of selecting against the generative end of the act in the interests of family planning. The case for and against contraception has been many times debated at length; what is not so often made clear is that it is an issue which illustrates, perhaps better than any other, the conflict between two different and apparently irreconcilable theological ideas about Man and his sexuality—one, broadly speaking, reflecting the conservative element in traditional western Christian thought, the other attempting to do justice to modern insights into the realities of sexual relation.

In this situation it is most important that married couples should see the question as one demanding a thoughtful, deliberate, and informed choice; but whether they actually make such a choice, or whether (as in most cases) they automatically accept or reject contraception on *a priori* grounds, one thing at least is certain—they do more than merely adopt an attitude to the practice of a particular technique. In the last analysis, knowingly or not, they declare themselves for one of two alternative interpretations of human sexuality, and of relation between man and

woman. Each, though exclusive of the other, is valid—granted the validity of othe premises upon which it is based; and at present it seems that we can hope for little more than a condition of peaceful and mutually respectful theological 'co-existence' in this area of Christian ethics.

The basic ethical factor in all human relation, and therefore in every kind of sexual relation, is love—concern for the good of the other, respect for his integrity, recognition of his personal reality, and willingness to give oneself in relation. But we recognise also a special kind of sexual love—a relation of complete and unqualified mutual self-committal, based on free decision, sustained by fidelity, and directed to the great enterprise of creating a common life—which is the foundation of marriage. This, admittedly, is not the 'love' of popular imagination and conventional sentimentality—a love too narrowly conceived in terms of venereal experience, predominantly emotional rather than rational, and basically fatalistic. It is the last that is particularly important from the ethical point of view, for love is often regarded as a kind of irresistible compulsion, in the grip of which men and women are impotent playthings of destiny, quite without responsibility for their actions. Falling in love is represented as a fatal experience, and everything must yield to the demands of passion—even marriage, home, and family, if these stand in the way of attaining 'happiness'. This kind of feverish infatuation, either with another person, or with love itself, is clearly not true love, and one cardinal point of difference must specially be stressed.

True love is indeed an overwhelming experience, but it should always be a moral one—one in which man and woman show themselves in their full human stature as responsible persons who hold themselves accountable for their actions, and not as puppets moving at the bidding of fate. Always, therefore, it involves a free decision by two who understand one another, who give themselves entirely and unreservedly to one another, and who accept one another as real persons, and not as symbols or channels of an erotic experience sought for its own sake. A deliberate, open-eyed choice must be made, in the belief that it is right and necessary, and with the resolve to stand by it at all costs. This does not divest love of its proper romanticism, but rather enhances it; it only emphasizes the fact that love always tends towards a point of decision at which moral and not emotional considerations should be determinative. It is a matter of the head as well as the heart—of the will no less than the feelings; but there is no inevitable tension here, for in true love both rational and emotional elements are harmoniously integrated.

So, too, with marriage; and in this connexion we may consider the ethical significance of the consent exchanged between the parties. As love tends towards a point of moral decision, so also it requires lovers to bear witness to their choice and its implications; and the vows which they make are also a public affirmation of that love in all its range and

depth, and a public acknowledgement of the obligations and duties which it lays upon them.

In the Marriage Service, bride and bridegroom stand before God and their fellows to declare that they have deliberately resolved to commit themselves finally and irrevocably to one another in a union which they accept as being essentially and necessarily permanent and exclusive. They do this, not primarily for the sake of society or the family, but in obedience to an inner relational compulsion. Love demands nothing less than total self-commitment to one beloved person for ever, and the 'vow and covenant' made between man and woman at marriage expresses their rational assent to this demand, and their determination to fulfil it. But the fulfilment itself is a task, not of a few months or years, but of a life-time; and in addressing themselves to it the couple are aided by the inventiveness with which fidelity successfully integrates the changes and crises of life into the whole relational pattern of their marriage. But marriage does not consist in a moral bond alone; otherwise it would not differ intrinsically from any other solemn compact. It is also a union of two in one-flesh—a 'coinherence' of man and woman, or participation by each in the being of the other, in which coition plays a vital role. As the 'vow and covenant' constitutes the moral basis of the permanence and exclusiveness of marriage, so this 'coinherence' constitutes its metaphysical basis, making it unique among human relationships.

These considerations have a bearing upon the problem of marriage breakdown. The covenant made between husband and wife at their wedding and sealed at its consummation establishes an ethical obligation of the most imperative kind to preserve the integrity and permanence of their union, and to spare no effort to deepen and enrich in every way the common life to which they are committed. In other words, marriage is essentially a moral union, and not simply a legal one. But it is also and equally a personal relation and, as such, subject to relational laws and principles in general. The weakness of the indissolubilist position is that it fails to recognize and allow for this. If a couple so far fail to honour their mutual obligation as to cause, or to acquiesce in, the disintegration of their relation, no useful purpose would seem to be served, and no principle maintained, by refusing to concede that the relationship had undergone a change so radical as to raise doubt about its continuing existence as a marriage. This does not mean, of course, that the two are not still mutually implicated, for they are bound together by their common involvement in sin and irresponsibility and the betrayal of love. A certain bond of guilt must remain, even though the relational context to which the vows apply and in which alone they are meaningful may have vanished; moreover, society itself has some share in responsibility for the breakdown and its consequences. But further discussion of marriage breakdown lies outside the scope of this paper.

In so short a space it is difficult to do more than touch superficially upon some of the more significant aspects of a subject like sexual ethics. I hope I have not disappointed you in refraining from 'good advice' and from offering solutions to some of our more pressing problems in this field. I have never ceased to maintain that our first task here is to seek and establish sound principles upon which to work, and in this paper I have again recorded my conviction that we need to think out again our sexual ideas and attitudes from the very beginning. That is why I attach so much importance to enquiry into the ontology of sex in Man, and why, therefore, I devoted time at the outset to a discussion of the metaphysical aspects of human sexuality, and the obligations which it creates for men and women.

A sexual ethic that is truly Christian must be based upon a conception of Man which takes seriously his sexual duality, and which sees sexuality, not merely in biological or venereal terms, but as a metaphysical factor in human life and relationship. It is towards an ethic so grounded that I believe the Holy Spirit is leading us in this age—and nothing else, I believe, can save our culture from its fatal obsessions and misconceptions in the sexual realm, and from the moral confusion which these produce. It is useless to tell men and women how they should behave, if we do not first explain the principles upon which sexual conduct of every kind must be founded; and the elucidation of those principles demands a revolution in our whole conception of sex itself in Man. Here, as elsewhere, I have tried simply to suggest where we may find a starting-point for this great task, and to indicate a few of the primary considerations to which we should attend.

THE RESOURCES OF CHRIST IN THE HEALING OF MENTAL PAIN

By Dr. Frank Lake, M.B., D.P.M.

Last month the third World Congress of Psychiatry met at Montreal. The new President of the World Psychiatric Association, Professor Cameron claimed 'that it was the task of the psychiatrist to go along with man in all his enterprises and to enable him to be himself'. He said 'that various fields of learning had at one time or another borne the responsibility of human leadership. At the present time psychiatry had this place, for there was nothing more important or urgent at present than that man should understand himself'.

As theologians, you may well feel that every sentence of this speech begs at least one question. At least you can see how large a view psychiatry has of its resources. Psychiatrists can 'help man to understand himself', 'enable him to be himself', and can 'bear the responsibility of human leadership'. Yet in many psychiatric quarters there seems to be considerable doubt whether even the most time-consuming and intensive psychiatric efforts, namely those of the psychoanalyst, are able to improve on time and chance in the relief of two thirds of psychoneurotic patients, and one third is unquestionably not helped. If we cannot do the job we are supposed to do, in curing the sick, how shall we guide the world?

We are being assured by organically-minded physicians that it is only a matter of time before all emotional disorders will be shown to have a biochemical basis which can be corrected biochemically. At the same time, other psychiatrists, seeing more deeply into the problem, as does Professor E. W. Anderson of the Department of Psychiatry in Manchester University, are not so optimistic. In summarising a recent symposium on the treatment of depression, he wrote, 'At the present, in psychiatry, it seems to be a fairly easy matter to shift certain acute psychotic symptoms. For instance, we can shift the symptoms of the depression by ECT; to some extent we can do it with the new drugs; . . . What we cannot do by such methods is to influence the underlying personality. The more I practise psychiatry', he says, 'the more I am impressed with what I think is the real problem in clinical psychiatry, which is precisely this problem of dealing with the underlying personality. . . . Many of the patients sent out as recovered after psysical treatment are not really so; they are left with their problems, having only had the symptoms of their depressive psychosis removed. Their personality disorder is often such as to call for prolonged psychotherapy afterwards.

That is all very true, but while, in a city such as Manchester with two million people, you can count the psychotherapists on the fingers of one hand (not counting the psychiatrists who are usually not formally trained

in psychotherapy at all, and in any case are mostly too busy for such things) it is difficult to see what the remedy is, if doctors continue to insist that personality disorder and emotional disturbances are illnesses which must remain the province of physical and psychological medicine. We tend to forget that until the Mental Treatment Act of 1930 brought psychoneurotic patients to the general hospitals and mental hospitals to be treated by psychiatrists, psychological medicine had largely been confined to the asylum and the care of the psychotic patient. On the whole, psychiatrists have never taken kindly to any method which required treatment by dialogue. Since, in many areas of Britain, the average length of time which a psychiatrist in the Health Service can spend with the patients in his care, amounts to about five minutes per patient per week; whatever his enthusiasm, talking is simply not practicable. The heart's desire of the psychiatrist is naturally therefore to find some drug which will be effective when prescribed at the end of five minutes' questioning. Undoubtedly there has been a break-through in the symptomatic alleviation of depression by drugs, which have most of the advantages and fewer of the disadvantages of electrical treatment. There have been some much less impressive advances in the treatment of anxiety. The mental pain of schizophrenia certainly is profoundly diminished by the drugs of the class we call tranquillizers. I well remember being told in India, by local doctors, of the effectiveness of the snake-root in the treatment of insane persons. It is the active principle of this drug, Reserpine, which became for a while the sheet anchor of our treatment of schizophrenia. A most unscientific amount of wishful thinking has led some psychiatrists to claim that the whole human problem of emotional disorder will soon yield to the practitioner prescribing pills.

And yet, Dr. T. S. Szasz (who has contributed extensively to psychiatric literature in recent years) writing about the psychoneuroses and personality disorders, claims that 'The notion of *mental illness* has outlived whatever usefulness it might have had, and . . . now functions merely as a convenient myth. . . . Mental illness is a myth whose function it is to disguise and thus render more palatable the bitter pill of moral conflicts in human relationships'. When a serious psychiatrist can write in a reputable journal in such terms, it is evident that there is considerable uncertainty among psychiatrists as to what personality disorders and psychoneurotic phenomena are. They are manifest as mental pain with well-recognised symptoms, but *are* they biochemical disturbances, twisted molecules on the germ cells, disturbances of the racial unconscious, constitutional misfortunes, the outgrowth of traumatic experiences in the sphere of inter-personal relationships in infancy, a lack of moral fibre, repressed sexuality, spiritual weaknesses, sinful attitudes against God and man, disorders of the conscience, as Stekel would

claim, pathological variants of ontological anxieties of identification with non-being, meaninglessness, or guilt (to use Tillich's analysis), the effect of repressed feelings of isolation and estrangement, as Anton Boisen claims, faulty education, the result of sparing the rod, or devil possession? There are serious contenders for all these theories of understanding the mental pain of the psychoneuroses and the personality disorders.

Whether we can understand these conditions or not, they have certainly never been more prevalent than today. Never has the cost of treating them with drugs, alcohol, tobacco and entertainment, in institutions, hospitals, divorce courts and prisons ever risen to such astronomical proportions.

When psychiatrists and medical psychologists are standing together on a platform addressing the world, they make many more brave claims for the resources they command than they can substantiate or even agree about in clinical conference. Organically-minded psychiatrists pour scorn on the relevance of the dynamic understandings which have stemmed from Freud. Those who favour analytic understandings are certain that those who oppose them are obscurantists blinded by their own complexes. No school of thought, attempting to explain the neuroses, commands more than a minority support, taking a world census among doctors.

On the view that phenomena should be understood on the basis of their higher organisations, rather than on the lower mechanisms which subserve them (in the sense that one would explain the appearance of salty water round the eyes of one's wife in terms of a human emotion to do with sorrow, or perhaps joy, rather than the other way round, that she feels sorrow or joy because the lachrymal glands are producing salt water) I would myself interpret these complaints in terms of their highest combinations and components, which are undoubtedly to do with personal relationships. That is to say they are to do with the human spirit in society, and if God is at work in the world at all, with the response of the human spirit to the activities of the Spirit of God.

Excluding those illnesses such as schizophrenia or maniac-depressive psychosis in which the hereditary determinants are shown by twin-studies to be extremely strong, I know of no evidence to do with personality disorders and the psychoneuroses which is not most satisfactorily understood by regarding them basically as problems of early and recent interpersonal relationships, and their effects upon the whole psycho-physical organism.

Psycho-dynamic theory and factual knowledge about the origins of anxiety within the first year has made considerable strides recently. It is now fairly generally conceded that the human being's basic experiences of anxiety are related to the special conditions under which being as a person is possible within the first year of life. A great deal more is known

about the dynamics of the origin of the human spirit in the first year. For most of this first year, the baby has no capacity for separate personal existence. It can conceive of itself as 'in being' or alive as a person only by identification with the mother's being and person. The dichotomy which later distinguishes the boundaries between the baby's 'I' and the mother's 'thou' is not possible at this stage. The infant is in 'the womb of the spirit'.

The analogy of the physical womb is an apt one. There the foetus is manifestly only a term of a tri-partite relationship. First, the source of life, is mother and her womb. Second, the relational elements constituted by the placenta and the umbilical cord; the foetus itself is merely the third term of this relationship. It has no life of itself. If the relational term, the cord, is constricted, the foetus becomes distressed, if blocked it dies. Yet if all goes well, merely by responding to the supplies that come to it, at the end of nine months an 'I-my-body' is born. The baby is still dependent upon mother, but the mode of that dependence is no longer by identification, but in a duality of bodies.

Ontological analysis recognises that for approximately nine months after birth the human personality is in precisely the same relationship to the personality of the mother for growth and development as, in the womb, the physiology of the foetus was dependent on the physiology of the mother. Personal being, or spirit, or self-hood, that which ultimately says 'I-my-self', is the result of nine months more or less response of the baby to the supplies of personal or spiritual being from the mother. The quality of the relationship with her is the quality of the self. If all goes well, if the mother gives constant and reliable access to the sight of her countenance, the infant will live in the light of it. The answer to the question 'Who am I?' is found in the eyes of the mother. The look in her eyes and the sound of her voice create a sense of being and belongingness. The 'umbilical cord' or relational element by which this spiritual being passes to the baby, is subserved by all the sensory modalities, by the sound of her voice, by her touch, by smell, but especially by sight. In the early months of infancy there is very little capacity to retain a sense of the mother's existence unless she can be seen. The reverberating circuits which preserve within the mind, the sense of the mother's substance and reality, even when she cannot be seen, develop only towards the end of this period. Round about the fourth month of life, though interested by a red brick, a baby loses interest in it as soon as it is concealed. But nearer the ninth month, interest is not lost in the interesting object when it is covered up. Reverberating circuits retain the information that it still exists and has substance though invisible. The covering hand is pulled away. The umbilical cord of sight begins to be supplemented by the umbilical cord of faith. 'Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' The infant is now able to retain a lively sense of mother's reality and substance.

About this time the transition occurs from life by monistic identification with the mother, a life of utter dependence of her manifest presence, to the ability to exist in duality as a person in one's own right. An 'I-myself' has been born from the womb of the spirit.

Now without stopping to offer you the evidence of this assertion, I would say that analysis, especially under lysergic acid diethylamide tartrate (or LSD, for short), which enables patients to re-live vividly these early months, leaves me without any doubt at all that the roots of all the major psychoneuroses, the hysterical states and personality disorders, the phobic reactions, conversion reactions of mental pain to physical symptoms, the schizoid personality disorders, anxiety depressions and obsessional or scrupulous states, and many of the roots of delinquency, as well as of stress disorders, derive from separation-anxiety incurred in this primitive phase within the first year. I must expand this a little, because this is the only way I can explain to you what we mean by mental pain, and it is when you understand the nature of this, that you will see what sort of resources can be expected to alleviate or cure it.

The roots of all the psychoneuroses lie in mental pain of such proportions as could not be retained in the infant's consciousness, but was split off and repressed, about the time of its first occurrence. These anxious experiences have remained as the buried roots of mental pain. The cause of these was principally separation-anxiety, endured during the early months of life, when, to be separated from sight and sensory perception of the source of being in mother or her substitute was tantamount to a slow strangling of the spirit and its impending death. A secure infant, which has begun to build up reverberating circuits of confidence and ego-strength towards the end of its period in the womb of the spirit, has much greater capacity to sustain patiently the absence of mother without anxiety, and indeed to rage for its rights, than has the infant who suffers this maternal deprivation in the early months. Particularly is this so if there has been a difficult labour, with damage to the child entering the world, or difficulty in establishing breathing, or feeding, early upsets, frights and fevers. All these diminish the strength of the human spirit and render the infant more susceptible to injurious anxiety when left alone or otherwise maltreated.

We find that the infant exposed to the intolerable strain of separation-anxiety reacts in one of two ways; either *passively*, if the experience comes early and there is little confidence in the maternal source, or later on, *actively, by rage*, against, not the mother (for she is hardly a separable object), but the whole condition of life-by-identification with a source of being who ought to appear, but does not. This rage, because one's rights are infringed, is combined with anxiety because one is powerless to exist without a 'thou' for one's 'I'. This rage, turned back

upon itself by apprehension, eventually leads to that very common pattern of breakdown which we call the Anxiety Depression.

On the other hand, *passively endured anxiety* leads down to an extreme panic of impending loss of personal being, and identification with non-being. If this condition, caused by the lack of anyone to pay loving attention, has to be split off and repressed, the personality pattern reacting against it in consciousness is that of the hysteric, whose life is dedicated to attracting and holding attention, by fair means or foul. But beyond the pain of panic, which is still longing for the mother to come, is the margin of intolerable stress, beyond which ultra-maximal stressing has occurred. The flame of hope for life-by-relatedness-to-a-human-being has been snuffed out in agony. The urgent longing for mother to return, so that one may live by her, is replaced by an equally urgent wish to die and to have nothing more to do with the world of women, the flesh, matter, and human commitment. The spirit has died in dread. What previously caused pain now gives pleasure. What gave pleasure before, to be looked at, to be touched, to be loved, to be cuddled, all these now cause pain, and the infant shrinks from them. It has experienced, before its sixth month has been reached, the appalling terrors of dereliction. Re-experiencing this even forty years later, the patient will suffer from a state of dread in which all sense of reality and personality is lost, with a deep self-loathing. Such persons, in the Schizoid Position, feel that they would not contaminate decent society, much less heaven by entering it with their wretched selves.

The Schizoid Defence against this is by introversion, to become oneself, by thinking about oneself, the centre of one's own life. Whereas for the normal healthy human being the only basic definition of life would be 'Respondeo ergo sum', the schizoid person, in default of anyone to think about him, is forced with complete accuracy to define himself, as Descartes did, by thinking about himself; 'Cogito, ergo sum'.

Wm. Temple used to say that this Cartesian dictum was the greatest disaster in modern European history. It is a disaster to me because it is a flimsy structure of intellectual pride, erected on a battlefield of a shattered and defeated infant spirit. Those who begin adult life defending against deep ontological anxiety and dread with the proud assertion 'I think, therefore I am' are often reduced before many years to the awful truth about the roots of their being, and with nausea groan out 'I stink, therefore I am'.

As Chesterton wrote, 'There is a sceptic far more terrible than he who believes that everything began in matter. It is possible to meet the sceptic who believes that everything began in himself'. 'For him his own friends are a mythology made up by himself. He created his own father and his own mother. This horrible fancy has in it something decidedly attractive to the somewhat mystical egoism of our day. Those seekers

after the Superman who are always looking for him in the looking glass, all these people have really only an inch between themselves and this awful emptiness'.[1]

Beginning in infancy, the damaged ego had to adopt a variety of defences against these forms of separation-anxiety, of identification with non-being, or of rage against the sources of being, or of the loss of well-being into meaninglessness and emptiness. Though all these roots of mental pain are lost in the deep unconscious, they remain powerful sources of the compulsive reaction pattern which we make to life, and when, for one reason or another, in adult life the unhappy pattern seems to be repeating itself, the infantile pain is liable to emerge, along with its original fixed and rigid defences.

Neurotic anxiety is therefore not merely the result of unhappy events in the present. If, in fact, a human being can see no friendly looks or voices, to be afraid of actual loneliness is a quite reasonable fear. Neurotic anxiety is the addition to that reasonable fear of strange, apparently unreasonable, terrors. But they are not unreasonable. The contemporary patterns have evoked their prototypes lying dormant at the roots of being. Working in this way, the buried past turns a tolerably fearful present moment into an intolerable, uncontrollable, disorganising mental pain. It makes a man feel, 'as it was in my beginning, is now, and ever shall be'. The feelings of absolute dereliction, panic, or impossible rage emerge into consciousness alongside the appropriate feelings and distort the sufferer's whole perception of his social environment. Just as the infantile anxieties were overwhelming and desperate, so they seem to be now.

If this is the nature of the conditions of mental pain leading to nervous breakdown, psychoneuroses and personality disorders and the like, what sort of resources are we looking for to remedy them? If we understand anxiety as the reverberation of a painful separation from personal being, by loss of relationship with its source in a loving parent, it is simply the most logical step that a therapist or pastor could take to provide just this quality of accepting and undemanding relationship. In providing an experience of re-relatedness in depth, we are making it possible for the sufferer to move away from his area of primitive anxiety, in which all resources are obscured from the mind and perceptions of reality are distorted, by drawing him back into a place of safety and personal bondedness. From being in a tight spot of anguish, the provision of true fellowship makes him feel, sometimes at once, that his feet have been set in a large room.

The resonance of emotions from the earliest experiences of life works both ways. Just as present loneliness induces pathological separation-

[1]Abridged from 'Orthodoxy', by G. K. Chesterton. London. Fontana, 1961, p. 26.

anxiety, its opposite, namely true company, will combat this neurotic anxiety. The substitution of good relationships, in which the lonely person is cared for, will displace the resonance of early anxiety-provoking situations by the resonance of such other good experiences of infancy as are available on the reverberating circuits of memory. The anxious person is thus re-mind-ed that his infant loneliness was often met by mother love. In this way, the mere provision of an attentive listener can put to flight an army of irrational fears.

You can see now quite clearly what this situation of mental pain demands of man or God, if they wish to be of help. I want to divide this consideration of resources into two sections.

First, the Christian resource which is really open to every one to do, namely attentive listening. Instead of putting this in my own words, I want to use the far stronger words of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, confessional leader and theologian, whose father, you remember was one of the greatest German psychiatrists of the last generation.

> 'The first service that one owes to others in the fellowship consists in listening to them. Just as love to God begins with listening to His Word, so the beginning of love for the brethren is learning to listen to them. It is God's love for us that He not only gives us His Word but also lends us His ear. So it is His work that we do for our brother when we learn to listen to him. Christians, especially ministers, so often think that they must always contribute something when they are in the company of others, that this is the one service that they have to render. They forget that listening can be a greater service than speaking.
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> Many people are looking for an ear that will listen. They do not find it among Christians, because these Christians are talking where they should be listening, but he who can no longer listen to his brother will soon be no longer listening to God either; he will be doing nothing but prattle in the presence of God too. This is the beginning of the death of the spiritual life, and in the end there is nothing left but spiritual chatter and clerical condescension arrayed in pious words. One who cannot listen long and patiently will presently be talking beside "the point", and be never really speaking to others, albeit he be not conscious of it. Any one who thinks that his time is too valuable to spend keeping quiet will eventually have no time for God and his brother, but only for himself and for his own follies.
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> Brotherly pastoral care is essentially distinguished from preaching by the fact that, added to the task of speaking the Word, there is the obligation of listening. There is a kind of listening with half an ear that presumes already to know what the other person has to say. It is an impatient, inattentive, listening, that despises the brother and is

only waiting for a chance to speak and thus get rid of the other person. This is no fulfillment of our obligation, and it is certain that here too our attitude toward our brother only reflects our relationship to God. It is little wonder that we are no longer capable of the greatest service of listening that God has committed to us, that of hearing our brother's confession, if we refuse to give our ear to our brother on lesser subjects. Secular education today is aware that often a person can be helped merely by having someone who will listen to him seriously, and upon this insight it has constructed its own soul-therapy, which has attracted great numbers of people, including Christians. But Christians have forgotten that the ministry of listening has been committed to them by Him Who is Himself the great listener, and Whose work they should share. We should listen with the ears of God that we may speak the word of God.'[2]

So far, clinical theological counselling would seem to be closely paralleled by the non-directive counselling much in vogue in the United States. As Christians, however, our resources only fully come into action when the listening process has developed the situation until the whole of the abyss is laid clear. God has spoken precisely to this situation in the death and resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ. We listen to the sufferer and then we listen together to God's Word in Christ. The once Jewish psychiatrist Karl Stern listened to the stories of torture and agony which came fro mthe concentration camps. He could see no answer to the riddle of the abysmal suffering which he had witnessed. He turns all answers aside as inadequate and writes: 'There is only one who unites all these secrets in His suffering, and that is Jesus Christ. The more you dwell on it, the more it becomes clear that in His agony He anticipated the hidden agonies of innumerable individuals. If we are concerned with the suffering of those innocent ones, we have first to look at Him. If we are concerned with the Evil which has brought it about, we have first to look at ourselves. Everything else is deception'.

So indeed we find it to be. The two basic sources of evil in human life, even in the first year where mental pain takes its roots, may be summed up either as deprivation, or as depravity. There are those evils which we suffer passively, at the hands of others, and there are those evils which we inflict on others, because of rage, aggressiveness, and the destructive emotions of jealousy, envy and greed.

When the attentive listener has, for instance, penetrated behind the total loss of any of the qualifications of spirit, love, joy and peace, which are missing from the depressive person, he comes upon that inner rancour, rage and bitterness which the old authors on accidie consistently

[2]The Ministry of Listening, from *Life Together,* by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Published by S.C.M. Press, 1954, London.

found to be present, along with the lust fantasies which we, too, expect to unearth. What about these destructive rages against the very sources of being? The depressed person is terrified of them. He cannot even bring them into consciousness. And yet what is Christ saying? Just this. That even if all we can bring to Him is a passionate and compulsive desire to murder the very sources of Being, and Himself as ultimately responsible for all Being, then this is an acceptable offering. The first person to benefit from His death was, after all, a murderer. When our evil is active, with hammer and nails, His love receives it with the utmost passivity, to the breaking of His Body and the shedding of His Blood. When we have done our worst, God's best, His resurrection, brings Him back to us. The Blessed Sacrament of the broken Body and the shed Blood is a continual reminder to those whose compulsive rages break out, or are turned upon themselves in depression, that the love of God has, once for all, come into cosmic conflict with the rage of man, particularly the bitter rage of religious man, and that the product is the Sacrament upon which we are bidden to feed.

This is the one great resource to which we draw the attention of all depressed persons as soon as the rage can be brought to consciousness as something which must be dealt with. Until it is dealt with, the Holy Spirit cannot live in a house which secretly is the home of bitter destructiveness against the sources of being and of libidinal fantasies which look for satisfaction not in a true personal relationship with God or man, but only in sensuous erotic pleasure.

What about those more ghastly agonies of dereliction and passive suffering which the ignorance and carelessness of human parents, or the stupidity which replaces God's pattern of caring, 'Call unto Me and I will answer thee' by the sadisms of Truby King, 'Call as much as you like, you are to be left to cry'. As a young woman at a university who suffered from both hysterical and schizoid personality disorders said to me in a voice full of hollowness and wretchedness, 'God's permissive will is just too ghastly'. When these are recalled to consciousness, the agonies which these people suffered in infancy are such as to load them with compusive doubt as to the very existence of a just or good or reasonable God. God has to justify Himself in the face of this inner accusation against His vice-regents, the parents, who the the 'gods' of our natural religion, or lack of it, the 'gods behind God'.

It would not do that Christ should, like us, endure passive suffering in the mode of passivity, because this would make Him merely into one more martyr. He must endure the ultimate evils of dread and transmarginal stressing into forsaken-ness and dereliction, not in a passive passivity, but in an active passivity. He must know that at any point, twelve legions of angels could deliver Him, that He could come down from the Cross, that this cup could pass from Him. In fact, we know He

did endure, in deliberate willed passivity, those terrors of passive suffering in which He was identified with that most terrible mental pain which I, as a psychiatrist, know of, the pain of dereliction, of agonised identification-with-Nothingness.

Psalm 22 shows us that all those physical accompaniments of agony, the bones as if out of joint with weakness, the bowels poured out like water, the heart like melting wax, the tongue cleaving to the gums, are all a part of this experience most movingly recognised by those who are undergoing a re-entry into schizoid dread. The knowledge that He is there, in hell, waiting for them, enables them no longer to run away from that experience of mental agony, but to advance in the power of His Holy Spirit, bravely towards it. What cost our Blessed Lord most to achieve for us in His redemptive work, that from which He shrank most, is for me the greatest resource in Christian psychotherapy.

I cannot myself go down to such depths with my patients. I can only be with them, speaking to them of Christ, Who does.

There is a third form of anxiety where what is threatened in infancy is not the total loss of being, but the loss of well-being. When the mother's sustenance, either of food or of personal care, fails, so that the infant is passively subjected to deprivation, the whole world seems persecutory to it, its rights are taken away and all has become empty and meaningless. One has not to go far in exigesis of the gospel record of the Crucifixion to show that our Blessed Lord is no stranger either to this form of human suffering.

I wish, in closing, to read you a few paragraphs from a letter I received from a young woman reading for an honours degree at a university, who has suffered all her life from mental pain of deep intensity, both of the passive sort into schizoid dread and hysterical clinging, and also the active sort which has led to severe depressions, with anxiety. She speaks of

> 'The sheer frustration of being just who I was, unchangeable and unable to escape either from the demands of the world or from the vicious circle of my own thoughts and being. Every difficult situation I met brought this fear closer and closer until I felt it would destroy me. The mental pain was at times so intolerable—the kind of pain which tortures but does not quite kill—that I was terrified that I would either kill myself or go mad.
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> 'When the last straw came, there was a floundering and terrible falling. I felt the horror of the quicksand's clutch and felt that every human hand was over me to push me down. I could neither understand what was happening to me, nor explain it to anyone else. I was blank, stunned, unable to think. My mind was so tired, and ordinary thought was so painful physically. I only only wanted to curl up

tightly on the floor, my face hidden, still and numb, rigid with fear, not daring to hope, because disappointment and disillusion had kicked me in the stomach for too long. When at last I did raise my head, it was to see the surroundings of chaos, meaningless confusion of the hell into which I had fallen. . . .

'From this time I would have made no further effort for myself. There was no point. But I had two or three friends who had watched me fall over the last few weeks, and whose love for me, faith in me, and hope for me persisted when my own were gone. They prayed on my behalf when I myself was no longer capable of prayer. They persisted so long and earnestly and lovingly that the minutest response in me, the barest wistfulness that this need not be so, brought me to the faintest desire to please them.

'And so I sought psychiatric help, partly for their sake, and partly in response to the sense they had given me that it was my duty as a Christian to do so. When I came for help I came in a quiet despair. The doctor's words of confidence and hope only brought tears to my eyes, and bowed my head further. . . .

'The doctor told me that when I fell to the bottom, Christ would be there. He had been there first. That was what man's rejection of Him, innocent, had meant. That had been his hell. I understood, unchanged. He showed me that behind the depressions I had suffered there was more destructive rage against the very sources of being than had ever been allowed to emerge, even into consciousness. I need not be afraid of it. I was to bring it to the Cross and be there with his murderers, joining them, recognising that I was so furious that I was really among them. Beyond the Cross would be the Resurrection and the Sacrament. I listened, but at the time it seemed little more than words. . . .

'At this point she describes herself, in the chapel alone at night, confronting the cross, and "angrier than ever I remember being" crucifying Him. "Then I saw His face, and on it twisted every familiar agony of my own soul'.

'Nothing can bind us closer than common dereliction for nowhere else is companionship so longed for. From that moment I was tied on to Christ, knowing that the rope would hold if I fell in the climb as He led me slowly and firmly out of hell, sometimes out of sight ahead of me, then dear and firm and calm as I scrambled up to His side. Even the word "love" had no meaning beside our common bond and the companionship of the climb. The debt was too great, too repeated for the ordinary courtesy of thanks. My thanks were all in the obedience with which I followed Him, slowly learning to trust His commands even when they seemed crazy and perilous.

'The first stage of the climb was spent in reconciling in my mind the

two views I now had of God: the being I hated, who was responsible for the universe and who still had not answered my question, and the living Christ whom I relied upon and adored.

'The Father is either unbelievably and appalling foul, or the most marvellous thing that ever happened—and if He is the first that no more fits in than if He is the second. I can hold Him at arm's length all day, but He has a way of holding you in the palm of His hand when you kneel and of making you know His healing within you that your defences against Him fall one by one without either your notice or your consent. In that calm somehow I can never remember what it was that I wanted to ask Him.

'And so slowly, in spite of myself, I was led to the point where I fearfully but firmly committed myself to the Trinity, and pledged myself to the belief that the Christ I had met at Calvary was in fact in unity with Him for whom I had searched. My hatred was still real but I was now increasingly certain that it had been directed towards the wrong object. I still did not know where the source of evil lay, but I was confident that it was not in God. With the restoring of the hierarchy as I worshipped God came the peace which passes all understanding.

'We cannot alter the past however much we want to, but we *can* use it and thereby make it a privilege and not a burden. To know something of what Calvary cost Christ is not only our dearest privilege, but also our greatest means of help to those still in darkness. The use of this knowledge in the service of God brings purpose to what was otherwise purposeless, and brings too a joy far beyond anything we could imagine. It restores the heaven we once felt we had lost.'

PERSONAL HISTORY AND CHRISTIAN PREACHING

By the Rev. A. O. Dyson, B.A., Assistant Curate of Putney

The attitude of the Jesuit Hardouin to history, around the year 1700, has been described as 'critical doubt about a theory of history'.[1] At the height of the French Enlightenment history was described as 'fable convenue'. Schopenhauer's view of history has been called 'fundamentally inimical'.[2] Such random and often inchoate doubts about the validity and usefulness of conventional historical writing, of which examples could be multiplied indefinitely, reached their peak in the years immediately following the First World War. Consequently Becker, writing in the 'Neue Rundschau' of 1927 was able to say, 'the era of historiography is past . . . belief in the objective surveyal of history has disappeared; and in its place, it is the subjective, the contrived, the philosophical, the artistic and the religious aspects, previously the objects of so much scorn, which have received an unexpected and almost exclusive evaluation, even over-evaluation'.[3]

The sources and manifestoes of this new view of secular history reveal promptly its major emphasis. Dilthey, an important precursor, proposes for example that the aim in understanding and interpreting history is, 'somehow to express the inner self, and somehow to place it before oneself and communicate it to others'.[4] Roughly speaking, the route leads from here via Husserl with his analysis of the cognitive patterns of consciousness, to Heidegger, who, from a similar phenomenological standpoint, breaks down history and tradition, to seek original and fundamental experiences in philosophy and religion which lead to a knowledge of the nature of man.[5]

The other liberal disciplines also reveal the influence of this so-called crisis in historiography, e.g. the sociology of Max Weber and Max Scheler,[6] the psychology and typology of world-views found in Pinder and Mannheim,[7] and the cultural-historical typology of Preuss, Wieser

[1]Karl Heussi, *Die Krisis des Historismus,* Tübingen, 1932, p. 23.

[2]op. cit. p. 23.

[3]C. H. Becker, *Die Neue Rundschau,* XXXVIII, 1927, p. 113.

[4]H. Holborn, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XI, 1950, p. 104.

[5]cf. Heussi, p. 37, 'In the years 1925-1930 the transformation of phenomenology effected by Martin Heidegger began to exert a strong influence upon problems of historiography; the decisive factor in this was the combination of Husserl's phenomenology, which was neutral towards problems affecting the philosophy of history, with thoughts deriving from Dilthey'.

[6]cf. the role of sympathetic understanding and valuation in Weber (*Ges. Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, 1922). cf. also Scheler's notion of the relation of ideas and beliefs to social structure and development (*Die Wissensform und die Gesellschaft*, 1926).

[7]cf. Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' (Holborn, *supra*, p. 117).

and others.[8] Thus in the 1920s a view of history overtook many secular disciplines, which made them first and foremost the arenas of the individual.

Now Bultmann has clearly recognised in his Gifford Lectures[9] the far-reaching importance of this revolution in historical thinking in Germany. But the remarkable step that Bultmann takes is to assert that this reduction of history, be it down to individual sociology, anthropology or psychology, is no more than a secularized version[10] of a similar biblical reduction which can be made, starting with the Old Testament's two main conceptions of history.

The Israelitish view of history[11] is this-worldly, involving a critical examination of the past leading to warning for the present. For it is history itself that reveals the Lordship of God. The future salvation is also this-worldly, but variously conceived, as a land of plenty, as return from the exile, as a temple-centred people. The apocalyptic view of history,[12] on the other hand, sees the goal in terms of cosmic catastrophe. In this case, as Bultmann says, it is more appropriate to speak of the end of history rather than the goal of history. Such a conception does not illuminate the passage of history, but only states that it will come to an end at a time appointed by God. Bultmann argues that the New Testament reflects both these conceptions, but shows a marked preference for the apocalyptic view.[13] In certain parts of the Acts[14] however, and in Paul, there is a significant change of emphasis in that the end of history is associated with the event of Jesus. Hence Bultmann's dictum, '. . . history is swallowed up in eschatology'.[15] But with the delay in the parousia Paul moves even further away from an historical standpoint, to evaluate such Christocentric history instead from his view of man. Two examples show how these individualising, anthropologising tendencies work out in practice. First the fact that Paul sees the history of Israel as a unitary history of sin,[16] makes it clear that he is assessing history not in terms of history but of anthropology, from his insight into man as objectively under the rule of the law. Secondly Paul does not generally define salvation as a future reward for the people, but as a present reality

[8]H. Preuss, *Luther und der gotische Mensch,* 1919. M. Wieser, *Der sentimentale Mensch,* 1924.

[9]R. Bultmann, *History and Eschatology,* Edinburgh, 1957.

[10]op. cit. pp. 73, 123 f.

[11]op. cit. pp. 18-22. For this section see also Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen. Dritter Band,* Tübingen, 1960, pp. 92-94.

[12]*History and Eschatology,* pp. 27-31.

[13]op. cit. p. 31.

[14]cf. Acts 13, 38-41.

[15]op. cit. p. 37.

[16]Rom. 10, 21.

for the individual. Hence what matters is the history which each individual experiences. This is what I shall call from now on personal history; and it is in this area that the true historical life (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of the individual lies.

Having now looked at two approaches to the notion of personal history, one secular and one biblical, I go on to define more precisely some characteristics of this personal history.

Such personal history is not related to a concept such as character, for Bultmann excludes any Greek notion of nature (φύσις). This because personal history is not an assured possession or endowment. The indicative 'have' always requires the imperative 'be'.[17] In other words the decision of faith is never final, it needs constant renewal in every fresh situation. From this it is obvious that in personal history the concepts of past, present and future, are of considerable importance. First the past; salvation for Paul involves freedom from law, sin and death, and, where the grace of God is thus at work in the individual, he is wholly released from the bondage of the past,[18] but also from his particular pasts, i.e. certain past decisions or events which seek to control and shape his present life. Second the present; however complete this release from the past and availability for the present may be, it cannot in turn be reckoned an assured possession. For if the individual in his present commits himself to this-worldly security, attaching himself to tangible realities, and to the self, especially in the form of self-confidence, he will shut out the invisible intangible realities on which his life in faith depends.[19] Clearly the present is of paramount importance in this account of personal history. It is the time when intentions are framed, where demands are faced and decisions taken. In such decisions a decision about the past is made, which elements are to be handed on and which are to be abandoned. There is therefore a grave element both of risk and of responsibility in every present situation. This leads on to the third aspect, that of futurity. For Bultmann, generally speaking, the texture of personal history is woven neither by phenomena nor by natural events, but by human actions.[20] Hence the individual is always directed towards the future, his life is always to be realised, actions can only be designated successes or failures in the future.

[17]op. cit. p. 46 f. 'There is a dialectical relation between the indicative and the imperative. . . . . 'If we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit' (Gal. 5, 25).

[18]op. cit. p. 45.

[19]*Kerygma and Myth*, edited Bartsch (E.T.), London, 1957, pp. 18-20.

[20]We say 'generally speaking' because Bultmann allows that 'human life goes its way not only through actions, but also through events which encounter us through that which happens to one. And the reactions to these events are also actions in a certain sense. Man is responsible in his reactions too, and his behaviour or conduct in the face of such events is also decision'. *Hisory and Eschatology*, p. 136 f.

I will end this brief account of personal history by expanding the notion of decision, as this is germane to my later comments on preaching. It is not meant *simply* decisions demanded by historical situations and historical tasks, e.g. the decision of Luther to protest against a corrupt indulgence-system, but particularly decisions within personal en counters which result in love or hate, fidelity or betrayal.[21] In other words we refer to subjective and perhaps unconscious decisions and reactions of this enigmatic ego which is always becoming, and constant only as a possibility to be realised, and yet which is at the same time a genuine subject, definable by the constant phenomena of memory, consciousness and repentance. The second point I want to make about the notion of decision, is that it must not be confused with the primary decision which is made in response to the preaching of the Cross. It is just because of such a decision that authentic decisions in the present over against past and future are possibilised. That is to say, personal history is possible, only because it includes a new self-understanding, which comes from faith in the Cross of Christ. For just this reason Bultmann emends Butterfield's[22] statement that 'every instant is eschatological' to read: 'every instant has the possibility of being an eschatological instant and in Christian faith this possibility is realised'.[22]

Now I shall offer some comments about the significance of preaching in the Bultmannian theology before attempting some kind of synthesis between personal history and preaching, which is the burden of this paper.

For Bultmann the eschatological event par excellence is the event of Christ. But the *Cross* of Christ alone does not constitute the eschatological event. The real significance about Easter Day is that it indicates the rise of faith in the Risen Lord,[23] and this rise of faith Bultmann includes in the total eschatological event. For the rise of faith is itself an act of God by which the redemptive event of the Cross is going to be completed. But Bultmann goes even further and includes the apostolic preaching, which had its origins in the rise of the Apostles' faith, in the total eschatological event of redemption.[24] Bultmann explains the status of this preaching when he says that 'it supplements the Cross and makes its saving efficacy intelligible by demanding faith and confronting men with the question whether they are willing to understand themselves as men who are crucified and risen with Christ'.[25] That is to say (and here

[21]op. cit. p. 43. 'This history of the human person comes into being in the encounters which man experiences, whether with other people or with events, and in the decisions he takes in them.'

[22]op. cit. p. 154.

[23]*Kerygma and Myth*, p. 42.

[24]ibid.

[25]ibid.

Bultmann approaches the crux of his argument), 'through the word of preaching, the Cross and the Resurrection are made present; the eschatological 'now' is here. . . .'[26] Bultmann makes clear that this re-presentation is not achieved by the instrumentality of memory, for *my* memory can only reproduce *my* past. Moreover recollection can only reproduce events in their worldly actuality, not in their importance as significant history.[27] At his most explicit Bultmann describes the mechanics of this preaching by saying that 'as a sacramental event . . . [it] re-presents the events of the past in such a way that it renews them and thus becomes a personal encounter for me'.[28]

Now Bultmann's evaluation of preaching is not quite as idiosyncratic as some critics have suggested, and it will be easier to understand his orientation if we bear in mind two sources to which he is indebted, and whose solution to the problem is similar. The first of these is Kierkegaard, who sought to answer the question how the historical event of Christ can have a decisive significance for faith today, by confronting his contemporaries so sharply with the scandal of the Christian message, that in deciding whether to believe or be scandalised they were made contemporaries with the first eye-witnesses.[29] In the second place Bultmann shows his enormous debt to Luther with his emphasis on *pro me* (on my behalf).[30] Brunner has recognised this indebtedness of Bultmann to Luther concerning the understanding of the kerygma as the Word of God which speaks to me, and he quotes the programmatic statement of Luther about forgiveness. 'What is it to me that God has created heaven and earth if I do not believe in the forgiveness of sins? . . . but if they (i.e. the other articles of the Christian faith) are to enter into our experience and touch us, they must come into this article, into our experience, and touch us, in order that we all, *I* for *myself,* and *thou* for *thyself*, and *each* for *himself*, may believe in the forgiveness of sins'.[31] Now Bultmann clearly includes both Kierkegaardian and the Lutheran emphases in his depiction of preaching as a sacramental event which encounters 'me'. But he goes further and ascribes to the preaching of the present the same power and freshness as, indeed a full identity with, the original eschatological event.

At this point I wish to depart somewhat from the trodden tracks, and try to take a step further Bultmann's theory about the apostolic preaching summarised above. I extend Bultmann's notion of the Christ event being continually re-created in the preaching, to suggest that different

[26]ibid.

[27]op. cit. p. 115.

[28]ibid.

[29]cf. Hermann Diem, *Dogmatics*, Edinburgh, 1959 (E.T.), p. 9f.

[30]cf. the language of Luther's Shorter Catechism.

[31]Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption. Dogmatics,* Vol. 2, London, 1952 (E.T.), p. 267, quoting Luther. W.A. XXVIII, p. 271.

words of Christ spoken into various situations during his ministry are capable, when a comparable contemporary situation obtains, of entering such a situation through preaching, with the same power, freshness and contemporaneity that they had in the original dominical situation. Now without trying to demonstrate, any more than Bultmann does in the last resort, how this actual and concrete re-presentation occurs[32] (to me an illegitimate procedure since it is preaching from faith to faith), we may perhaps shed some additional light on the phenomenon by quoting Bornkamm's comments on the immediacy both of Jesus' words and actions. Unmediated presence is always the characteristic of Jesus words, appearance and action, within a world which had lost its present'.[33] Therefore the more the word of Christ can quite literally be brought into any present situation where it is applicable, the less we need rely on moralising or text-quoting in an effort to cope with that situation. The more also we shall have of the immediacy of Christ in that vital area of personal history, the present, the sense of which we too (pace Bornkamm) have largely lost.

Now it is my contention that if we examine the individual situations into which Jesus speaks in the Gospels, and such sections as the Sermon on the Mount would be excluded from such an examination since they are addressed at large, we shall find that they cover just that range and type of situation which were described in that sketch of personal history given above.[34] That is, bondage with the past, uncertainty with the present decision, freedom, responsibility; and within these areas, the decisions arising out of small encounters, love and hate, etc. Not only, however, do Christ's words lay bare these areas of personal history; they also bring healing and wholeness to those who cannot achieve authentic decisions, or who at least always seem to make unauthentic ones.

In summary of this section, I have suggested that if we take the Bultmannian logic to its conclusion, it is possible to recreate in their concreteness and actuality Christ's words into personal history situations of our day. And the instrument for this is the preaching. But this extension of the Bultmannian notion of the preaching, from the preaching of the Cross for commitment, to this wider preaching into personal history, requires some critical justification. As we have seen, Bultmann includes in the eschatological event the Cross, the rise of faith (Easter Day), and the first and continuing apostolic preaching. Bultmann's failure is his

[32]That is to say the phenomenon is incapable of proof, though we have tried to show grounds on the basis of which faith may accept it, cf. J. S. Bezzant, *Journal of Theological Studies*, VII, 1956, p. 333 in his review of Brunner's *Eternal Hope*, 1956, p. 52.

[33]Günther Bornkamm. *Jesus of Nazareth* (E.T.), London, 1960, p. 58.

[34]An investigation into Jesus' *action* such as we propose of Jesus' words, has been carried out by Ernst Fuchs, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LIII, 1956, p. 219 f. cf. also LI, 1954, pp. 14-34.

exclusion from the eschatological event of the Ministry of Jesus. True he comes near to this with his references to 'the fact of Jesus having come'[35] (*Gekommensein*). But it is a rather bare fact, bare not just because of Bultmann's Lutheran demand for faith alone, but also because of his radical criticism of the trustworthiness of the synoptic tradition. If however we do include the Ministry, which is surely part of the total event of Jesus, then we have a series of archetypal eschatological events, beside the main one of the Cross. And the word 'eschatological' in this context, as Aldwinckle points out, 'is not here a futurist reference to the last things but the 'existential' import of the event evoking human decision in the present'.[36]

Having now outlined in theological terms a possible combination of personal history and preaching, this juncture leads naturally to a discussion of why such preaching into personal history is necessary. The three reasons which I shall adduce lie on the border where a Christian anthropology[37] and psychology, pastoral practice and psychiatry, meet and blur. This is not fortuitous; and at the end of the discussion I hope to have established the second main point of this paper, namely that the preaching into personal history, which has been approached theologically, is nothing other than a positive Christian method of treating what the psychiatrist calls mental illness.

The first justification is partly connected with the Anglican, and I suppose the Protestant, *'Weltanschauung'*. Allport, in his book *The Individual and his Religion*, in a survey of the more rational roots of the individual's religious sentiment,[38] has laid emphasis on the pursuit of meaning in the face of an incomprehensible universe.[39] Now some re-

[35]Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, Vol. I, London, 1952 (E.T.), p.43. 'Jesus' having come was itself the decisive event'.

[36]R. F. Aldwinckle, *Journal of Religion*, XXXIV, 1954, *Myth and Symbol in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology*, p. 274.

[37]We intend Bultmann's sense of the word 'anthropology', *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 107. 'It was Karl Barth, I believe, who first charged me with substituting anthropology for theology. This is an easy misunderstanding of the existentialist position. Anthropology is here being used rather as Feuerbach used it, and existence is identified with subjectivity. Using "anthropology" differently, I would heartily agree; I *am* trying to substitute anthropology for theology, for I am interpreting theological affirmations as assertions about human life.' Such a statement is indicative of Bultmann's great debt to W. Herrmann. cf. *Kerygma und Mythos II*, edited Bartsch, Hamburg, 1952, p. 185. 'We cannot say of God what He is in Himself; we can only speak of what He does to us.' cf. note I, ibid.

[38]G. W. Allport, *The Individual and his Religion*, New York, 1960, p. 17.

[39]Wayne E. Oates, *Religious Factors in Mental Illness*, London, 1957, referring to Frankl's *Aertzliche Seelsorge*, Vienna, 1946, suggests that 'the search for power and sexual gratification, the search for the release of hidden hostilities, and the nihilism of ethical restrictions are being superseded in the contemporary person by the hunger for meaning and for a satisfying interpretation of the end and purpose of his predicament and suffering', p. 162.

ligions try to offer, and some people are able to accept, a world conception which has logical simplicity and serene majesty. This may assume on the intellectual level the form of a theological system, e.g. Thomism, or on a popular level the form of a devotional system, e.g. a comprehensive sacramentalism. Allport then asserts, in a way germane to our present theme, that 'most individuals are not sufficiently contemplative nor sufficiently imitative to adopt *in toto* the explanation offered by any one master theologian . . . they find that they require their own interpretations when they are in the grip of the engrossing pressures of their lives. In times of acute desire it is not the perfection of a system as a whole that satisfies but some aspect of it that renders intelligible and supportable the needs of the moment'.[38] In that quotation the phrases 'engrossing pressures of their lives' and 'the needs of the moment' are to my mind wholly analogous with the dynamic and existential data of personal history outlined above. And Allport's remark that people require their own interpretations seems another way of saying that they require solutions and advice which are individually tailored for them in their own situations. In the final section on the mechanics of personal history preaching I shall try to show how such preaching can answer the needs which Allport exposes, more individually[40] and more therapeutically than a theological system or a devotional system can.

The second justification is on similar lines, but reveals another facet of the problem. Dr. Frank Lake in a recent lecture drew attention to the fact that preaching is often failing to meet the needs of the mentally ill because it is too general in form and content. At a later stage he explained his rejection of the Adlerian, Freudian and Jungian analogies of being as models to be used for therapeutic purposes in conjunction with the Christian faith, on the grounds that they were concerned with principles (sex and aggresion, will to power, etc.) rather than with relations. For this reason he sought to replace these *principia explicandi* with a *principium cognoscendi*, i.e. Christ. If we combine these two statements it is possible to see a profound reason why preaching is too general, namely that it also arises all too often out of principles, doctrinal rather than psychological of course, not out of relations. If that is the case, the peace, grace or forgiveness which the sermon offers, will fail completely to reach depressives, who in the nature of their illness are reduced to a very elemental and torn relationship with others. For them no healing

[40]At the same time this preaching, though individual, need not be individualistic. For especially with preaching in the context of the Holy Communion, it is preaching within the visible body of Christ. Oates, op. cit. p. 167 suggests, appositely at this point, that 'the original concept of interpersonal relationships in a covenant community is foundational to the understanding of this positive function of religion in therapy'.

word can hope to be effective unless it is in the context of relation,[41] rather than in the form of principle. At a later stage I will suggest tentatively ways of achieving a degree of dialogue[42] in the preacher/listener relationship, or as I should prefer to put it, in the Christ/listener relationship, within the sermon.

The third and final justification is closely related to the other two. It concerns religious symbols. In much doctrinal expository preaching, and even more in preaching which is composed basically of ethical injunction, listeners are often left with a carrot dangling in front of them, which they are incapable of grasping for themselves. In the case of psychopaths this can lead to a serious degree of frustration. Now perhaps this is not so serious in a religion which is well equipped with religious symbols. As Philip Mairet and Victor White have hinted,[43] a beatified state of perfection, such as is predicated of the Virgin Mary in Roman Catholic dogma and practice, when held up as a goal or pattern, will not cause great frustration to him who seeks but fails to imitate it, the reason being that he knows very well that it is a degree of perfection which belongs only to the beatified. When however a love of neighbour is preached outside the context of an absolute symbol, e.g. in the form 'you ought to go out and love your neighbour', we can expect the possibility of distress being created in those in the grip of mental illness. For intellectually they realise very well what they *ought* to do, but are emotionally incapable of doing it.[44] There is therefore clearly the necessity in

[41]In other words the preacher must have some counterpart to that affection required by the priest, which Terruwe stresses. (A. A. A. Terruwe, *The Priest and the Sick in Mind*, London, 1959 (E.T.), pp. 51, 115).

[42]The danger of preaching being too general remains an ever-present danger in this sort of preaching, and arises from what Oates calls 'the impossibility of reproducing highly personal insights at the mass level [which] results in a 'watering down' of therapeutic concepts into popular clichés that caricature rather than mature the science of psychiatry', op. cit. p. 221.

[43]*Christian Essays in Psychiatry*, edited Philip Mairet, London, 1956. The two thoughts which I wish to combine are Mairet's (Presuppositions of psychological analysis, p. 66 f), 'The person who can live with unquestioning faith under this hierarchy of symbols, fully expressive as it is of the vital realities in our normal being, avoids all serious inner conflict with his unconscious'; and White's (Victor White, O.P., *Guilt; Theological and Psychological*, p. 163, note I). 'This may illustrate how dogma should function . . . as what Jung calls the determination and safeguarding of the archetype. According to the dogma, an immaculate conception is the unique privilege of the Blessed Virgin alone; but it corresponds to a universal ideal or archetype of stainless perfection. The function of the dogma *should be* to prevent its projection upon favourite children by parents and teachers, as well as its introjection by the children themselves.'

[44]Earl Loomis, *The Self in Pilgrimage*, London, 1961, pp. 5 f., finds this condition normative in the North American culture, and offers the following explanation, '. . . the reason we refuse to search for our inner being is that we fear we shall find something *good* . . . we resist recognition of our assets because, once recognised, they must be *used*. For goodness makes claims. . . . It must be used. Otherwise it becomes evil in our hands'.

Anglican preaching, where such absolute symbols are not generally available, of rendering the gift which the sermon offers as accessible as possible, which means entirely within the *Sitz in Leben* of the individual. It also reveals the necessity of presenting into that individual's own situation the person of Christ, whose healing power alone may be able to bridge the gap between the hearer's 'ought' and 'can'. I suggest that these requirements can also be met to some extent by preaching into personal history.

I shall now describe the content and pattern which it is suggested preaching into personal history should assume. First the content; it has already been observed that the main themes of the I-Thou synoptic conversation-pieces, the main themes of the Bultmannian notion of personal history, and the main themes of secular post-historiographical writing are decision, freedom, responsibility, etc. Now the healing, reassuring or shaking words which Christ speaks into these themes with complete relevance are aspects of the living character of the Father of whom Christ speaks. These focal aspects, which cover every variety of personal history situation, have been brilliantly summarized from the biblical evidence by Wayne Oates.[45] It is the 'God who "fainteth not neither is weary", "whose love is broader than man's mind", "who is the fullness of maturity", "who satisfies our desires with good things", "who binds us to himself in order to free us from all lesser and inadequate loyalties", "who has granted that we may become like him in love", "who emptied himself for us that we might become sons of God" . . . "who loves us with an everlasting love", and "who forgives us of our sins and enables us to forgive each other and to bear one another's burdens" '. Such is the content of the sermon, the theme decided upon out of the personal history thesaurus, and the appropriate word to be spoken into this theme chosen out of the focal phrases we have quoted.

Second the pattern; this represents quite a divergence from that normally expected in expository preaching. The sermon can be divided into four sections. The first does not begin with a text, which may militate against the immediate establishment of dialogue, which if not achieved at the beginning is not likely to be captured later on. Instead the opening of the sermon is to consist in the realistic and imaginative depiction of a life-situation appropriate to the main theme; or preferably three or four variant depictions on that theme, in order to establish an I-Thou relationship with as many people in the congregation as possible. This first section can be compared to the preliminary diagnosis of a psychiatrist's interview. Now these life-situations will be entirely within terms of the immediate home, work, or leisure environments of the congregation concerned. For example, a theme of forgiveness might begin with a variant life-situation about the resentment of one assembly-line worker

[45]Oates, op. cit. 169.

for another over output at piece-work rates. It is essential that these depictions cut to the quick, and that if possible they should be profound enough to reach the deep-seated resentment of a mentally-ill person. This does not mean that they must describe situations identical to ones experienced by such a person, but that the emotion involved must be so clearly defined as to be immediately recognised, and if possible even felt during the depiction.

In the second section of the sermon, the words of Christ, first spoken into a similar New Testament situation, must now be spoken into the theme under attention, in particular into the life situations described in the first section. It is neither necessary nor desirable to describe in any detail the New Testament context in which the dominical words stand, as would be normative in expository preaching. For this tends to create distance between the immediacy of Christ's words and the patient or patients in the congregation. It would allow the latter to take refuge in the delusion that the context in which the dominical words were first spoken was a unique historical situation, in no sense meant for him.[46] By rhetoric and other devices it is important to give the dominical words as much emphasis as possible. For I suggest that they represent what Bultmann has called 'the down-stroke of revelation',[47] and as such should be a spiritual, mental and emotional shock to the hearer. I should wish to sketch a partial analogy here with the timing of electro-convulsive treatment in the therapy of the mentally ill.

In the third section of the sermon there must follow a fairly detailed account of the way in which these dominical words may be appropriated to the *actual* life-situations of the hearers. For although in the first part of the sermon a number of life-situations were depicted, to establish dialogue in preparation for the dominical words, those situations, however realistic, were imaginary and could not be identical with the situations the hearers are going to experience. The effect of the words of Christ at their most intense should have been (using again the previous example) to demolish, albeit momentarily, the house of resentment which the patient has built about himself, in more biblical terms to rob him of his particular idolatry. It is imperative therefore that the preacher

[46]This could be an instance of what Stack Sullivan calls 'distance machinery' bringing withdrawal and unrelatedness.

[47]cf. the whole of the article, 'Der Begriff der Offenbarung im Neuen Testament', *Glauben und Verstehen*, III, pp. 1-34. Another way of putting this is to say that 'encounter with Jesus' occurs. This is surely the main point about a sermon on Bultmannian lines, not that it is thoroughly unmythological, which seems to be a preoccupation of Bartsch. cf. his sermon, Appendix C in David Cairns' *A Gospel without Myth*, London, 1960. With this cf. Fuchs, *Das Programm der Entmythologisierung*, Heft. 3, of *Schriftenreihe der Kirchlich-Theologischen Sozietät in Württemberg*, 1954, p. 9. 'Today demythologising, at least in the area of New Testament scholarship, is encounter with Jesus.'

should go on to fill this vacuum, by trying to show quite realistically how the forgiveness of Christ may enter into his coming resentment-situations, or maybe how he is going to be able to live with his illness, because Christ has given him a wider ethical loyalty.

The fourth and last section of the sermon consists in a call for resolve, resolve to go on receiving the dominical words, resolve to establish a prayer relationship about the day-to-day dealing with future resentment-situations, and so on.

In conclusion I would draw attention to the fact that intentionally I have chosen to interpret Bultmann's account of personal history, and therefore preaching into personal history, and therefore 'Christian psychiatry', all from an ethical standpoint. I believe Bultmann intends this in his notion of personal history,[48] and that he is right. For it is only thus that we are true to the biblical revelation, where in Oates' words, 'the idolatries of the biblical account are constantly being challenged and overcome by the power of ethical love intrinsic to the character of the Hebrew-Christian conception of God'.[49] It needs also to be said that the foregoing suggestions for preaching into personal history are not intended to lead to the dogmatic conclusion that all sermons should be like this. Rather that in the growing recognition of the positive work of the Christian Religion in the therapy of mental illness, in the diminishing gulf between religion and psychiatry,[50] there is possibly a place for something akin to this type of preaching into personal history, and that it is both theologically and psychologically justifiable.

[48]cf. Bultmann's comments on W. Herrmann's *Ethik* in *Expository Times*, LXX, 1959, p. 125. 'This opened out to me a truer understanding of history than was contained in the so-called "Historismus", and taught me to recognise the origin of ethics in the relation of person with person in history'.

[49]op. cit. p. 170.

[50]cf. Karl Stern, *The Third Revolution*, London, 1955, p. 256. 'When the psychoanalytic movement is presented in its fundamentals. . . . We rediscover something old—the unity of the human person. . . . Out of the senses Ultimate Sense arises. Out of the dimness of the flesh (*caro*) charity (*caritas*) emerges. This is a preeminently human image of the psyche. In the middle of it we find, with overwhelming concreteness, the polarity of love and hate.'

TRUTH AND CHRISTIANITY

By The Rev. E. F. Carpenter, Ph.D., Canon of Westminster

I dare say that some of us this evening, looking back over the years and very properly recalling 'days of fresh air in the rain and the sun'—usually the former—can also recall, if dimly, a famous essay which begins with the words: *'What is truth?* said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer'.

From the point of view of Pontius Pilate, if from no other, it must be admitted that this was a pity, for had he lingered a little longer he might have received a considerable degree of enlightenment. Yet it needs to be said, at least to his shade (with kind permission of Dr. Farrer, Marie Corelli, and Lloyd Morgan) that what he regarded as not worth waiting for, others have pursued with a life-long passion. When in contrast the 18th century theologian, William Whiston, died at the advanced age of 85 in 1752, his friends were a little apprehensive as to what might best contribute a fitting epitaph. During his tempestuous life he had browsed widely in the perilous fields of religious unorthodoxy and as a consequence had been hounded out of his professorship at Cambridge, and for the rest of his life was forced to endure hardships (to quote Macaulay's phrase which he used of Bonnie Prince Charlie) 'such as make the heart grow sick'. A friend suggested as most appropriate the Latin: 'Quocunque veritas duxit, ausus sequi'—'Wherever truth led, there I dared to follow.' There is a bold and almost defiant ring about such words, as if to suggest not only that the pursuit of truth is the one thing needful but also that it is likely to lead away from orthodox and long established opinion.

No one, I think, would be prepared to deny that the truth (however defined) must constitute a man's final allegiance at least in the sense that he ought to aquaint himself with it. Few people really assent, other than in a flippant way, to the oft repeated tag that 'where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise'. There is something pathetically non-adult in such a state of enforced innocence and there is a natural feeling amongst developed and mature people that it is better to know, even when the 'known' is disconcerting and almost frightening. Whenever a state of ignorance is preferred to a state of knowledge it is usually because of some particular and immediate fact in the present situation. The mother, for example, who is critically ill and who is kept in ignorance of the death of her son a few hours previously, is screened in this way only because at the moment she is not able to make an adult response to the situation in which she finds herself. The shock of it might kill her. But to be permanently protected in this way would mean a retreat from living which no one could responsibly wish to indulge, that is of course if he

is not pathologically a chronic escapist, a condition which would normally be regarded as a form of psychological disease. Such retreat leads to the impoverishment of the human psyche, the more disastrous because at the ordinary, everyday level truth (like Milton's 'two handed engine') has a terrible habit of catching up on us.

> 'Does he want the moon to play with?
> Or the stars to run away with?
> They'll come if you don't cry.'

So runs the lullaby: but alas! the baby, too soon adult, will painfully learn that the universe is not like this. Jesus was content to affirm that finally it is the truth which makes a man free: and Socrates that virtue, in the last resort, is a kind of knowing.

To be in a state of knowledge then—I use the term 'knowledge' generally at the moment without definition—is therefore to enter into an intrinsically valuable human condition. It follows therefore that to seek it constitutes a moral duty, since a man ought always to desire to move from a less valuable into a more valuable state.

It must be already clear, however, that what I have said above faces an obvious initial difficulty, and needs, as we shall find later, some clarification. Expressed as it was above, in general terms, the proposition can almost too easily win an over-all assent. To sharpen it and make it stand up to more critical enquiry, certain qualifying observations must now be made. Clearly certain kinds of knowledge strike the ordinary and quite uncritical person as more valuable than other kinds, and it would be possible, even at the practical level, to construct a rough hierarchy of value in this respect. At the very bottom of the rung of the ladder would come knowledge which nearly everbody must regard as factual and for most purposes useless. For example, I suppose it is at least theoretically possible for me to find out how many discarded tops of Coca-Cola bottles are lying on the Great North Road between London and Edinburgh; or, for that matter, the number of leaves in summer on the great oaks—or what are left of them—in Windsor Great Park, where I was this morning. It would be possible, but no one *could* assert that this is valuable knowledge (except for highly specialised purposes which at the moment I just cannot think of). Certainly an integrated and full life can be lived without such enlightenment. A great deal of factual knowledge, though not quite so utterly useless as the above, remains finally non-essential knowledge, except that it is for extremely limited ends—knowledge, that is, which a man can manage without.

This is another way of saying of course that much factual knowledge is instrumental only, a necessary equipment for particular undertakings such as the weather over the Atlantic to a pilot, or the mastering of Burke's Peerage for a snob. Of a higher order, since it fulfills a much

more deep seated and more fundamental psychological need, though moving within the same impersonal order, is that knowledge of the sensible universe which the dedicated natural scientist seeks simply in order that he may understand a little more clearly how this same universe behaves. He seeks coherency and a system.

I imagine, however, that we may take it for granted that when Jesus said 'The truth shall make yoou free' he was not talking about the tops of the Coca-Cola bottles, nor of the weather, nor of Burke's Peerage, nor even of the uniformities which exist in the physical universe. The truth, here referred to, if we give to it its seemingly natural meaning, cannot be contained within such departments of knowledge or ways of knowing. If it could, members of television quiz panels, whose minds seem to be cluttered up with an encyclopaedic mass of unrelated factual information, would be prophets of the Kingdom. There are indeed other territories of knowledge, other ways of knowing. There is the kind of knowledge which enters into a man through the experience of listening to music. Some people have even confessed that music is the greatest thing in their lives, bringing with it a real enlightenment. Yet it has to be recognised that to large numbers of people music is almost a closed book, and no amount of effort on their part will enable them to read it. The wisest of them even admit it. True, the argument has been put forward that the essential experience given to one man in music is mediated to another through a different art form: but this does not alter the basic fact that it is possible to enjoy what would usually be thought of as a developed life without music, though the range of possible experience is obviously restricted by this deprevation. The same may be asserted of many other departments of knowledge, the truth in respect of which does not seem such as to make a man free in any final sense. A mathematician cannot be free in his mathematics unless he is knowledgeable about them, and the more his knowledge grows the more free he becomes; but this freedom only exists within a defined territory. It is not a whole freedom for the mathematician as a person, who does other things than mathematics (his particular skill), though it cannot be ruled out that to be free in the former context may be a help, not of course the sole means, of his becoming free in the latter. The connection, however, is not a necessary one. A good mathematician might be a bad man—some doubtless have been.

Such reflections lead to the inescapable conclusion that when the word 'truth' is used in any significant sense by the religious man, he is using it in a particular way and with subtle overtones. He is not thinking of every kind of truth; with what happens to be the case about anything. As I suggested earlier in a reference to the quiz expert, the human mind can be cluttered up with stacks of useless and utterly unrelated information such as would seem to constitute a positive hindrance to any creative

and worth while thinking. Often to be able to forget is more important than to remember. The Christian would unhesitatingly claim that it is only certain *kinds* of truth which can make a man free—that is free in any teleological sense. Such truth we may describe as 'saving truth', this kind of truth being usually understood as including (if the distinction can properly be made) both the datum of the truth experienced and the quasi-cognitive act of experiencing it. By this I mean that saving truth is known and appropriated only through some kind of active response and personal commitment to it. Traditionally, and of course by definition, such truth is understood as saving, as making a man whole, as promoting his final end, thereby releasing him from the slavery of the divided self and the irrationality which leads to nowhere in particular.

Having thus called attention to a wide diversity in the kinds of knowledge to which truth may refer, I want to interrupt my argument at this point—I shall return to it—to ask what it is that people understand in ordinary conversation when they say that this or that is *true*. The answer, I believe, is not difficult: they understand that something happens to be the case. In other words they think of themselves as referring to a fact or a situation which is a real fact or a real situation, having some kind of objective existence. Indeed they assume this even when it might appear, on more mature reflection, that the truth under discussion refers to a mental act as in logic or mathematics, that is to necessary ways in which the mind works. Yet they see mathematics as referring to 'things out there'. In reacting almost unconsciously in this way such people are doubtless influenced by the enormous contemporary emphasis on the physical sciences, in which departments of knowledge the criteria of truth (if not the content) seem to be fairly simple and straightforward. The physicist affirms that water freezes at a certain temperature at a given pressure, and repeated experiment shows this to be the case. The astronomer, from his calculations, predicts an eclipse of the moon at a certain time. It duly takes place and his calculations are thereby regarded as proved accurate. This need not of course be the case, for all that can be safely concluded (unless we assume a pure accident which is extremely improbable since the accident can be repeated) is that the calculations are sufficiently accurate to guarantee the prediction: or that any inaccuracies cancel each other out. By and large the physical sciences move in a world where a rough and ready verification is possible: and in which controlled experiments can be conducted, and if need be endlessly repeated. The enormous impact upon the modern world of the applied sciences, which have brought with them our technological age, has, without question, had the effect of establishing a psychological climate in which the answer to the question 'How can truth be determined and its certainty guaranteed?' is largely uncritically conditioned by the kind of verification which the scientist would look for, would demand, and would find.

Something is true, I say again, in popular thought (and we all share this popular thinking) if it can be shown to be true; by which I mean if what is affirmed is shown to conform to the behaviour of the existent about which the statement is made. By patient investigation, by the right 'know-how' coupled with a proper humility, men can get at the facts, what happens to be the case. Physical uniformities are discernable and this enables the scientist, who assumes the whole to be a related and continuing system, to make his predictions. The physicists and not the seers are the prophets of the modern world and it is the Yuri Gagarins who excite its imagination. True knowledge so acquired is far from a complete knowledge either in its nature or range. Quite obviously it can be pursued only by a process of abstraction, that is by taking away from the existent investigated many of its noticeable characteristics. It is irrelevant that the rose is beautiful while it is being chemically analysed or that it reminded the poet of his beloved. Yet there can be no doubt—and here I am deliberately repeating myself—that the vast transformation in the mechanics of living brought about by the inductive sciences has led us all, when we ask the question, 'Is it true?' first of all to expect a verifiable answer. Truth must correspond with certain facts and until the facts are sufficiently assured to make the correspondence complete, there is no real knowledge. If it cannot be shown to correspond, knowledge, subject to such limitations is a mere matter of opinion—a kind of half real knowledge. Indeed the unconscious supposition is that many matters of doubt and enquiry which at present suffer from this defect, and are therefore at the moment matters of opinion only, will later become certain knowledge when some physical explanation or description of them is provided. In this respect I recall the satisfaction with which a well known rationalist heard the news that the feeling 'I have been here before' can now be induced by a purely physical stimulus. It was felt to be appropriately gratifying that a long familiar and apparently non-rational experience could now at last be explained without any resort to para-normal or a quasi spiritual explanation. Modern man feels that this is as it should be.

I am at the moment concerned—and it is important for me to say this again—only with the reaction of the average man, that is with most of us in our average moments: and not with whether this is an informed or proper reaction. That the man in the street does react in this way I have little doubt, and that as a consequence he makes little distinction between the truths of mathematics, the truths of logic, and the truths of physics, and so on. I am equally convinced that since, at certain levels at least (the level at which most of us use them) the conclusions of mathematics are secure and not open to question, means for most people that they must partake of the one criterion capable of demarcating what is true from what is untrue. They must have to do with some tangible reality, with independent objects.

It is important that I should not be misunderstood at this point. I am not immediately concerned with the accuracy of this view, with whether laws of thought are laws of things: or whether the sciences of logic and mathematics can be explicated from the human mind independently of any experience of the external world. What I am saying is that the pressure of the total environment upon man is such as to evoke in him a particular approach to the problem of truth, which approach sees it as capable of fairly simple and straightforward verification in a particular way. As a result of this he demands that every kind of truth should answer to this same yardstick.

I think it probably true to say that this represents a vast transformation in popular psychology. We all in one way or another share it. It is not a matter of will or choice; we catch it, as by contagion, from the very air that we breathe. What is significant about this attitude is that it tends to limit assured and reliable knowledge, *real* knowledge (truth) to a sphere in which some kind, and indeed a specific kind, of empirical certitude is possible. Yet paradoxically it can hardly be denied that knowledge so limited is a very limited knowledge, and that the effect of this restriction is to weaken our rational hold on, and to take reality away from, other kinds of knowledge, and these of such a kind as men in their personal lives regard as most significant.

I do not for a moment wish to be thought of as saying that the pursuit of scientific knowledge has a utilitarian and instrumental value only. Indeed, its acquirement demands, in the nature of the case, that a man has an essential humility, is prepared to sit down before the facts, and apply himself rigorously. The reality which the physicist investigates will *not* adapt itself to meet the predilections, the wishes or the ideology of the investigator, as the Russians finally found in the Lysenko affair. That others may use and manipulate, the scientist must first discover: and in his process of discovery he may well find a datum the intricacies of which inspire wonder and evoke awe. One is reminded of the words of the great Sir Isaac Newton, that he felt like a little child playing on the sea-shore while the mighty ocean stretched away into the unknown.

It is certainly doubtful, however, how far the truth (the existent) apprehended in this way, and the experiencing of it, can constitute in respect of man's total life a 'saving truth', no matter what virtues are necessary to acquire it: and this is not altered by the efforts to investigate saving truth by scientific methods, and to explain them within the context of simple factual verification. A scientist need not finally be a good man, though he has shewn himself willing to sit down before facts, and to work hard to find them. Saving truth, on the other hand, moves essentially in the world of value, value being here understood in terms of a man's final commitment. Such a bold statement as the last, introducing the concept of 'value', raises problems rather than at first seems

to solve them. It is necessary to say something briefly about the use of this term.

The concept of 'value' is a difficult one: but our inability to give a *rationale* of it does not take away from the empirical fact that men do make value judgments in certain human situations, and that some of these judgments they often regard as the most significant judgments that they make. Truth which saves is truth which has unique value: truth in the experienced response to which a man recognises that something is happening in him which he regards as uniquely worth while. True it is that such phrases as 'uniquely worth while' or 'uniquely valuable' are tantalising, even irritating and sometimes question begging expressions which, like a distant mirage, recede and becomes less tangible as the traveller approaches nearer to it. Always the over-riding question remains, 'valuable for what?' Knowledge of a time-table is valuable knowledge when it is a matter of getting from Paddington to Oxford. Within this limited ambition, and assuming that a man could have no other purpose in life, and that there were no other purposes beyond this present world of existence, then the knowledge of how to get from Paddington to Oxford would be supremely valuable. But most people *have* other ambitions—some might even wish to get to Cambridge—and would regard them as more important and significant.

But again words such as 'important' and 'significant' raise precisely the same ultimate question—important and significant for what? An infinite regress, going ever and ever further back, would seem to be intolerable unless any attempt at the raising of final questions is ruled out of court. A man must rest somewhere and be forced to say, if only tentatively and for practical purposes, that *this* is intrinsically valuable; this experience is in itself worth-while and it is so, not because it leads to something beyond itself, but because it is what it is. The *perennial* problem is not simply to suggest what such valuable experiences are, but also why they are significant: and to what, if any, truth of existence they refer.

An attempt to answer, at least half of this question, was put forward in hedonistic utilitarianism, which loosely maintained that a condition of happiness is the most valuable experience into which a man can enter. In support of this contention, an appeal was made to common experience, namely that most people prefer to be happy rather than unhappy. It is, of course, not quite so simple as this. Happiness is a most ambiguous term and is not easily denoted. But if it is accepted as the most valuable of all experiences, then the knowledge of how to aquire it must be seen as a 'saving truth'. But is this so? For would not the hedonist in practice maintain that to act rightly a man ought to be prepared to give up his own happiness to secure that of another. If the answer is 'yes' the utilitarian argument would seem to break down, for

if it be replied that the man who sacrifices his own apparent happiness (for example goes into a concentration camp to save a friend) knows an inward, a more satisfying happiness because of his self-denial, then this introduces a judgment of value within happiness which lands us back in our original dilemma. Certainly the criteria which determine that one kind of happiness is superior or more valuable than another are not easily come by, and any critique of the internal nature of happiness is bound to introduce categories which it is difficult to see how they can arise from the feeling-content or the structural patterns given in the experience itself. And we cannot get out of this difficulty by indulging a merely quantitative assessment, for example 'duration', or to quote Hume in another context, 'force' or 'liveliness'.

Nor is this merely an academic question, particularly as Christianity claims to convey valuable knowledge. I have however quoted the case of hedonism merely because it provides a straightforward example of the difficulty inherent in value judgments. At the risk of some repetition perhaps I may express the dilemma as follows.

Let us assume (and it is of course only an assumption) that experience of commitment X constitutes what a man would claim to be a saving experience. It makes whole: it satisfies: it is self authenticating. If such a commitment does exist—and is not anarchically different in different men—then it is a final truth about human life which ends all arguments. Yet it would still seem to be mysterious as to *how* a person could make such a statement and what grounds he would have for maintaining it.

Some people might argue, and in many respects F. H. Bradley did, that in resorting to such a judgment as this, all a man can do is to fall back on some ultimate intuition. He just knows it is valuable and he cannot be expected to have a rationale which pretends to say why value has value. Indeed, to try to do so, in any metaphysical critique, would be to embark once again on that infinate regress, that long long road which stretches out even beyond Tipperary.

But is it possible to stand firmly on this kind of ground? Hitler, as we all remember to our cost, had his intuitions about Herrenvolk, and we all know the frustration of the 'take it or leave it' attitude to life or religion. The difficulty inherent in intuitional views is always that their truth can neither be denied nor rationally affirmed. If a man says simply: 'For me this experience is extremely valuable and I prefer this experience to any other' he is standing on unassailable ground. But once he goes further and begins to say that *other* people ought to be standing there also, that is that they should (ought to) try to put themselves into this same saving experience, then of course he must break out of the prison house of his own intuition at least so far as to assert that the intuition registers to a universal system in which they together with him are involved; and he

must also be able to let others know what he is talking about, and by what means they can enter into the same salvation. To do this both explication of the experience and a common language of communication are needed. In a minimal way at least he must resort to conceptual or propositional thinking. If these are not forthcoming, reference cannot be made to an ordered system, or to a body of saving truth other than that which is *sui generis* to each person who is saved through it. It is indeed a chastening thought that the defender and expounder of particular values is always confronted with this same age old problem from which many would assert that there cannot, in the nature of the case, be any escape. He must ask himself: Why is this value more valuable than any other, apart from the fact that I, and maybe other people, happen to prefer it? *Such* a question it is obvious cannot be meaningfully discussed except by penetrating into the world of metaphysics. It is for this reason, as will be seen later, that I personally deplore the lamentable decline in the cultivation of philosophical theology, and the consequent neglect of the great question of our day 'Is Christianity true?' and if it is true, in what sense is it true? Biblical typology, biblical etymology, biblical eschatology will not alas! provide the answer.

It is now time, it is indeed past the time, when we must turn to ask the question: How does Christian faith endeavour—or how has it endeavoured—in respect of its Christ commitment (that is its ultimate value) to deal with this age-old problem? The answer, I think, is threefold, though the second of these is derivative or implied in the first.

First it has attempted to give substance and rationality to value by linking it up with a final ontological ground which both elicits and sustains it.

Secondly, it has attempted to link value to event—that is (loosely speaking) to wed ideas to facts.

Thirdly—and I am thinking of the Neo-Thomists—it has sought, within value, to discover structural patterns and inner coherence.

I shall (in view of what I said briefly in respect of the third) confine myself to the first two.

I think it is at this point, as they say, that I must come clean. I believe that to be able to give *some* rationale of value—that is to be able to give a reason for the hope that is in us—is the supreme intellectual task facing the Church in this day and generation. I believe that to be able to assert a real existence for 'valuable knowledge' is imperative. I believe further, that against the background of the psychological climate engendered in a technological age, large numbers of people do not commit themselves to Christian faith because they do not believe it to be true. It is this situation which often creates a sense of impotence amongst parsons and as a result a resort to methods that are unworthy and will not serve

valuable ends. I'm afraid that a veritable proliferation of Billy Grahams will do little to mend this. I will not be so unkind as to suggest that they may even aggravate the situation.

It is necessary, however, for *me* to come clean because I intend, in a few words, to indulge in a critique—in so far as very limited time allows—of both the endeavours to justify value judgments as stated above. I do this, not because I accept such criticisms, but because it is important for us all to re-examine the presuppositions of belief if only to build on them again more firmly. We must not allow ourselves—as members of the Modern Churchmen's Union—to be complacent in these matters. At all costs we must go on wrestling with them.

First then, some Christians claim (and I think perhaps I would) to get over some of this difficulty by asserting that saving truth always refers to a metaphysical ground behind all existence and therefore relates a man to his final end. This view may imply at least one of two things—or both. Either that it is its metaphysical nature which gives to value its value: or that it is ontological reality which makes its claim upon us compulsive in experience.

Blurring this distinction, however, at least for the moment, let us quote a particular example to illustrate this point of view. Suppose, we assume, as I do, that to realise a personalistic and sacrificial love constitutes for a man his 'telos' and that therefore to know this means to enter into a saving knowledge. If this be really so, then this love activity (and the experience of it) constitutes a final value. Its absolute claim upon us in the last resort rests upon the final authority—that is that status in reality—of the ontological ground which it is supposed elicits it. The felt value of the love-act just is: the rationale of the value—though it might be claimed that the knowledge of this rationale enriches the experience of the value—is that it is propped or supported by the ultimate ground on which all value rests. To change the form of statement into theological terms: God himself is love: man is made in the image of God: therefore to enter into an effective love relationship is for man the one thing needful.

Here, so it is claimed, we have a saving truth which does not finally rest on (though it may be psychologically evoked by) any feeling intuition or ultimate judgment as to one experience being intrinsically more valuable than another. Rather it rests on a truth of existence: upon a coherent philosophical analysis which links value to the basic structure of final reality itself. Ultimate value and final existence are one and indivisible.

This thesis is certainly an attractive one, for at first sight it seems to get us out of the subjectivism to which value (and religious) judgments are chronically prone, and to plant them on solid earth—or on an even more substantial heaven. To the direct question: Why is Christ's value judgment *vis à vis* love 'better' than, for example, Hitler's about Herronvolk, the answer is perfectly clear. The latter is a purely subjective creation of a diseased mind, or a mind grossly in error: the former judgment arises

from a true response to the metaphysical, and therefore the objective, reality of God. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right.

The thesis, I repeat, is attractive, but though we may hold it, it is important to recognise the difficulties inherent in it. A few hasty comments may be offered.

The argument, it will be immediately recognised, depends on the possibility of equating value with existence. Value becomes, not so much more valuable, but more real, by reason of its unique metaphysical status. Given effective ontological existence value becomes more significant, has a unique claim. Dis-value lacks such a support. The truth which sets a man free exists finally independently of himself. For example, if to realise a sacrificial love constitutes for man his final well being, this existential fact is not effected by his refusal to recognise it, though of course if he does not do so his personal life will correspondingly suffer.

Two questions must however be asked. First, can metaphysical or ontological existence add value to value in this way: is it finally real existence which *is* the value? Secondly, is it philosophically possible to link up valuable experience to a final ground? Is not the effort to do so involved in a contradiction, for have we not first to discover some *je ne sais quoi* within the experience (i.e. make a purely subjective judgment) in order to be driven to such a reference. Are we not back where we started? The answer to both these questions then would seem to be either it is very doubtful or it is very difficult. There is no need for us to go all the way with the modern existentialists when we take heed of their cautionary note and humbly remind ourselves of the ease with which we can fall into a discussion which is linguistically tautological.

Supposing, for the purpose of discussion, that love has *no* metaphysical ground in God, would its claim upon the good man, assuming he still felt its challenge, be any less categorical or urgent? It is no reply to this question to suggest that it would be felt to be less categorical and urgent: would not in fact be compulsive. But ought the good man any less to desire it? I suspect that if we could imagine a universe—and the elder Huxley didn't so much imagine it as felt it to be the case—in which love had no ontological reality, the good man would still feel bound to follow it. Indeed the rewards associated with goodness by eighteenth century theologians are quite nauseating. Huxley affirmed that man must be moral against a universe in which internecine strife reigns, in which the weak go to the wall, and both pity and compassion are at a discount. In Huxley this is significantly moving because as an agnostic his ontology was confined to this spatio-temporal world: yet he did not *in practical life* conclude that the ends which men set themselves ought to be based on this ontology—though of course he could not forbear asking himself what kind of existence value had. His

argument is the heroic one that mankind ought to pursue just those values to which the universe seems so unfriendly.

It may be asserted—and it is so asserted—that this is just a case of muddled thinking in Huxley and that he took over his values from a Faith in which they were rooted in a firm philosophy of being. This may be, yet he does in an extreme form call attention to the difficulty inherent in the endeavour to equate value and existence and to see this link-up as constituting the claim of virtue upon the good man. It might even be asserted that in a universe in which evil was ontological as we believe goodness to be in ours, and goodness lacked this kind of reality —goodness would still move the good man to pursue it. Would not the latter still possess intrinsic value and hence exercise a claim upon him?

Another cautionary note of a probably practical kind may well be struck at this point—though I do not myself regard this objection as very important. Still, it might be asserted that it is dangerous indeed to weaken a man's hold upon value by suggesting that unless value can be proved to have ontological existence, then its rational claim upon our allegiance is weak or non-existent. To suggest this might well be unfortunate, for it is surely important that those dedicated to value should not have the ground upon which they stand cut from under their feet. A Huxley cultivating virtues which he believes to have no ontological validity, is surely in a more intrinsically valuable condition than a Huxley whose dedication is weakened because he is convinced that there is absolutely no reason why he should carry on with this cultivation. Certainly people do in fact feel a compulsive call to 'virtue' without consciously relating its compulsive claim to any ontology: and it must be admitted that it is not easy philosophically to prove the connection.

The second and uniquely Christian attempt to give substance to value endeavours to link it up with events, and sees particular significance in a certain historical succession. Traditional Christianity, for example, sees God as actively and uniquely at work in the history of the Jewish people and supremely so in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. It claims to say something about God, and about His purposes for men, because of certain events which have happened within history. This historicism may be very briefly illustrated in three ways.

First, in affirming that God is love most Christians would not begin with any general principles but would refer to special 'acts' or events in the life of Jesus. These events they would regard as having ontological significance: as revelations, that is, of the nature of God.

Secondly the assertion is made that God 'did' something through Jesus quite independently of His revelation of His own nature through him. Hence doctrines of atonement—and so on.

Thirdly, orthodox theology asserts that God's own being was en-

riched through the participation of the Incarnate Christ *in* time—i.e. in symbolic terms the God-man returns into the Deity.

I would claim that such transcendental historicism is *sui generis* to Christianity. Neither Platonism nor the religions of the East make any religious statements because of historical events and both would strongly deny the possibility of referring from the one to the other.

There is no time for me, within the brief confines of a paper of this kind, to enquire into the nature of an event—whether there can be fact without interpretation in historic description. Suffice to say that the whole subject bristles with problems, and I for one would find it difficult to accept either Archbishop Temple's or Professor Alan Richardson's more refined contention that it is divine illumination which alone makes it possible for the prophet to see significance in the events around him.

The difficulty which always confronts value judgment arising from history—and may I anticipate by saying that I believe the Christian must make them—can be best seen in the most crude attempt to make just this transference, that of the famous Archdeacon Paley, whose *Evidences of Christianity* became a standard Christian Apologetic for almost 100 years.

To the Archdeacon, a historical transcendentalism seemed perfectly simple. Jesus, he said, laid down ethical norms and worked an atonement. If asked, How do you know these ethics and atonement were of God—were expressions of His will? his reply was: Jesus worked miracles and was himself raised from the dead. Such power is not given to men, indeed far from it, for the universe is an ordered system. Only God, the Creator, can introduce himself into the mechanism in this way. Thus, Jesus vindicated in a unique manner, is proved to have been the chosen instrument of God. This guarantees his status and consequently his ethics, since no deceiver would have been used as a channel of miraculous power.

The argument, I repeat, is perfectly simple—too simple. It is the extraordinary nature of the physical event, in that it runs counter to natural laws, which clearly indicates an intervention, which none but God could effect. If divine power is evident in this one aspect of his life, then divine authority is set on all its aspects. No particular insight, it must be noticed, no value judgment is needed to make the transference, which is effected by a simple philosophy of causation. Whether a man is cured of paralysis, was dead and is alive again, walks on the water—these are capable of verification by ordinary eyesight and common sense. Nor has Paley any need to assume that the fact in itself has intrinsic value—walking on the water obviously has not. The fact, event, merely calls attention to a supernatural agency in respect of its causation. It will be immediately recognised, as suggested a moment

ago, that the Archdeacon's use of this argument assumes, quite uncritically, that the source of power in the universe is also the source of value. It was of course the cherished assumption of the age: and to Paley the transference from the event to an indication of divine power and from this to setting the seal on Christ's ministry as a whole was self evident. By the same logic Paley might have vindicated Herrenvolk if Hitler had had miraculous proofs, though in fact he would not have attempted to do so.

It is obvious, of course, that it is no longer possible for us, in the twentieth century (and for many reasons) to take the same attitude to the miracles; but my concern is merely to illustrate from Paley the difficulty of linking event to value. Miracles of themselves cannot add anything to the claims of morality, unless the relating of value to the ground of existence, if secured, can do this. Miracles cannot do more than indicate that Jesus had certain powers over the minds and bodies of men; over physical disease; over nature. These powers may be simply inexplicable at the moment; they may suggest that their author draws upon certain hidden forces; but this cannot give added weight to ethical teaching—to value. No external support of this kind will serve to bear the weight of such transcendentalism. Indeed, it might serve to take away from value.

This fact has long been recognised, and it is for this reason that miracles are no longer handled in this way. Rather they are understood as signs of the breaking through of the Kingdom of God—it is questionable as to how different this really is—and the tendency now is to see the Christ-event as part of a greater historic whole. Since it is no longer thought possible to proceed from event to value as Paley attempted, insight now replaces miracles. The ontological significance of the events is thus thought of as either given in illumination to the prophets: or discovered, in experience, by the believer in commitment *to* the events. Still the same resistant problem remains; namely that it is difficult philosophically to see how the experience of illumination in the mind of the prophet can necessarily be causally linked up with a chain of historic events. Might there not be two series, one mental in the mind of the prophet, the other factual out there in history, two series which happen to coincide—a sort of prophetic occasionalism? In this case all we are sure of is of something happening in the consciousness of the prophets and the events become unnecessary.

I believe that this view in repect of insight can be restated in a way to be more satisfactory. To do this we should have to maintain that there is something within the events, due to God's Providence at work in a context offered to Him by the free but may be conflicting wills of men, which requires the interpretation which the prophet gives to them. Even then, however, we are back with our original problem—

the difficulty of linking up what happens in history with a transcendental ground.

The importance of an honest and intelligent approach to this problem is I hope apparent: for this is a problem unique to Christianity, going right to the heart of the Faith, the truth of which cannot be meaningfully discussed apart from such a consideration. Such a discussion is particularly urgent in our day because in view of the difficulty of what I have called the transference, and also because of the near impossibility, at the level of historical evidence, of guaranteeing the historic facts, many theologians have asked themselves the question whether it was not possible to loose Christianity altogether from its historic moorings in the traditional historical deposit.

At the level of historical scholarship it must be admitted that the certitude of the Gospel-events cannot be guaranteed. By this I simply mean what I say: though this does not necessarily imply that they did not happen. If I say to a friend that Mr. Gladstone died on 19 May, 1898 and he were to reply, 'I do not believe it', it would be possible for me to accumulate such a body of evidence as would compel reasonable belief. I could in fact place him in such a position that historical scepticism would remain impossible. If he still persisted in his denial, I should finally have no option but to say to him: 'You are either being deliberately perverse, or you are so stupid that you cannot understand the nature of historical evidence at all'.

Now the events narrated in the New Testament are not supported by this kind of evidence and in the nature of the case could not be expected to be. It is perfectly possible for an intelligent and informed person to remain sceptical both of the events in themselves and the value judgments which the writers of the Gospels made (and the authors of the Creed) in respect of them. A fair minded Christian could not say of such agnosticism, 'You are being perverse or are simply stupid'. To repeat, this does not imply that the events did not or could not have happened, but rather that belief in them is not determined or guaranteed by weight of historical evidence alone. It is quite unfair, from pulpit or platform, for the preacher in rightly affirming that Christianity is an historical religion, to pour withering scorn on the sceptic in this matter of historicity; though a great deal can very properly be said *in favour* of an essential historicity.

For myself I am bound to confess, if a little irrelevantly, that I should find little help in a guaranteed historical certitude, and am forced to conclude that even if historic facts in themselves could be so guaranteed the value judgment made in respect of them could never claim this kind of certitude. Such reflections add up to saying that the kind of knowledge into which the Christian enters is something more and other than a text book knowledge of history. There is all the difference in the

world between reciting 'He was crucified, dead, and buried' and repeating it with the addition 'who for us men and for our salvation'.

For these reasons the historic deposit has long constituted a difficulty for the philosophers and theologians—the more so since the application of scientific techniques to the writing of history. Now the deposit has become almost an embarrassment. Not only is it by no means easy to leap from event to value (for the philosophical problem involved seems insoluble), but it is also impossible to be sure about the events in themselves. But need Christianity, it is asked, be burdened with this load? It is no answer, so it is asserted, merely to state that Christianity always has been wedded to this historicism; the real question is: Need it be so any longer and would the Faith be impoverished, that is less true, without such doubtful support? Might it not be even more true? Is it necessary to go on arguing without any hope of certitude, whether this or that event really happened; and anyhow what its significance is? Cannot the historical problem be short circuited altogether and regarded as irrelevant? Whether there was in fact a historic Christ, so it is claimed, doesn't really matter. There probably was. What is undoubtedly true, and no-one can dispute it, is that a satisfying myth has grown up around the 'Christ-event', which now represents a basically true psychological and spiritual pattern. In response to it many have found life, and found it abundantly. What matters is the intrinsic quality of the experience which is engendered by commitment to this pattern. Its status *qua* event in a factual history; or its status ontologically in any metaphysical sense—these are quite irrelevant and anyhow can never be determined. What is important in the myth, as Professor Braithwaite has said, is that it helps 'in expressing the asserters' intention to follow a specified policy of behaviour'. The events of the Christ story are 'true' not because of any factual occurrence, but so long as they 'reinforce the intention of the believer'.

I do not myself accept the thesis of either Bultman or Braithwaite in this matter of historicity. I believe, perhaps I ought to say that I have a hunch, though I have denigrated hunches, that Christianity would dwindle away into a gnosis and that its particular ethical pattern could not be sustained without a substantial historical ground. The Christian dynamic would disappear. But I am grateful to both of these sincere men for calling attention once again to the over-ruling question: 'What do we mean when we say Christianity is true?' Does this imply that certain historically doubtful events happened? And I am also grateful to them for pointing out the difficulty which modern man feels in traditional expositions. It is at this point that we are back where we began—that is with the over-riding need to place in the forefront of both our apologetic and our evangelism the basic claim that Christianity *is* true—and that it is only because it is true that it works. Tradi-

tionally, and I must confess that here I feel myself on the side of the traditionalists, its truth has been understood as firmly based on a truth of final existence. The ethical quality of the Christ commitment and all that this involves—these have been seen as linking man up with a transcendental and divine ground. Finally this *must* mean that ultimate existence and absolute value are one and indivisible and it is because of this that in searching for truth passionately a man will not be forced to be moral against the Universe. If he seeks *existence* with integrity he will be challenged by *love*. It is because of this basic conviction, which is an assumption of faith even if a presumption in philosophy, that I find myself ill at ease with techniques of conversion which are designed rather to elicit a conditioned reaction than a fully free and personal response. When we begin to ask ourselves what the *nature* of Christian Truth is we soon recognise how impossible it is to blitz a man into it. Contrary to long cherished opinion it is not always difficult to make a horse drink water; but it is beyond the realms of possibility to *make* a man espouse the cause of virtue even by using the most subtle means of coercion which modern totalitarianism and advertising expertise have devised. Saving truth can only be spiritually discerned, and it ceases to save when it is not freely sought and freely accepted. To respond to value—indeed even to recognise it—is not like an assent to a proposition which compels acceptance, as do some of the laws of physics or even the evidence for the fact that Queen Victoria died in the Isle of Wight. Certitude of this kind, and at this level, cannot be found in religion nor is it desirable. Commitment to value, to Christ, is not equivalent to faith in a time-table but moves more in the world of trust in a person—though it moves far beyond this. To enter into such a commitment is a true knowledge but it is difficult for modern man, by reason of the technological condition of the age, to understand this. His almost unconscious presupposition is that all truth must conform to the *same* criteria—that is to the criteria required in the examination of sensible phenomena. Religion does not seem so to conform, and therefore must inevitably represent a kind of half real, subjective, precarious knowledge, more akin to opinion. So is modern man's hold on religious truth weakened, and he feels he is not fully sincere in a profession of it. Its truth is suspect; and it is for this reason I suppose that a great deal of Church going often represents a nostalgic sentimentality which recalls the School chapel; or makes for a psychological let-up after the grind of business. I recall vividly the heading of a leading article in a morning newspaper some three days after the Christmas holiday: 'Back to reality'.

It is this kind of attitude which I am sure we have to challenge and to contest: but I am certain we can only do this, and do it effectively, when we set *ourselves* a high standard of integrity: when we do not

use unworthy and cheap arguments to maintain our case; when we see ourselves at one with the sceptic in recognising truth as our loyalty. There are great and severe difficulties in the way of belief, and we must honestly admit them. I suppose that *any* attempt to make sense of, and to interpret, this perplexing universe and the life which moves upon it will have its difficulties. It is not only unfaith but faith which recognises this: and he does scant service to Christian Truth who asserts that it is all transparently simple and without impediment. Well did St. Paul say 'We see through a glass darkly' or as a modern translation has it: 'We see the baffling reflection of reality as in a mirror'; though at another time he could triumphantly claim: 'I live, yet not I: it is Christ that liveth in me'. There is an agnosticism which can be held as a tension within faith. It is for this reason that I have called attention to certain difficulties within a faith which claims to communicate saving truth through a divine revelation in history: and I have suggested that these difficulties cannot be lightly brushed aside.

It is against this background that I bitterly regret the lack of interest shown today in fundamental religious problems. In every age in the history of the Church the question, as to the truth of Christianity, must be raised again and again in different contexts; not to evoke scepticism but to support faith. In our day the meaningfulness of religious language, the nature of religious faith and its validity, even the language of its communication—these are all being called in question by philosopher and Marxist. It is no answer to such attacks to fall back on a self-authenticated biblicism, for if the most perfect scientific scholarship were able to assure us that *this* (and nothing else) was New Testament Christianity, the question would still have to be asked 'So what'—and 'Is it true?' When all is said and done this is finally *the* question which the man in the street asks (as well as the scientist in his laboratory) and he will ask it increasingly in a world where the applied sciences seem to provide assured results. The affect of such success may be to weaken his hold on truths not so easily demonstrated. It is up to the philosophical theologian in one context and the parish priest in another to keep this question of truth, and its wider reference, constantly before all seekers and worshippers so that there may be built up a climate of opinion which once again sees Chistianity as the most rich and rational explanation of the fullest range of man's experience.

What is truth? said jesting Pilate. Perhaps it was, after all, rather a hollow laugh. I hope that at least the members of our Conference will be prepared to stay for the answer.

CONFERENCE SERMON

CHRIST AND HUMAN NEED

By the Rev. G. R. Dunstan, M.A., F.S.A.
(Minor Canon of Westminster Abbey, Clerical Secretary, Church of England Council for Social Work.)

St. John iii. 4. How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?

I

Nicodemus was right: there is no going back. All of us have had this experience, of being born. None of us remembers it. (Some of you, no doubt, know the experience from the other side: you have given birth.) But we all know roughly what happens.

Birth is a delivery from prison. Birth is not the beginning of life. Life began in the prison, in the womb. Life in the prison was complete, in a way: there was food; warmth; security; a certain liberty of movement; a capacity to give pleasure, as well as pain. Above all, there was no awareness of being in prison: no frustration, no knowledge of being shut in.

Birth came, and a delivery from prison. If we were lucky, life was as complete as before: we had food, warmth, security; more liberty of movement; more capacity to give pleasure, and pain. But with birth came something more: with the delivery came an awareness of the deliverer. The unborn child is not aware of his mother; once he is born, he becomes aware.

Birth is a delivery from prison: birth gives knowledge, awareness of the deliverer.

So far so good. But we cannot go back. There is no entering a second time into the womb, to be born. And yet Jesus said we must: 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God'. What did He mean?

II

The theme of our Conference is 'Christ and Human Need'. It would not be difficult to be superficial in an opening sermon on this theme: a diagnosis of our condition; a smack at the Church for being out of touch with our condition, or for 'doing nothing' about it; a topical knock at the Establishment and the Crown appointment of dignitaries; by contrast, a persuasive to belief in the modernity of Christ, how He would have remedied our condition, had He been here; and a peroration on the virtue of love.

Our Lord Jesus Christ was not superficial about human need. He was radical: He said roundly that we must be born again. And He said

this, not to a wicked man, but to a righteous man, a religious man, one of the best of the religious sort whom He encountered. We err if we identify the once-born, the unregenerate, necessarily with the wicked. Recall what we said of the life of the unborn child, imprisoned in the womb: there was food, warmth, security; a certain liberty of movement; a capacity to give pleasure as well as pain; (all of which the ordinary, honest citizen of the world can have); and above all there was no awareness of being in prison, no knowledge of being shut in. And this is the condition and the tragedy of the unregenerate: he has no awareness of being shut in, in an environment which gives him all he appears to need. It is the condition of the unregenerate man, of the unregenerate Church, of the unregenerate society. The need of all three is continually the same, to be born again: that is, to be delivered from prison, and to be made aware of their Deliverer. Our task then, is twofold: it is to discern, and submit to, and so to further, the liberating work of Christ; it is also to make the world aware of its Deliverer.

The work of Christ, and the recognition of Christ: two operations, which we must regard as two. They are often regarded as one, and as the exclusive concern of the Church; we must suspend judgement, for a moment, whether this be so.

III

First, then, what was the liberating, regenerating work which God did in Christ? Let me tell you a story.

Mr. and Mrs. Jones had three children: they had all grown up and gone away from home, to college or to work. The house was rather empty. At that time the local authority Children's Department was looking for foster parents for children in its care. The Joneses said they were willing to take a child: and they were offered a boy of nine. The children's officer told them of his background, and warned them that he would be 'difficult', but she would help them through. (And she did.)

But difficult he was: 'impossible', the husband said sometimes. For seven, eight, nine months they strove to keep the boy, and their home intact. They cared for him, just as they had cared for their own: and every expression of affection was rebuffed. Someone called about truancy from school; the policeman called, about a gang of boys. There were storms by day; nightmares by night. His hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him—except two. Whatever they did for him, he said his real mother could have done better: there was never a better cook than she—the real mother who was always coming to see him, and never came.

This boy was in prison—locked in a world of his own, unaware of what was happening to him; unaware that two people were in travail

to bring him to birth again: a birth, this time not of the flesh but of the spirit.

At last, he became aware: he had been accepted, and loved, and not let down, and he learned to trust people again. He became capable of affection, of accepting it, and of giving in return. He had been born again: delivered from prison, and made aware of his deliverer. Life had been enlarged into a new relationship.

IV

When we speak of this accepting, liberating, regenerating, love of God, we speak of a great mystery. The language of Christian devotion always speaks of Jesus as the Mediator—the One Who brought the love of God fully to mankind; and so became our Deliverer or Redeemer, the One Who brought us out of prison, and gave us this second birth.

We cannot explain what we mean by this. But this we do know: that when we can see, or experience, this liberating, enlarging power exercised by caring people—by foster-parents like the Joneses; by a good priest or school-master or scout-master, with a boy who is going through a difficult patch; by a probation officer, or a social worker, with very limited men and women—then we can understand a little of what Jesus did with people: did in His life, and also in His death; why they called Him their Deliverer, and not theirs only, but the Deliverer, the Redeemer of all mankind, the One Who caused them to be born again and become sons of God.

The death of Jesus was at one with the life: it was the farthest outreach of this liberating love, going with mankind to the depth of human need, into the deep prisonhouse of death. His resurrection was proclaimed by all the apostles as a delivery, as new birth from death, a new life for all mankind; and coupled with it was a proclamation of the name of the Deliverer:

> Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which according to His abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.
>
> *I Peter i.*1 ff.

so opens the *First Epistle General of Peter*. Similarly, in the apostolic preaching after Pentecost, as it is recorded in *Acts,* it is the name of Jesus which is proclaimed, together with His resurrection and the mighty works done by the apostles in His power; it is in the name of Jesus that men are summoned to salvation by baptism, the symbol of the rebirth or regeneration accomplished by the death and resurrection of Christ.

> 'Ye rulers of the people, and elders, . . . be it known unto you all, and to all the people of Israel, that in the name of Jesus Christ of

> Nazareth, whom ye crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even in him doth this man stand here before you whole. . . . And in none other is there salvation: for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved.'
>
> *Acts* iv.8-12

> 'Repent ye, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ.'
>
> *Acts* ii.38

His is the 'name which is above every name' (*Phil.* ii.9, *Eph.* i.21, *Hebrews* i.4) cosmic in the extent of its power. It is clear that those who first wrote of Him saw in Him, His words, acts, relationships, life, death, resurrection, the clear light of the absolute; in Him is no darkness, no shade of contingency, at all. Reinhold Niebuhr did well to remind us of this, in an essay entitled 'Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism'[1] and written to rebuke those who talk glibly of 'love' as the easy remedy for all human ills. It was love which redeemed us, but love to the absolute, love with cosmic power. The day of an exemplarist gospel is past; it is *the work* of the Lord Christ with which we have to do.

V

And yet, experience gives us pause. It is a commonplace of our time that a liberating work, at many points akin to that of Christ, is done among us by men and women who do not profess His name; who may, even, in word repudiate His name. Consider for a moment the mere titles of the papers to be read in this conference. We shall hear about a psychological investigation of conscience, the healing of mental pain, values in education, the meaning of social health. The mere recital of these reminds us of friends and colleagues engaged in psychiatry, in education, in social work, who, in their respective professional relationships, different in kind but all demanding a peculiar sort of caring for people which Christians call love, do exercise a liberating ministry day by day: but not expressly in the name of Christ; it is, they would say, their profession, the truth of which they obey. They do bring their people to a sort of rebirth, delivering them from prison; but they cannot give them a knowledge of their Deliverer, if to speak of Him with faith is the only means.

To this extent their regenerating work is, if theologically judged, incomplete: the fulness of the new life requires growth in relationship, in the knowedge or friendship of Christ and so in His likeness; and a

[1] In *Christian Realism and Political Problems*. (Faber, 1954).

ministry to people which stops short of this is but a preliminary one, preparing people for more. But the Church, far from using this notion of incompleteness as a form of reproach, should rather welcome these ministries as ancilliary to its own, and recognize how impoverished, all too often, are its own skills both in the preliminary ministry and in leading those who have been so delivered into the fuller knowledge of Christ the Deliverer. We cannot claim for Christians or for the Church a monopoly in these ministries, which we must nevertheless recognize as a work of Christ; nor could we claim for the Church today even a leading part in the reconciling of political or industrial estrangement, or in community development in different parts of the world; yet these too we would claim as works of Christ, the Reconciler of mankind.

What then? are we not driven again to our theology, to renew our minds with a Christology higher even than that which has energized—regenerated, we might also say—the Church of our time, namely the recognition of the headship of Christ over His Body, the Church? For the Church to look to Him as Head, the Saviour of the Body, (*Eph.* v.23) is but right, the only hope for the Church's life. But for the Church *to claim* Him as Head, as if He were committed exclusively to the heading of this body, this is to bring Christ down: to forget that He is 'Head *over all things* to the Church', to Whom 'all things are put in subjection' (*Eph.* i.22); 'the Head of all principality and power'. (*Col.* ii.10); the light, not of the Church only, but 'of the world' (*John* viii.12), 'the true light which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world'. (*John* i.9.)

The work of Christ, and the recognition of Christ, are, then, not necessarily one operation but two. Christ the Lord, the Redeemer, the Deliverer is One Who can save by many or by few; and if He pours forth His gifts on men and women who do not recognize whence they come, it is not for us to grudge but rather to rejoice that His work is being done, as the prophet of Israel rejoiced when the Lord called Cyrus his anointed. (*Isaiah* xlv.1). Many in the Church also partake of these gifts: we have our healers, our teachers, our social workers, our industrial officers, our searchers after truth; and they have to master, and to use, the same technical skills as their professional colleagues, and to work with them in the same world. This is necessary, *necessary*—for the Church's ministry to be incarnate thus—if the Church is to perform what is essentially its own task, to make known the Deliverer, in such a way that the world may recognize Him. We do not offer Christ as *one* saviour, a competitor among many others; we preach Him as *the* Saviour, *the* Deliverer, Who is doing His own work wherever men are being delivered and saved. The deepest human need is to recognise Him, to know Him, and to grow up in Him. The Gospel has a saying (*Mt.* xii.43; *Lk.* xi.25) about a man delivered from bondage to an evil

spirit who, for want of this knowledge of his Deliverer, returned to a bondage seven times worse than before.

VI

Here then is the perennial human need: the recognition of Christ. Here too is the mission of the Church: to exhibit Christ, in word, in sacrament, in community, that the world may recognise Him. A boy of seven, the other day, distressed at a picture of starving refugees, the dumb victims of our politics and our wars, was comforted by his mother with motherly advice: 'Don't think about it', she said. His reply burst out through his tears: 'If people thought about it, it wouldn't happen'. Is our need to recognize Christ in the sufferer, and in the healer? in the prisoner, and in his deliverer? in the conflict, and in the reconciler? in the truth, and in the searcher after truth? Is our Church sensitive enough to recognise Him there? and has it the affections, the love of Christ and of people, through which to make Him known? (For this knowledge is not given but through the affections). We hear much of 'communication' today, and of the use of the organs of publicity. They have their uses. But the knowledge which is rebirth is not given this way. The modern church must be a pastoral church—I affirm it, knowing how antique it may sound—a pastoral church, furnished with a ministry, lay and clerical, which is both theologically quickened and practically skilled, and operating in the parishes, within the professions of healing, and teaching, and social work, and in the special communities created by industry, immigrants, learning and the like. I yearn for a pastoral church, exercising a pastoral ministry, having this pastoral end: that men may be born again, given a second birth which is a delivery from their many prisons, and a knowledge and a love of their Deliverer; and therefore for a church which loves men and their world, with affection, with 'bowels of mercies'. *Cor ad cor loquitur*: to the heart, the heart speaks. This is the true evangelism. The Church must first, and continually, be born again.

REVIEWS

THEOLOGY AND HISTORY

In these Wiles Lectures[1] delivered at the University of Belfast in 1959 the late Dean of Winchester discusses in detail 'Some vital issues arising from the revival of interest in Church history during the sixteenth and seventeenth century'. The first is the relationship of ecclesiastical history to other branches of history and also to theology. Justifiably, he claims that ecclesiastical history is inextricably related to political, constitutional and economic history and that no facet of ecclesiastical history can be studied in isolation from the contemporary background of economic and social conditions. In respect of its purpose and method ecclesiastical history stands on an equal footing with other branches of the historical sciences, and the criticisms levelled by Professor E. T. Merill against 'an ecclesiastical temper of mind' which deflects the church historian from the straight path of scholarly rectitude are effectively countered. What then of the relationship between ecclesiastical history and theology? On this complex problem the author reiterates a point of view already elaborated at greater length in his previously published work. Appealing to the philosophical work of R. G. Collingwood he maintains that the historian is confronted not with facts alone but with facts interpenetrated with interpretation. Granted this principle, it is possible for the historian to vindicate the historical character of the N.T. documents where there is constant interpenetration of fact and interpretation. The N.T. then becomes a legitimate field of investigation for the historian. On the *theological* claims of the N.T., the historian *qua* historian is not competent to pronounce any verdict. The historical career of John the Baptist is a matter of fact, to be ascertained by the usual processes of historical investigation. But the interpretation, 'he was sent by God' is an act of faith which strictly falls outside the competence and jurisdiction of the historian. Sharply separating history and theology in this manner, the author nevertheless confesses that two problems remain to vex the historian. The first is that of miracles. Outside the N.T., the problem largely dissolved when ecclesiastical history, on the basis of the usual methods of historical investigation, showed the accounts of the miraculous to be legendary and fictitious. This narrows the scope of the problem to the N.T. evidence of the miraculous. On these, the ecclesiastical historian, maintains the author, must admit that *qua* historian he can pronounce no verdict. 'He is unable to affirm miracle; but most certainly he cannot deny it'. The second problem revolves around the relationship between the historian's own Christian convictions and his work as ecclesiastical historian. Does his Christian faith influence in any way the course of his empirical investigations? There is no discussion of this important and difficult problem. The author is content to voice his own personal conviction that the more one studies ecclesiastical history the more one is convinced 'there's a Divinity doth shape our ends. . . .'

Interesting as this discussion is, some readers may find it disappointing, because the author has not taken the opportunity afforded by the Wiles Lectures to develop further his reflections on the complex problems of the relationship between history and theology. Although in practice it is convenient to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the historical study of the life and ministry of Jesus and the theological interpretation of that life, the *theoretical* justification for this procedure is difficult to discover. And a theoretical framework which would allow for both the historical and theological interpretations of the same past events would also furnish a more satisfactory statement of the relationship between the historian's

[1] *Man as Churchman*, by Norman Sykes. The Wiles Lectures 1959 (Cambridge University Press, 1960. pp. ix + 203).

own personal Christian Faith and his work as a historian than the late Dean of Winchester has been able to offer. But the Dean rightly discerns that this raises issues which are fundamentally more philosophical and theological than historical.

In the book's remaining three essays the author moves freely and authoritatively in his own familiar fields of study. First comes a discussion of Petrine supremacy in the western church from Irenaeus to the Vatican Council. The second surveys the debate from the sixteenth century onwards concerning the relative importance of Scripture and Tradition in formulating doctrine and dogma. The third illustrates one aspect of the church and state conflict in nineteenth and twentieth century Western Europe—in France, Germany and England over universal state education. These essays are all marked by deep scholarly learning, an ability to present the relevant facts clearly, and a style possessing Johnsonian echoes. The three are united by the moral they all implicitly draw, namely that dogmatic *a priori* assertions involving statements about the past are apt to be broken on the wheel of the empirical investigations of the ecclesiastical historian. In this case it is the dogmatisms of the Roman Catholic Church which the late Dean of Winchester takes firmly but courteously in hand to reveal their inadequacies when held up to the clear light of historical investigation. But Protestants, surely, need to take this moral to heart as much as Roman Catholics.

T. A. Roberts

A BRAZIL-NUT BISHOP

Few Anglican bishops in the twentieth century have combined the qualities of scholarship, leadership, and ecclesiastical statesmanship as notably as Arthur Cayley Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester from 1923 to 1945. Mr. Jasper's admirable biography[1] does full justice to Headlam's solid achievements and is equally successful in the portrait of the man, at once formidable, brusque to the point of rudeness, and yet without malice and capable of deep affection and loyalty. Like Garbett, Headlam had a passion for work. But he invites comparison with his contemporary and friend, Hensley Henson. Both were sturdy independents who disagreed much but always respected each other. Henson once compared Headlam to a Brazil nut, 'repulsively hard in the shell and admirable in the kernel'. Sir Michael Sadler described his as a 'fascinating blend of dignity, ferocity and humour'. But, unlike Henson, Headlam did not attract public notice; he was never a well-known figure. Nevertheless he contributed more to ecumenical relations than any other Englishman of his time. The Dean of St. Paul's, in an appreciative Foreword to Mr. Jasper's book, says of Headlam's Bampton Lectures, 'The Doctrine of the Church and Reunion', that it is a book that 'deserves to be read and pondered by all Christians who care for the future of the Church'.

Headlam's powers of diplomacy, administration and foresight served him well in his work of reconstituting King's College and incorporating it in London University. His broad theological sympathies led him to break a long connection with the *Church Quarterly Review* when the editorial policy of that journal was antagonistic to the *Lux Mundi* group. At a later stage he saves the *Review* from extinction and revitalises it as editor.

As Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford Headlam welcomed the advent of Ripon Hall to Oxford, saying to the Rev. H. D. A. Major, its Principal: 'We have two other kinds of Churchmanship here in Oxford and we shall welcome you: but

[1] *Arthur Cayley Headlam—The Life and Letters of a Bishop*, by Ronald Jasper (Faith Press, 1960. 35/-).

don't think that I agree with you, for I don't'. Despite the disagreement, Headlam did not hesitate to send students to Ripon Hall. When an attempt was made to bring a charge of heresy against Mr. Major (as he then was) after the 1921 Girton Conference, Headlam deplored the action of the English Church Union in asking the Convocation of Canterbury to condemn certain statements expressed at the Conference as subversive of the Christian religion. Headlam wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury (28 April, 1922) 'As far as I can judge the whole tendency of the work of the writers of *The Modern Churchman* is definitely constructive. The attacks upon them come from a body of men who seem entirely blind to the many religious difficulties which are aroused at the present day, and who seem not to understand the points at issue in these discussions'.

Headlam again showed his breadth of sympathy when a storm blew up some years later in connection with the Church Congress held in his diocese at Cheltenham in 1928. The Church Union announced that it could not support the Congress because Dr. H. D. A. Major had been invited as one of the speakers. An open letter of protest with nearly a thousand signatures, including that of Lord Halifax, was addressed to Headlam as Bishop of Gloucester and President of the Congress. Again Headlam stood firm and would not be stampeded. 'What I am in effect asked to do is, on the ground of a number of passages divorced from their context, to condemn Dr. Major without giving him the opportunity of stating his case . . . (I believe that Dr. Major) as we all do, feels the difficulty and urgency of the many problems created by the new thought of the day; that he is anxious to defend the truth that he believes; and that he is attempting to build up an apologetic and a philosophy of his faith which is in accordance with modern thought. I do not entirely agree with his method or his statements; but the way to meet them is by open and free discussion.'

Headlam himself was a solid, orthodox, middle-of-the-road Church of England man. As a Bishop he was strong and dignified, free from all pretentiousness and fuss. He would never wear a mitre, which he regarded as a rather ridiculous headdress. In the judgment of Dean Inge his Primary charge was 'the most noteworthy episcopal pronouncement we have had for many years', and *The Modern Churchman* (April-May 1925) expressed the hope that the clergy and churchwardens of the entire provinces of Canterbury and York might digest it.

His outstanding contribution, however, was in the sphere of inter-Church relations. His opposition to the attacks of the Church Union on the South India scheme helped the realisation of that achievement in Church unity. He was the architect of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, and did more than any other Anglican of his time to develop friendly contacts with the Eastern Orthodox Churches. In spite of his ecumenical zeal he was opposed to the formation of the World Council of Churches because he suspected the political leanings and implications of the Life and Work movement. So, too, in the ecclesiastical conflicts of the Nazi regime in Germany, Headlam began by backing the wrong horse. Mr. Jasper's able biography is a mine of information about ecumenical relations and a worthy tribute to one of the few outstanding figures in the twentieth century Anglican episcopate.

W. G. Fallows

THE LATE DR. H. D. A. MAJOR

The family of Dr. Major have invited me to prepare for publication an account of his life and work. I should be most grateful if readers of *The Modern Churchman* who possess letters written by him, or other unpublished materials of biographical interest, would kindly send them to me: any such documents will be copied and returned. There are no doubt others who could supply reminiscences which would be of assistance in writing a work of this kind, and I should be glad to receive these also.

Magdalen College
Oxford.

A. W. Adams

NEWS OF THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION

The Annual Meeting: The Annual Meeting was held at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, on 26 July. The members present expressed their warm support of the Council's invitation to the Bishop of Birmingham to continue in office as President for a further period. The Bishop said that he would be willing to do so for a further twelve months.

Mr. W. G. A. Russell was re-elected Treasurer and, at a subsequent meeting of the Council, the Chairman (the Reverend J. D. Pearce-Higgins), the Vice-Chairman (the Reverend W. G. Fallows) and the Hon. Secretary were re-elected.

The following were elected members of the Council for a period of three years:

Rev. A. W. Adams
J. F. Aitchison, Esq.
Rev. Alan Dunstan
Rev. A. O. Dyson
F. G. Cound, Esq.
Rev. W. G. Fallows
Dr. W. H. C. Frend
Canon A. L. Harriss
Lady K. Oldfield
Dr. K. M. Wood Legh

The New Leaflet. Enclosed in this copy of *The Modern Churchman* is a new leaflet that has been produced for prospective members. The present membership of the Union is a little over 800 and the Council feel that this number could be greatly increased. Members are asked to give the leaflet to someone whom they think may be interested. Further copies may be obtained from the Secretary.

The Modern Churchman as a Christmas Present. It has been suggested that members may like to solve the Christmas present problem by sending *The Modern Churchman* to their friends for twelve months. Those who wish to do so are asked to send the annual subscription of 18/6 to the Secretary together with the name of the person to whom it is to be sent. A suitable card will accompany the first number which will be sent shortly before Christmas. To ensure that copies are available the Secretary would be glad to have the orders by the end of November.

The Annual Conference 1962: The Conference will be held at Somerville College, Oxford, from 7-11 August. The subject will be 'The Christian Church in the World' and the Chairman will be the Reverend H. C. Snape.

Council Meeting: Members of the Council are asked to note that the next meeting of the Council is on Wednesday, 13 December, in London.